The Voices of the Forgotten:

A Case Study of the Sudanese Indigenous Peoples’ Movement

This paper will work to examine the internal dynamics of the social movement that has emerged as a response to the recent conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan. Using the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a guidepost, this research will examine how human rights for the people of Darfur rose to the international agenda. It will work to outline the various initiatives the movement takes as an effort to implement policy through both the United States of America as well as through the United Nations. Moreover, it will examine the successfulness of the movement by examining its impact on creating policy to end the conflict in Darfur.

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For nearly 100 days in 1994 the people of Rwanda systematically slaughtered each other, resulting in the deaths of approximately 800,000 people.[[1]](#footnote--1) When the merciless human rights violations finally subsided the international community was shocked by its own inaction — how was it able to ignore Rwanda so effortlessly after it had seen the atrocities of the Holocaust on the larger part of the European Jewish population? Individuals across the globe vowed to prevent and end all future human rights violations as outlined by the International Bill of Human Rights. And then came the outbreak of violence in a remote region of the world Darfur, Sudan. The Janjaweed – the Devil on Horseback – began ruthlessly taking the lives of thousands of non-Arab Muslim Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit ethnic groups.

 Like Rwanda, state actors turned their backs on the people of Darfur and consequently the world saw the emergence of a social movement fixated on ending the conflict in Darfur. This paper will work to study the social movement that has emerged demanding fair and equal human rights and the ending of the conflict in Darfur. First it will examine the movement’s efforts to end the conflict by means of state actors. When at all possible, advocacy groups will approach their domestic governments if said governments are considered open and representative. However, in the human rights social movement paradigm, the domestic government will generally offer no viable solution. Therefore, the advocacy groups generally must look to the international community to further its agenda of ending the human rights violations. Moreover, this paper outlines the process the movement takes as an effort to successfully lobby the main intergovernmental organization, the United Nations.

This paper will work to examine the internal dynamics of the American based movement demanding the end of human rights violations in Sudan by outlining the various initiatives the movement takes as an effort to implement policy through the United States of America as well as through the United Nations. More importantly it will examine the impact the movement has on ending the violations in Darfur by subsequently illustrating whether or not non-state actors can be influential in creating policy. I argue that the movement uses Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s boomerang pattern as a basic foundation in working to create policy through state actors and the United Nations. However, as shown in Figure 1, I propose the movement must also partake in resource mobilization and grassroots activism as an effort to strengthen its chances of successfully achieving its objectives.



A transnational social movement emerged advocating for universal standards of human rights. Now known as the human rights advocacy movement, it is composed primarily of both international and domestic non-governmental organizations that play a vital role in working to pressure “more powerful actors to take a position.”[[2]](#footnote-0) In order to successfully do so, advocacy groups follow a specific process as an effort to effectively create a suitable policy. According to the authors of *Activists Beyond Borders*, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, advocacy groups (NGOs) follow the boomerang pattern as an effort to successfully reach their objective. As Figure 2 shows domestic NGOs approach its governing body (State A) as an effort to end human rights violations. It suggests that in doing so the NGOs are unsuccessful and must turn to the international community for aid.



Figure 2: Boomerang Pattern[[3]](#footnote-1)

By relaying information these NGOs are able to “bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside.”[[4]](#footnote-2) Subsequently, these larger and international NGOs move to lobby open and representative governments to apply pressure on the state in violation. In addition, these NGOs also lobby the main intergovernmental organization (the United Nations) to pressure the violator to end the violations.

In short, this model proposes that local movements appeal for assistance from the international community when they are unheard at home and when the domestic political opportunity structure is unfavorable. According to Sydney Tarrow, political opportunity structures are “consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent or national – dimensions of the political environment that either encourage or discourage people from using collective action.”[[5]](#footnote-3) Moreover, Tarrow observes that social movements work to achieve its’ objectives through governments that are open and representative.[[6]](#footnote-4) Keck and Sikkink assert that when “channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked… domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside.”[[7]](#footnote-5)

**Creating Policy Through State Actors**

Framing

Since NGOs are likely to find limited political opportunity structures in their domestic governing body, the NGOs will often search out international state actors as a means to achieve its’ objective. Undoubtedly, the governing body the movement infiltrates must be open and representative with political opportunity structures for the movement to be successful. In practice, social movements approach states such as the United States and Western European states for support in ending the violations. The human rights social movement follows a specific pattern as an effort to enable the state actors to take action against the state in violation.

