Small-State Foreign Policy:
An Analysis of Kiribati, Nauru,
Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu

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By

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Introduction

Choosing a starting point for the study of small state foreign policy is no simple task. There has yet to be a consensus amongst scholars as to what separates small from large states. For example, should small states be judged according to their size, population, military strength or economic capabilities? Also, with regards to foreign policy, is it more beneficial to analyze the systemic role of international organizations, or the individualism of the state? Undoubtedly, these types of questions can become extremely problematic when the foreign policy of small states is considered.

Despite these ambiguous starting points, however, a sizable portion of the literature concerning small state foreign policy still seems to focus on a dichotomy between hegemonic powers and their weaker, less standardized neighbors. Alliance formation is normally a good point to begin such a study. The reasoning for alliances between nations, as the literature often illustrates, is because small states generally seek the protection [i.e., military support] that larger states can provide. It can be extremely beneficial to analyze the relations between large and small states by building on previous concepts of alliance formation.

The purpose of this paper will consequently be to consider the foreign policy of five small island states in the Pacific region, as well as the alliances they form. By examining the effects that “system dominating states” (see, for example, Keohane, 1967, p.295) have on foreign policy, I will test the hypothesis that: small-states seek the protection of larger states via the formation of alliances. The ultimate objective in examining such a hypothesis is to gain a better perspective on how small states might support international organizations such as the UN\(^1\), and accordingly achieve some sort of inference into the types of alliances, if any, that they might be forming.

The first, and most important, reason that this study is imperative to the field of international relations is due to the fact that the selected states are among the UN’s newest members and undoubtedly have a great likelihood of forming alliances that could impact the future of the entire

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\(^1\) See Rothstein, R. L. (1968)
organization. The sheer fact that the states being considered are five of the UN’s eight newest inductees is critical in establishing salience for this paper. The second reason this study is important is because it should be interesting to discover whether small states bring unique perspectives to organizations like the UN. In other words, small states should not be discounted from studies concerning policy making. At the very least, analyzing the perspectives of the South Pacific might eventually result in an increased understanding for international relations as a whole. A final explanation concerning the importance of this study is quite simply because research covering the foreign policy of Oceania is severely lacking in the field of Political Science. And, by comparing previous scholarly research with the current circumstances of five Pacific nations, this article will contribute to the cumulative knowledge of international studies. If used properly, the knowledge gained from this paper could help states recognize their differences, which should ultimately help strengthen positive foreign relations.

**Review of The Literature**

A large portion of past research into small-state foreign policy has focused intently on defining exactly what constitutes a small state (Liska, 1968; Osgood, 1968; East, 1975). Many definitions have been constructed, but certainly none have gone undisputed. In due course, however, semantics have forced scholars to delineate between small and large states. Some of the definitions are concerned with a state’s size and population (Vital, 1967), others are more abstract and are concerned with issues of political power and the formation of alliances (Rothstein, 1968), while some are purely interested in the systemic roles that state leaders create for their countries (Keohane, 1969). Conversely, even though this paper will discuss small state foreign policy, it will not attempt to create a definition by which states can be measured. Rather, alliance formation will be the focus, with only a brief section explaining why the five states in this study were selected as being small in stature.

In addition to the sometimes contested definitions of size, many leading scholars on small state foreign policy (Vital, 1967; Rothstein, 1968; Keohane, 1969; Singer, 1972; Katzenstein, 1985; East,
Ethridge 1975; Vayrynen, 1983; Espindola, 1987; Sutton, 1987; Sanders, 1989; Hey, 2002) also debate whether or not small states have their own agenda and are willing to engage in “high-risk behavior” (East, 1975, p. 568), or if they are simply pawns in a hegemonic system. As a result of these discussions, however, the research has varied so drastically that it can be difficult to decipher the importance of small states in the area of foreign policy. For example, do small states only seek alliances for the external protection which then allows them to focus on internal issues (Krebs, 1999)? Or, do small states actually help influence global change and/or transform the fate of international organizations by giving their verbal/electoral support (East, 1973)?

As some these questions demonstrate, the literature on small-state foreign policy has also been extremely cognizant of the influence that security issues can have in the construction of interstate amity. In other words, much research of small state foreign policy has stressed alliance formation (Liska, 1968; Osgood, 1968; Rothstein, 1968). For example, as Rothstein noted, the extent to which small states seek alliances often helps define their status as “small powers”, due to the fact that large powers do not need to seek protection (1968). But, as stated earlier, scholars such as Krebs have countered Rothstein’s argument with the idea that weak states seek alliances in order to focus on regional concerns (1999). Nonetheless, these arguments are generally centered around the same principal; that small state foreign policy is riddled with alliances. At the end of the day, it seems difficult to find many scholars debating whether or not these alliances are actually occurring. Rather, the more pertinent question seems to be why they are occurring.