First, advocacy groups learn of an issue and mobilize to bring awareness to the violation being committed. In order to successfully do so, the advocacy groups must properly “frame” the issues at hand. According to David Snow and colleagues, framing can be defined as the “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.”[[8]](#footnote-6) In other words, the advocacy groups frame the issue in such a way that is appealing to the body they are advocating to. Moreover, Snow argues that “by rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective.”[[9]](#footnote-7)

There are other various tactics used by NGOs to create comprehensive frames. Advocacy groups must be have the ability to generate truthful and powerful information in a timely fashion that can be transferred to wherever it will have the largest impact. Keck and Sikkink refer to this process as information politics, and stress that by partaking in it, an effective frame will be created that shows the violation is not “natural nor accidental,” while clearly identifying the violators, and offering a viable solution.[[10]](#footnote-8) Moreover, according to Peter Hans Schmitz, publishing reports and testimonies on human rights violations instills moral outrage in the international community and consequently, garners more public attention.[[11]](#footnote-9)

Another tactic used by advocacy groups to better frame an issue is by applying a specific language that hyperbolizes the issue. By doing so, a more dramatic language to the issue, human rights advocacy groups are able to “dramatize the situations of the of the victims and turn the cold facts into human stories, intended to move people to action.”[[12]](#footnote-10) Advocacy groups can further frame the issue by exploiting symbolic events through what Keck and Sikkink have termed, symbolic politics.[[13]](#footnote-11) For example, the United Nations created Human Rights Day in 1950, and it has since been celebrated globally on December 10th. This event has created an opportunity for human rights advocacy groups to better infiltrate its message to the public. Keck and Sikkink have termed this tactic as symbolic politics, and assert, “symbolic interpretation is part of the process of persuasion by which networks create awareness and expand their constituencies.”[[14]](#footnote-12)

It is important to note that when framing an issue for a specific state, the issue must also be framed in terms of the state’s interests. Keck and Sikkink argue that by linking the issue to money, trade, or prestige, the NGO will be more successful in lobbying to the governing body to become involved.[[15]](#footnote-13) By applying various methods of framing, NGOs can more successfully influence the actions taken by international state actors.

Resource Mobilization

While working to frame the issue, NGOs will also partake in resource mobilization as an means to further achieve its objective. Resource mobilization, constructed by John D. McCarthy, Doug McAadam, and Mayer Zald emphasizes that if movements “are to be sustained for any length of time, require some form of organization: leadership, administrative structure, incentives for participation, and a means for resources and support.”[[16]](#footnote-14) Moreover, John D. McCarthy asserts that advocacy groups must “attempt to mobilize at least some labor, financial support, in-kind support, and legitimacy in order to increase their chances of survival.” Therefore, the smaller activist groups appeal to larger more connected NGOs. In doing so, the message the movement is trying to convey will be better received by its audience, allowing the movement to gain more momentum.

By successfully partaking in resource mobilization the movement will then have the ability to participate in grassroots activism. Additional resources will grant the movement the ability to infiltrate the media, flooding it with its objective. As a result, the movement will have the ability to organize public demonstrations and protests, further educating the public on the issue. As Samantha Powers outlines, political leadership has viewed lack of public outrage as a mandate to notintervene during a crisis.[[17]](#footnote-15) The NGOs influence relies in large part on its “ability to mobilize its own members and affect public opinion via the media.[[18]](#footnote-16)

Once public support has been established, through framing, resource mobilization, and grassroots activism, the NGOs will be more influential when lobbying target actors to take action against the violator. In open and representative governments garnering public support can impact the policy choices of said government. According to Senator Sam Brownback and future president Barak Obama it takes diplomacy, financial resources, and effective security forces to have end genocide.

In a world where these resources are finite, it often takes pressure—pressure from ordinary individuals standing together for an extraordinary cause—to mobilize these resources. In short it takes you.[[19]](#footnote-17)

Garnering public support pressures state actors to take action against the violators. The movement will pressure the target actor to create its own policy that adequately punishes the violator. In addition the movement will simultaneously lobby the target actor to pressure the United Nations to uphold international law and end the violations.

Lobbying State Actors

When lobbying the target actor to create its own policy, NGOs uses what Keck and Sikkink describe as leverage politics. “In order to bring about policy change, the networks need to pressure and persuade more powerful actors. To gain influence the networks seek leverage over more powerful actors

In the United States, human rights groups got leverage by providing policy-makers with information that convinced them to cut off military and economic aid.[[20]](#footnote-18)

By applying information and symbolic politics, as previously talked about, NGOs can successfully apply leverage politics as an effort to achieve its objective.

In addition, the human rights social movement uses accountability politics when lobbying a target actor. This tactic may only be applied if a state has publicly taken a stance on an issue that relates to the movement’s objective. If plausible, the movement will shame the state in the eye of the international community, if the state does not stay true to its word. Keck and Sikkink argue that it is imperative for state actors to be respected by the international community, and that “exposing the distance between discourse and practice…is embarrassing to many governments.” [[21]](#footnote-19) Accountability politics can prove to be a useful method in terms of lobbying a state actor to implement suitable policies.

State Actors via the United Nations

Moreover, the human rights social movement may also lobby state actors to lobby the United Nations to pursue a policy path. The Security Council is mandated by the United Nations Charter to establish peacekeeping operations, international sanctions and authorize military action. The United Nations Security Resolution 1674 “reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”[[22]](#footnote-20) Through means of the Security Council, states are able to influence the United Nations to take action against human rights crimes. While lobbying the state actors to create individual policies to end the violations, the movement may also pressure the state actors to create policies through the United Nations.

The human rights social movement successfully lobbies state actors to end human rights violations through means of individual policies in addition to implementing policies through the United States. The movement does so by firstly starting out as small activist group, advocating for basic human rights. Upon approaching its domestic government, the activist groups are likely to be ineffective, due to limited political opportunity structures. Therefore, the activist groups must appeal to the international community for assistance. It will work to frame the issue as a states interest by using proper language as well as through information and symbolic politics.

The activist groups are then able to follow the process of resource mobilization by aligning with larger NGOs, which will bring more attention to the issue. As a result, the issue will be effectively brought to the public’s attention consequently ensuing public outrage. In doing so, the movement hopes the public’s opinion will pressure the state target actor into pursuing a suitable policy course that works to end the human rights violations.

**Creating Policy Through the United Nations**

Framing and Resource Mobilization

In addition to pursuing state actors to help end human rights violations, the human rights movement also looks to the United Nations for assistance. The process the movement takes to pressure the United Nations to implement policy is similar to that of the state process. Once domestic activist groups encounter limited political opportunity structures, they too will look to the international community for assistance. By correctly framing the issue through the use of information politics, language, and symbolic politics activist groups are able to form a cohesive and comprehensive argument promoting the end of human rights violations. Through resource mobilization, activist groups can align themselves with larger NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. International NGOs such as these have a large political clout, allowing them to successfully achieve the objective of ending human rights violations.

Lobbying the United Nations

The human rights movement works to intervene at the United Nations through means of the Commission. Established in 1946 by the United Nations, its purpose is to promote and create awareness of human rights standards, protect human rights by drafting universal standards, and implement procedures for monitoring and enforcing standards.[[23]](#footnote-21) Under Article 71 of the United Nations Charter, NGOs are granted “consultative status” at the Commission. NGOs are given the opportunity to submit reports, make oral and written interventions, and “consult” with members of the Commission during their deliberations.[[24]](#footnote-22)

 According to Michael W. Hovey, NGOs have six main objectives when interceding at the United Nations. The NGO “must raise the issue, seek sympathetic partners and allies; educate about the issue; work the system; facilitate agreements between disputants; and seek a consensus.”[[25]](#footnote-23) Hovey notes that these steps may not necessarily follow a particular order, but that the first three stages deal with the advocacy role of the NGOs, while the last three are tied to their role as intermediaries. Having consultative status at the UN Commission allows for various NGOs within the movement to infiltrate and lobby the UN into ending the violations.

In addition to consultative status, the human rights social movement simultaneously lobbies the United Nations to end the violations by demanding the application of international laws. The International Bill of Human Rights is an informal title given to the combination of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Together, these international laws provide basic human rights to all individuals. Since the United Nations is responsible for upholding these laws the movement may use accountability politics as a method to impel the United Nations to end the violations. As Keck and Sikkink outline, it is embarrassing when the distance between discourse and practice is exposed to the public.[[26]](#footnote-24) Therefore, the movement may be able to pressure the United Nations into taking action to end the human rights violations by means of accountability politics.

The human rights social movement follows a specific pattern in its attempt to end human rights violations. As outlined above, this process is extremely complex, but enables the movement to successfully achieve its objective. By correctly framing the issue through the use of information politics, language, images, and symbolic politics advocacy groups are able to form a cohesive and comprehensive argument promoting the end of human rights violations. When adjoined with resource mobilization the social movement gains more power and influence, allowing it to further its agenda. The human rights social movement follows this process as a means to pressure both capable state actors and the United Nations into creating policies that will effectively end human rights violations.

**Human Rights Violations in Darfur**

 In recent history Sudan has been plagued by internal conflict and civil war. In 1987 two Sudanese academics documented ethnically targeted mass killings in both the town of ed Da’jen and the war zone of Bahr el Ghazel. A year later, an anonymous report surfaced, titled “Sudan’s Secret Slaughter,” further documenting more ethnically targeted mass killings.[[27]](#footnote-25) While the situation in Darfur worsened, activist groups such as the Massalit Community in Exile and the Sudan Human Rights Organization emerged.