Beyond the discourse of alliance formation and the semantic squabbles that attempt to define small states, another major trend in the literature concerning small-state foreign policy is that it usually only considers European examples (Zahariadis, 1994; Breuning, 1995; Krebs, 1999; Hey, 2002). This, in turn, means that many of the world’s small states are simply omitted from popular discussion and systemic analysis. For example, with the exception of a few works (Anckar & Anckar, 2000), South Pacific foreign policy has gone largely undocumented by scholars of the social sciences. This is
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undoubtedly a major concern for the field of International Relations. Consequently, the following will attempt to shed some light on five of the United Nation’s newest Pacific members – Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu.

Methodology

In order to examine the behavior of small-state foreign policy, I will use data gathered from the United Nation’s General Assembly over the past three years. The data will consist of voting records from a large selection of Resolutions, covering many diverse issues. The particular states that will be considered are (in alphabetical order): Republic of Kiribati (hereafter Kiribati), Republic of Nauru (hereafter Nauru), Palau, The Kingdom of Tonga (hereafter Tonga) and Tuvalu. Palau was the first of the five states in this study to enter the United Nations, and will consequently be underrepresented by merely analyzing resolutions from the past three years. However, in order to include as much information as possible from Tuvalu’s short history in the United Nations, while at the same time representing each state equitably, it is important to begin from the time Tuvalu was admitted into the UN.

Due to the large amount of Resolutions that the UN enacts each year, it would not be feasible to include voting records for every motion. Thus, the particular issues that this paper will include in its analysis shall be: human rights, Middle Eastern conflicts, nuclear proliferation, colonial issues, and US relations with Cuba. Without doubt, the UN is faced with a larger agenda than these issues will represent, but for the purpose of analyzing small state foreign policy, these issues are nonetheless diverse in nature, and should ultimately remain sufficient for identifying common trends in state voting behavior.

The data will reflect voting records from the 56th, 57th and 58th General Assemblies of the United Nations, and will be analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. The framework will compare results from the five Pacific states with the equivalent voting records from the US, France,

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2 Palau was inducted into the United Nations in 1994 under resolution A/RES/49/63 (United Nations, 2003b)
3 Tuvalu was inducted into the United Nations in 2000 under resolution A/RES/55/1 (UN, 2003d).
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Australia and the UK. Regarding this analysis, the two Pacific states with the most actual votes for each issue will be included in the individual analyses. Due to the fact that the Pacific states sometimes do not vote on certain issues, sample sizes would be too small to include each state in every individual analysis.4 However, all five states will be considered in the final portion of the paper, which will analyze all of the individual analyses in an overarching comparison of all the selected issues. Simple percentages and correlation outputs will be a major data source for study.

The particular issues to be analyzed are: human rights (including the situation in Iraq and the situation in the Congo), Middle Eastern conflicts (including Iraqi, Iranian, Palestinian and Israeli situations), colonial issues (including colonialism in the Pacific), and the US-Cuban situation. As has already been stated, voting records from the General Assembly’s 56th, 57th and 58th sessions will be the data source for these issues. All resolutions that ended with a vote taken were considered, and those chosen were carefully selected according to their substance. Resolutions overlapping two categories will be considered in both sections. For example, if a resolution involved human rights in Iraq it will be present in the analysis of both human rights and Iraq, and will consequently be considered twice. If a resolution dealt with only one of the selected issues, it will be analyzed only once.

This study will consider a total of 93 different Resolutions, with three being considered twice [e.g., in two different sections]. Concerning the number of Resolutions in each category, the US-Cuba issue considers only three, the issue of territories/colonies considers ten, the issue of nuclear power considers thirteen, the human right section considers twenty-three, and the Middle Eastern section considers forty. Due to relatively small sample sizes, some issues will be necessarily considered in a qualitative manner leaving correlation outputs for the issues with larger sample sizes.

By creating such a design, it should be possible to equally represent all five states, while ultimately not compromising the data with small sample sizes. Also, because the Pacific states that are being analyzed frequently do not vote on issues, nothing will be recorded when no vote was presented.

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4 Of the ninety-five Resolutions, Kiribati, Palau and Tuvalu voted only 5 times, 30 times and 34 times, respectively (UN, 2003d).
Omitting such data will obviously reduce the overall sample, however it would not be appropriate to allow absent votes to sway the general correlations. Regardless of whether or not the Pacific islands were attempting to make a point by not voting, this data will not be considered in the formation of alliances. Abstentions will, however, be included as a recorded vote.

As far as defining the formation of alliances, both simple percentages and strengths of correlation between the Pacific states and the Western powers will be considered. In other words, the more similar two states are in terms of UN voting behavior, the stronger the alliance will be measured. Obviously correlations of .50 and above will be considered to have more potential for alliance than would a negative relationship. However, for the most part, relationships will need to have a correlation above .70 to be considered as having a considerable effect. In addition, when correlation outputs are conducted, only statistically significant relationships\(^5\) will be considered.

There were three basic reasons why the comparison states [e.g., US, France, Australia and the UK] were chosen. The first reason is because they were all, at one time or another, in direct control over at least one of the Pacific states at hand (Central Intelligence Agency, 2003). The second reason is because these states represent three major regions of the world; located in the Pacific, Europe and North America (CIA, 2003). The final reason for choosing these states was that the US, France and the UK are all permanent members of the UN Security Council (United Nations, 2003c), and Australia is often considered to be the major power in the Pacific region. In order to effectively analyze alliances between small and large states, these countries should represent a solid base for comparison.

Considering the strengths and weaknesses of this approach, one possible drawback is that both the length of membership and voting history for the states being examined are relatively short. The only way to compensate for this, however, would be to add data from small states that have been members of the UN for longer periods of time. Yet, in so doing, the freshness of this study would be

\(^5\) Statistical Significance will be measured at \(p = .05\) or less.
completely undermined. Moreover, by studying new inductees, it might possible to get a sense of alliance formation at its early stages

Another possible weakness for any small-state analysis returns to the fundamental dilemma of what exactly constitutes a small state. Depending on what one uses to measure small states, it could be true that there are only a few super powers in the world, thus making all other states small by comparison. However, as this paper will demonstrate, the five states in question are indeed small by almost any explanation of the word. Therefore, the following section will demonstrate that physical size, population and economic capabilities all point to the fact that the states being considered are undoubtedly small.

Finally, with regards to the relative strength of this paper, by applying leading theories of political alliances and small state foreign policy (see, for example, Rothstein, 1968; Vital, 1969), it should become possible to test theories that have been largely accepted but rarely applied to the Pacific region. In addition to testing theories, this paper will use the collected data to make inferences into the types of alliances that might have potential for the future. Predictability of small state foreign policy is the ultimate goal of this work.

**Explaining Small States**

As has already been stated, there are many different ways in which small states can be defined. However, the defining characteristics for this study will simply include: physical size, population and economic capability. If this logic is accepted, then it stands to reason that all five states being considered are indeed small. For example, as table 1 demonstrates, the mean area for the five states is 413 Km Squared, the mean population is 50,000 inhabitants and the mean Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is an annual US $112 million.6

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6 Individual statistics were retrieved from the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Factbook (2003).


Table 1 | Explanation of Small States
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Area (Km Sq.) | Population (In thousands) | GDP (In $U.S. millions)
Kiribati | 811 | 99 | 79
Nauru | 21 | 13 | 60
Palau | 458 | 20 | 174
Tonga | 748 | 108 | 236
Tuvalu | 26 | 11 | 12

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MEAN SCORE = | 413 | 50 | 112
Standard Deviation = | 380 | 49 | 91
N = | 5 | 5 | 5

Note: Data developed from the Central Intelligence Agency – 2003.

In simple terms, the mean area for the five states is barely more than twice the size of Washington D.C., their mean population is almost one/six thousandth when compared to that of the United States, and their mean GDP is practically incomparable to the US’s 10.4 trillion equivalent\(^7\) (CIA, 2003). Regardless of the starting point, or semantic quarrel, these statistics are fairly convincing insomuch that the five states are generally small in size, population and economic capabilities. Given this argument, it seems that these categories are more than sufficient for defining Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu as small states and thus justifying the remainder of this study.

**United Nations Voting Behavior**

After accepting that the five Pacific states being considered are, in fact, small by measures of size, population and economic potential, it then becomes possible to transition into the substantive analysis of this essay. As noted in the literature review, small state foreign policy is often characterized via alliances with larger states. Consequently, the remainder of this paper will analyze whether UN alliances are being formed by Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu. And, if so, what types of alliances they are [e.g., alliances with larger states, or intrastate alliances].

As Rothstein aptly noted, “Small Powers are something more than or different from Great Powers writ small” (1968). If this is true, then it can be very dangerous to generalize about the

\(^7\) The US GDP is approximately ninety three thousand times larger than the mean GDP for Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu (CIA, 2003).
behavior of small states. Likewise, it seems that if anything useful is to be gained from an analysis of small state foreign policy, actual behavior from historical events can be the best point of departure. United Nations voting behavior is useful because it is well documented and very difficult to manipulate. Generalizations seem highly unlikely with this type of methodology. By analyzing a broad range of issues, it should be possible to determine whether small states do, in fact, differ from large states with regards to voting behavior.