The movement emerged in early 2000, when the Sudan Human Rights Organization began releasing press statements urging the Sudanese government to end the human violations. Various releases were published directly toward the Sudanese government. For example, in 2001, a press release called for the Sudanese Government to Stop the Holocaust of Southerners.[[28]](#footnote-26) Another refers to the government as the “worst violator of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”[[29]](#footnote-27) Numerous press releases went unnoticed by the Sudanese government and the world, and as a result the killings escalated and the situation in Sudan continued to worsen rapidly.

Since 2003 the region of Darfur in Western Sudan has been ravaged by killings, torture and destruction and rape. The conflict began by a rebellion from the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The two groups attacked the Sudanese government in February in protest of the government’s inability to protect villagers from attacks from various nomadic groups. Both the SLA and JEM accuse the Sudanese government of favoring the Arab population.

In addition, both groups were frustrated with the poor quality of life due to the economic marginalization of the region of Darfur. In response, the Sudanese government armed and trained the Afro-Arab Abbala tribes in the Northern Rizeigat region in Sudan. These groups became known as the Janjaweed, ordered to kill and repress the SLA and JEM, that were mainly composed of non-Arab Muslim Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit ethnic groups.[[30]](#footnote-28) While statistics vary, Amnesty International reports that 300,000 men, women and children have died.[[31]](#footnote-29) In addition, 2.6 million have been displaced. Meanwhile according the United Nations over 2.7 million people have been displaced and over 300,000 have died.[[32]](#footnote-30)

 Instead of taking action to end the merciless killings, the Sudanese government ignored the pleas of activists and victims within the country. On Wednesday, June 30th, 2004, a group of 400 Sudanese students gathered at the United Nations offices in Khartoum, Sudan, to deliver a statement about the conflict in Darfur to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The activists collided with policemen who launched teargas grenades and opened fire. One student was killed, while some 15 students were injured in the melee while 48 students were arrested.[[33]](#footnote-31) In addition, the government began kidnapping, torturing, and arresting those condemning them. The various attempts to pressure the Sudanese government to end human violations went unheard.[[34]](#footnote-32) As seen in Keck and Sikkink’s boomerang pattern model, the movement clearly encountered limited political opportunity structure and blockage when appealing to its domestic government structure. In order to end the violations, the Sudan Human Rights Organization undoubtedly had to appeal to the international community.

 In 2003 the Sudan Human Rights Organization issued a press release asking the international community to end the violations. The issued release, titled “Call upon the International Community to Stop the Sudan Government’s Planned Genocide,” used specific language that emphasized the urgency of the situation and the need for assistance. It read,

In a new wave of repressing the Darfur citizens the Sudan Government’s permanent emergency law is heavily empowering local authorities, in response to government’s political frustration and administrative failure, to apply dusk-to-dawn curfew, which would lead in the war conditions of the region to property confiscation and house inspection by State guaranteed extra-judicial powers to the army, police, security, and the government-supported Janjaweed militias in all cities and villages of DarFur [*sic*]. In one word, the Omer Bashir military regime decided to shut out the whole region of DarFur [*sic*] from Sudan and the rest of the world to exercise free-hand crimes against humanity using extreme State terrorism.

These repeatedly transgressing non-constitutional measures are aimed to terrorize the innocent citizens with the fear of genocide beyond all known acts of state terrorism. Under the new curfew, government troops will arrest whoever the government takes by suspicion as leaders, members, or fifth columnists of the DarFur [*sic*] warring groups, burn crops, loot civilian property, torture to death, or extra-judicially kill civilians. Most of all, the African descent DarFurians [*sic*] will be facing the danger of genocide more than ever before.[[35]](#footnote-33)

The domestic NGOs of Sudan had encountered limited political opportunities when it approached its governing body to end the human rights violations. As a result the activist groups appealed to the international community to help further its agenda of ending the violations. By effectively framing the issue to appeal to its international targets the movement bettered its chances of achieving its objective of ending the human rights violations in Darfur.

**Creating Policy Through the United States of America**

Resource Mobilization

Initially the movement faced substantial difficulties in trying to infiltrate itself into the international arena. For a period of time the conflict in Darfur went unnoticed by the media. While domestic NGOs such as the Sudan Human Rights Organization and the Massalit Community in Exile continually appealed for international assistance, their efforts went unanswered. The only media coverage the area received was generally centered on the North-South peace negotiations in Naivasha. Reports of killings in the Darfur region were originally portrayed as a by product of the ongoing ancient tribal hatings. Even when a news article surfaced in 2003 and “Janjaweed,” appeared to be the culprit of another attack on small African village, the international media remained focused on the North-South talks.[[36]](#footnote-34)

After continued efforts from domestic NGOs, the international NGO, Amnesty International first began reporting on the conflict in Darfur. In the Spring of 2003 Amnesty International released an article titled the “Looming Crisis in Darfur.” The article described a pattern of violence emerging in Sudan; a government sponsored movement “sending waves of horsemen named Janjaweed to destroy villages and kill Darfur’s inhabitants.[[37]](#footnote-35) By aligning itself with Amnesty International and other various international NGOs, such as the International Crisis Group[[38]](#footnote-36) the Darfur human rights movement was able to better infiltrate the international community with its agenda. These larger NGOs provided the movement with more financial funding, more man-power, and greater access to the media.

Soon after, “heart-wrenching images of children, rapes, and horsemen” began appearing in the media world-wide.[[39]](#footnote-37) It was being infiltrated with “images of innocent Darfurian civilians — men, women, and children — hounded from their homes by ravaging militia.”[[40]](#footnote-38) The United States was no exception, and in 2004 the United States media began focusing serious attention to the issue.[[41]](#footnote-39) Many started categorizing the conflict in Darfur as “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide.” For example, in March 2004 the New York Times published an article pronouncing the conflict as a genocide and called upon the United States to “stand up to genocide.”[[42]](#footnote-40) By using applying a specific language and imagery the movement was able to garner the attention of the citizens of the United States.

In response to the mainstream headlines, advocacy groups began mobilizing in the Unites States. A U.S. based NGO known as the Genocide Intervention Network quickly emerged. Two students from Swarthmore College established the network in October of 2004. After gaining a larger support base, in April of 2005 the network publically launched its “100 Days of Action Campaign” as an effort to bring awareness to the Darfur conflict. This campaign title is strategic and plays upon symbolic politics. It is named after the 100-day genocide in Rwanda, a time where the world stood by and watched the systematic killings of thousands.[[43]](#footnote-41) By referring the to Rwanda genocide the American public is reminded to take action in order to prevent more merciless killings.

In July of 2004 the Save Darfur Coalition was founded in New York City at the Darfur Emergency Summit as an effort to end the human rights violations in Darfur. The event itself is an obvious example of resource mobilization. It was co-sponsored by the United States Holocaust memorial Museum Committee of Conscience, the American Jewish World Service and the City University of New York, more than fifty leaders from human rights, religious, and humanitarian groups.[[44]](#footnote-42) Together the group announced a Call to Action:

The purpose of the statement and of the newly formed Coalition is to raise public awareness and to mobilize North Americans and members of the international community to respond to and help end the atrocities that threaten the lives of two million people in the region.[[45]](#footnote-43)

Today the coalition is a compilation of over 180 human rights organizations. Its mission is to “stand together and unite our voices to raise public awareness and mobilize a massive response to the atrocities in Sudan's western region of Darfur. Moreover it aims to “call on the United States, other governments, the United Nations and regional organizations to focus their efforts on ending this crisis.”[[46]](#footnote-44) Another major player is the student led organization known as STAND, which consists of over 850 chapters at high schools, colleges, and universities.[[47]](#footnote-45) These three networks now work together under the umbrella of the Genocide Intervention Network.

Together the organizations have worked tirelessly to garner the support of the American public. The Save Darfur Coalition launched the “Million Voices for Darfur” campaign on January 22, 2006. The date is symbolic because it is the 55th anniversary of the ratification of the United Nation’s Convention on Genocide. The campaign sought to deliver one million hand-written and electronic postcards from American citizens to former President Bush, all demanding that he support a “multinational force to protect the people of Darfur.” On June 29, 2006 the millionth postcard was jointly signed by Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and then Senator Hillary Clinton.[[48]](#footnote-46)

The network has successfully used grassroots activism as a means to further garner the support of the American people. It has sponsored various rallies to bring the issue to the attention of the American public. On April 30, 2006 the groups sponsored “Save Darfur: Rally to Stop Genocide” at the National Mall in Washington D.C. There were an estimated 100,000 supporters present, including prominent United States figures such as future President Barack Obama and George Clooney. Moreover Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel and Rwandan survivor Paul Rusesabagina partook in the rally. These figures provided another example of symbolic politics, as they are well known and influential in the American public. The activists also applied further language to the campaign, holding signs calling for “not another Rwanda” and “Never Again, Again.” The latter narrated the various failures to stop genocide in areas such as Germany, Cambodia, Rwanda, Armenia, etc.[[49]](#footnote-47) The media published articles about the rally that reached an audience of an estimated 31 million people.[[50]](#footnote-48)