**US–Cuban Relations**

The US-Cuban concern was chosen for this study because there was at least one Resolution on the issue from each of the three Assemblies being analyzed. Also, it seems that by looking at an issue that directly affects one of the comparison states [e.g., the US], it should be obtusely obvious if any of the Pacific states are taking sides with the US. Because statistical significance would not occur with such a small sample, it would be impossible to quantitatively test the results in this section. Thus, qualitative analysis is the method that has been chosen.

By looking at voting records from the three resolutions concerning US-Cuban relations over a three-year period, it becomes possible to see that none of the Pacific states supported the US in their voting behavior. In fact, as voting records show, it is very rare that all five states vote on a particular issue, but in the 58th Assembly there was a vote present from each island nation, and none were in alignment with the US in terms of keeping Cuban embargos in place (UN, 2003d). Thus, it seems that at least for the issue concerning the US ending its economic, commercial and financial embargos with Cuba, the five Pacific states have not formed a political alliance with the US. Though, it should also be noted that France, the UK and Australia all voted contra the US (UN, 2003d), making it unanimous amongst all the states being considered, excepting the US, that the trade embargos against Cuba should be ended.

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8 The bibliographic information for the three resolutions is: A/RES/56/9, A/RES/57/11 and A/RES/58/7 (United Nations, 2003d).
9 Of the ninety-five resolutions considered, this was the only one that had a vote present from all five states.
What this demonstrates is that if there is any sort of alliance being formed by the Pacific states with regards to the Cuban embargo, that it is certainly not occurring with the US. Rather, there seems to be a sort of alliance forming between the Pacific states, France, the UK and Australia. What is somewhat surprising about these results is that out of all the comparison states, the US could probably offer the most military protection\(^{10}\), yet an alliance between the Pacific states and the US is not what seems to be occurring.

This analysis is strong not only because it shows voting behavior over a three year period, but it also includes votes from all five Pacific states. But, as was already eluded, due to the fact that there were only three resolutions on the topic of US-Cuban relations, the results are by no means conclusive. Rather, what seems most useful at this point is to add to these findings by analyzing resolutions which concern a broader range of issues, and will ultimately boost the overall sample size. By doing this it should then be possible to see whether or not the Pacific states remain in alliance with France, the UK and Australia, while opposing the US on other issues. This should ultimately define whether the votes on US-Cuban relations were merely a trend, or if they are constant result.

**Nuclear Weapons**

Issues of nuclear weaponry generally grab the attention of all states in the world. Due to the devastating effect that nuclear warfare poses, it seems that small states would either want to rid the world of all nuclear arms, or simply take sides with those who possess the weapons [e.g., form alliances]. After analyzing UN resolutions, it seems that Pacific states are no exception. Of the five Pacific nations in this study, Tonga and Nauru were the only two states that voted with any sort of frequency on issues of nuclear weapons. Thus, they will be compared separately with the four Western states to determine if alliances were being formed with regards to their views on nuclear weaponry.

Concerning nuclear potential, there were twenty votes considered from the three Assemblies, and the results show that Tonga and Nauru voted in agreement with each other sixteen times (UN, 10 The US occupation of Guam (CIA, 2003), as well as a large military budget (CIA, 2003) both suggest that the US would be the most ready source for military protection in the Pacific.)
This is an eighty percent agreement between the two most frequently voting Pacific states in the study.\textsuperscript{11} In all, Nauru voted for nuclear disarmament ninety percent of the time, and Tonga voted for disarmament eighty-five percent of the time. This relationship seemed to be the strongest overall voting alliance for the Pacific states. The Western states of the US, France, UK and Australia only voted for nuclear disarmament 5%, 30%, 30% and 30% of the time, respectively. Obviously it appears that Tonga and Tuvalu are not on the same side as any of the larger states with respect to nuclear weaponry.

The results show that Tonga and Nauru are voting in alliance with one another. But, in contrast to the US-Cuban votes, they are not tending to take the side of any of the large states. Rather Tonga and Nauru are voting against the large states, only forming an internal alliance amongst small states. However, much the same as the first example, this analysis only shows voting trends for one particular issue. It will be most useful at this point to analyze Pacific voting behavior on yet another issue to determine whether this finding holds constant. The next section will discuss the existence of alliances on territory/colonial concerns.