Furthermore, a former Marine Captain Brian Steidle toured the United States in 2006 advocating for additional security and humanitarian efforts in Darfur. Steidle worked by giving eye-witness accounts and image displays to audiences and educating Americans on how to take action to end the conflict in Darfur. Covering over 21,000 miles and 20 different locations Steidle’s efforts served “as a crucial mechanism for grassroots mobilization in support of the Million Voices for Darfur Campaign and the Rally to Stop Genocide.”[[51]](#footnote-49)

Lobbying the United States of America

By garnering public support the movement was then able to lobby the American Congress to take action against the human rights violations. On July 22, 2004 the United States’ House of Representatives and Senate passed Resolution 467, “Declaring Genocide in Darfur, Sudan.”[[52]](#footnote-50) The Save Darfur Coalition lobbied the United States government to pass legislation that would establish further economic sanctioning against Sudan. As an effort to garner addition public support the movement published ads in various papers reading “Americans Don’t Support Genocide. Our Tax Dollars Shouldn’t Either.”[[53]](#footnote-51)

The United States government responded by introducing the Darfur Genocide Accountability Act: H. R. 1424 on March 17, 2005. The bill was first introduced by representative Donald Payne (D-NJ). There were 138 co-sponsors of the bill. It called for the specific sanctions against Sudanese government officials, authorized the president to use for as a means to end genocide, and denied port entry to ships engaged in business in the oil sector of Sudan.[[54]](#footnote-52) Although the bill never passed it set precedent for future congressional action, specifically the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, introduced in June 2005 by former representative Henry Hyde (R-IL). There were 162 co-sponsors of the bill.

After the bill was introduced to legislators the Genocide Intervention Network co-sponsored a National Call-In Day for Darfur. The network bombarded Congressmen with over 10,000 phone calls urging them to pass the bill. As a result of the activism, the network added fifteen additional co-sponsors for the Senate act and thirty-one additional co-sponsors for the House Bill.[[55]](#footnote-53) Initially Congress stalled the bill, but finally voted on April 5, 2006 resulting in a 416 to 3 vote. However, the Senate then revised the bill, stripping an important measure that would have protected states that chose to divest from companies in Sudan. After its revision the DPAA was then passed by an unanimous vote on September 25, 2006 and signed into law by President Bush on October 13, 2006. The Act imposes sanctions against officials identified responsible for genocide by the President and urges the President to deny port entry to any U.S. ships engaged in business in Sudan’s oil sector. However, it the law has had little impact as it was stripped of a key component before becoming a law.[[56]](#footnote-54)

In April of 2006 President Bush issued Executive order 13400, expanding the national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 13067. The original order, issued by President Clinton in 1997 imposed a “trade embargo against the entire territory of Sudan and a total asset freeze against the Government of Sudan.”[[57]](#footnote-55) President Bush’s expansion on the order blocked the property and interests in property of specific individuals found in connection with the conflict in Darfur. In October of 2006 President Bush signed the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (Executive Order 13412). The act upholds EO 13607 and further prohibits all transactions by U.S. persons relating to Sudan’s oil sector.[[58]](#footnote-56)

 In December 2007 the United States government passed another important piece of legislation regarding Sudan. The Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act (SADA) authorizes local and state divestment from companies doing business with the Sudanese government. It also prohibits these companies from receiving U.S. federal government contracts and authorizes states to prohibit contracts.[[59]](#footnote-57)

 The Human Rights movement for Darfur has done an exceptional job in garnering the public support of the American people through resource mobilization and grassroots activism. While there has been some policy created by the United States, it still remains limited and unsuccessful. As a superpower, the United States has the ability to easily impose military sanctions that would immediately end the conflict in Darfur. However, since the invasion of Iraq much of United States’ defense capabilities have been focused on the Middle East. According to the *New Yorker*, the

Bush Administration has declared the death of several hundred thousand people in Darfur to be a case of genocide, but it has devoted only fitful rhetorical outrage and even more fitful attention to the subject. It has declined to offer any American contribution to a United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur, even though President Bush scolded the opening session of the General Assembly last month, saying that the U.N.’s “credibility” is on the line. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, meanwhile, met with representatives of governments at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, in New York, and, according to the Washington *Post*, “renewed her call for Sudan to halt a military offensive in Darfur and yield to international pressure to allow more than 20,000 U.N. peacekeepers to protect civilians there.” The Bush Administration still seems to imagine that the world will jump when America tells it to. But at the U.N. the world wasn’t jumping. If anything, it was laughing.[[60]](#footnote-58)

 The policies the movement has been able to create through the state have been remarkable, because they prove the movement has some influence. However, the policies have done little to end the conflict, indicating the movement’s real inability to create a successful solution in ending the conflict in Darfur.

U.S. Pressure on the United Nations

In addition to lobbying the United States to create its own policy, the movement has also attempted to lobby the United States to pressure and lead the United Nations into action against the conflict in Darfur. For example, at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights held in Geneva, the United States attempted to unite member-states on a policy course for ending the violations in Darfur.[[61]](#footnote-59) Later that year the United States proposed a United Nations Security Council Resolution that would impose an arms embargo, travel ban, and potentially institute sanctions on individual violators. In addition, the United States government has repeatedly pressed the United Nations Security Council to endorse a resolution that would economically sanction Sudan, including an oil embargo.

 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1556 was adopted by thirteen members, while both China and Pakistan abstained from the vote. The resolution gave the government of Sudan thirty days to disarm the Janjaweed and punish human rights violators. If the government failed to meet these requirements economic sanctions would be instituted. [[62]](#footnote-60) Moreover, in September of 2004 the United States proposed a draft resolution finding Sudan in violation of Resolution 1556. The draft also called for an expansion of AU force, international over flights to monitor the situation, prosecution of individuals in violation, and a no-fly zone for Sudanese military aircraft. However, various countries such as China, Russia, and Pakistan objected to the proposed resolution. Consequently, the United Nations Security Council agreed on the adoption of Resolution 1564. The compromised resolution did not find Sudan in violation of Resolution 1556 and therefore no further actions were taken.[[63]](#footnote-61)

While these Resolutions indicate the United States’ has pressured the United Nations to take action, the efforts have been considered nothing more than symbolic actions.[[64]](#footnote-62) The Bush Administration has been criticized by the media and activist groups for labeling the conflict in Darfur a “genocide” solely as a measure to transfer pressure from the United States to the United Nations. Under the December 1948 genocide Convention, the United Nations is required to act to end the genocide.

Moreover, when the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Darfur violence returned with findings of definite war crimes, the United Nations intended to indict the violators through the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the United States hindered the United Nation’s ability to end the conflict in Darfur by suggesting that there be a special tribunal set up instead. The United States protested the use of the ICC because it feared that “some of its own human rights violations, particularly in Iraq, might make it liable to prosecution.”[[65]](#footnote-63) Clearly, the social movement working to end human rights violations in Darfur has had little success in lobbying the United States to pressure the United Nations into creating an appropriate policy that would satisfy its objectives.

**Creating Policy Through the United Nations**

Resource Mobilization

Since its emergence the movement has worked to lobby the United Nations to help end the conflict in Darfur. Groups such as Amnesty International and Human rights hold consultative status at the United Nations, allowing them to lobby the United Nations internally. Both have submitted reports and urged for further funding, but have largely gone unnoticed. Moreover, other NGOs in the movement have publically called on the United Nations to take action in Darfur now. For example, international NGOs have created Global Day for Darfur as an effort to rally public support for UN intervention in Darfur. Thus far, there have been five Global Days for Darfur, established collectively by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Save Darfur Coalition and the International Crisis group.[[66]](#footnote-64)

The annual “Days for Darfur” have been held since 2006 as an effort to draw attention to the conflict and mobilize action among the American public. For example, the first global day for Darfur was held on September 17, 2006. The date was symbolic, marking the first anniversary of the signing of the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document. More than sixties events in forty-two cities were held, all collectively urging the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Darfur.[[67]](#footnote-65) The Second Day for Darfur was held as a measure to pressure world leaders to work in collaboration with the African Union to protect women from rape and sexual brutality in the region of Darfur. In 2007 the movement held the Third Day for Darfur. The date was symbolic because it marked the fourth anniversary of the Darfur crisis. The movement held events in over 200 cities as an effort to call on the UN Secretary-General to demand that governments pressure all sides to stop the violence. That same year the Fourth Day for Darfur was held as an effort to call on the UN General Assembly to maintain efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur and to fully deploy UNAMID peace-keeping forces.[[68]](#footnote-66)

In additional efforts to garner public support NGOs have collectively appealed to the United Nations to implement policy. For example, in a letter written to the Secretary-General Mr. Ki-moon 37 various NGOs collectively urged the United Nations to uphold its Security Council Resolutions as well as further pressure the Sudanese government to end the violations against human rights.[[69]](#footnote-67) Throughout these various demonstrations of resource mobilization and grassroots activism the social movement has been able to successfully garner public support as a means to further its agenda of ending the human rights violations in Darfur.

Lobbying the United Nations

In addition to the minimal success the movement has had in creating policy through the United Nations via state actors, it has also struggled to effectively lobby the United Nations itself. Firstly, it is believed the United Nations did not want to implement a policy toward the conflict in Darfur because it may have hindered the peace process between the North-South conflict. Sir Kieran Prendergast, the undersecretary-general for political affairs and second in command Kofi Annan were both dragging their feet in the issue of Darfur because they did not want to derail the peace process that could potentially end the 21-year long civil war within the country of Sudan. Prendergast, has asserted that “if you could conclude the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, then that would provide a model which would enable you to settle the political side of the Darfur problem.”[[70]](#footnote-68) However, according to Mukesh Kapila, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, the Sudanese government refused to continue the North-South peace process without a long-lasting solution in Darfur.[[71]](#footnote-69) Clearly, the United Nations and the Sudanese government were at a stalemate and the human rights social movement’s attempts to pressure the United Nations to find a viable solution in Darfur went unnoticed.

Moreover, when the United Nations does work to implement policy toward the conflict in Darfur its efforts are hindered by member states. For example, the main body that would implement policy toward Sudanese government is the Security Council. One of its permanent members, with veto power is China. China has consistently blocked UN policy regarding Sudan because it has close business ties with the country. Currently, China is Sudan’s largest investor in the oil sector.[[72]](#footnote-70) As a result, China has consistently put its’ own self-interests ahead of the victims of Darfur by crippling the policy of the United Nations toward Sudan.

In addition, when the United Nations does implement a policy toward the conflict in Darfur it is undermined by the domestic government itself. For example, on August 31, 2006 the United Nations Security Council ratified Resolution 1706 as a partial solution to the conflict. It was passed with twelve in favor while three members abstained (China, Qatar, and Russia). The resolution calls for 20,600 UN peace-keeping troops and police officers to aid the 7,000 forces deployed by the African Union.[[73]](#footnote-71) However, Sudan has refused to comply with the Resolution, claiming it is an infringement of state sovereignty. The Sudanese government has repeatedly expelled peace-keeping troops from the region.[[74]](#footnote-72)

In January 2005 the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur recommended that the International Criminal Court (ICC) begin an investigation on the conflict in Darfur. In March the United Nation Security Council passed Resolution 1593, mandating the start of an investigation of the conflict in Darfur by the ICC.[[75]](#footnote-73) It declares that the Security Council decides that the

Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully.[[76]](#footnote-74)

In 2005 the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo opened an investigation on the conflict in Darfur. Two years later the ICC prosecutor took action by summoning Ahmad Muhammad Haroun, former Minister of State for the Interior of the Government of Sudan and Mr. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, the alledged leader of the Janjaweed. The Sudanese government ignored the summons, denouncing the court’s jurisdiction. Moreover the ICC prosecutor sent a letter to the Sudanese government requesting the voluntary extradition of the Darfur suspects to the ICC. The Sudanese government continued to ignore the ICC’s requests. As a response, the ICC then issues arrest warrants against Haroun and Kushayb.[[77]](#footnote-75)

On July 14, 2008 the ICC prosecutor requested the indictment of Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir on three counts of genocide, five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes. Even so, the Sudanese government refused to cooperate and continued to violate human rights in the region of Darfur. An arrest warrant was later issued in March for war crimes and crimes against humanity.[[78]](#footnote-76) In response, President Al-Bashir expelled all humanitarian aid agencies from the Darfur Region. A total of thirteen international and three national agencies were forced out of the region.[[79]](#footnote-77) Clearly, the movement cannot successfully enable the United Nations to implement a policy that will end the violations of human rights in the region of Darfur.

 In early 2010 a peace accord was agreed upon as President Al-Bashir announced the ending of the conflict in Darfur. However, the movement has not been able to achieve its objective of ending the human rights violations in Darfur because there has been little agreement on the specifics of the peace accord. In addition continuous violence has continued to hinder the peace process.[[80]](#footnote-78)

 The social movement working to end the human rights violations in Sudan through the United Nations successfully gained momentum and recognition from the international community. The movement has been able to garner substantial public support, but unfortunately public support has not proved to be enough when working to implement policy through the United Nations. The same can be said in respect to the movement’s effort to pressure state actors into ending the genocide. In the case of Darfur the movement has been largely successful in garnering public support through resource mobilization and grassroots activism. And while it has been able to lobby the United States and the United Nations into creating some policy toward Sudan, the policy has proved to be ineffective, as the region remain plagued by continuous human rights violations.

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