\textbf{Territories/Colonial Issues}

For issues concerning territories and colonial issues, the two Pacific states that had the highest amount of votes were Tonga and Tuvalu. Of the ten Resolutions concerning this issue, Tonga voted a total of eight times, with seven votes being “yes” votes in favor of granting independence to non-self governing territories, and the other an abstention (2003d). Tuvalu, in comparison, had only five votes, all of which were “yes” votes (2003d). Interpreting these data seems fairly simple in that they tend to suggest congruence between Tonga and Tuvalu’s voting behaviors. Even though the two countries did not vote the same amount of times, there was only one difference in their voting behavior, and that was in the form of an abstention.

\textsuperscript{11} Of the twenty Resolutions, Kiribati only voted for four times, Palau did not vote at all, and Tuvalu voted only once.
By comparing the results of these two countries with the four Western states, it seems that the only country that could even be considered to have been in an alliance with Tonga and Tuvalu was Australia. Australia was certainly out-spoken against decolonization, voting in favor of granting independence to colonies for all ten votes (UN, 2003d). None of the other powers made a “yes” vote for any of the ten Resolutions (2003d). France abstained on all ten Resolutions (2003d). The US abstained four times, and voted against the other six Resolutions (2003d). And the UK abstained six times, and voted against decolonization four times (2003d).

In general what the Resolutions concerning decolonization tend to suggest is that there is again alliances forming between Pacific states, but that this time Australia is also is concordance with the views of the island nations. However, much like the previous sections, it should be conceded that these ten Resolutions are certainly not enough to make any definite conclusions. Rather, when this information is coupled with the voting behavior on nuclear weaponry a clearer picture can begin to emerge. It seems that political alliances are not forming with the UN’s newest Pacific inductees and some of the larger, more dominating nations of the world (with the exception of Australia voting to end decolonization). The following sections will present an even more diverse set of examples, giving ever-larger sample sizes. By the final section, in which all five Pacific states will be correlated, it should be possible to see what types of trends are emerging for alliance formations.

Human Rights

There were twenty-three Resolutions in which human rights were voted upon for the three Assemblies at hand. In contrast to the previous sections, human rights has a larger sample size, and is not generally considered an issue that any of the selected states are accused of abusing. Thus, this section should be a nice test for unbiased alliance formation.

The two Pacific states with the most amount of votes for these section were Nauru and Palau. Nauru had thirteen votes and Palau had fourteen (UN, 2003d). The totals for each country, however, were not conclusive for determining alliance formation, insomuch that neither tended to vote in any
particular way. Thus, simply comparing percentages would not be decisive in concluded any particular
alliance formation. It was decided instead that conducting a simple bivariate correlation would be
more useful. And, as table 2 demonstrates, there are only three statistically significant correlations
between Pacific states and the four Western powers.

The first significant correlation is between Nauru and the UK. The problem, however, is that
Pearson’s correlation is demonstrating a negative relationship. This information is tending to indicate
that, in regards to human rights, Nauru is not forming any political alliances with the Western powers.
Moreover, to further support the findings of the previous section, in which the Pacific states were only
forming alliances with Australia and each other, Palau’s strongest relationship is with Australia.
Though Palau also has a statistically significant relationship with France, Pearson’s correlation is a
.567, which tends to demonstrate only a moderately strong relationship. However, Palau does show a
Pearson’s correlation of .881 for its relation with Australia.

What the votes on human rights tend to suggest, more than anything else, is that the strongest
alliance being formed is one between Palau and Australia. However, other than this relationship, the
abovementioned correlations tend to illustrate very little for the existence of political alliances between
the Pacific states and Western powers. Because the UN is not accusing any of the nine states involved
in this study for violating human right issues [e.g., human rights is a fairly neutral subject], and
because there were twenty-three Resolutions included in the correlation output, these results leave very

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<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Correlation of Human Rights Votes</th>
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<td>PALAU</td>
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Note: data developed from the United Nations -- 2003d.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
little to be disputed. However, by further examining one more issue, which will include an even larger sample size, it should be even easier to determine whether political alliances are forming between the selected Pacific states and the four Western powers, or whether intrastate alliances between Pacific nations are more prevalent.

**Middle Eastern Conflicts**

The data in this section is by far and away the heaviest in terms of sample size. Of the two Pacific countries being considered, Nauru and Tonga had twenty-seven and twenty-four votes, respectively (UN, 2003d). In terms of alliances, this is the first section in which one of the two Pacific states has seemingly voted in a way that aligns with any Western power other than Australia. For the first time, Tonga had a moderately strong correlation with both France and the UK. In fact, the only Western power that Tonga did not seem to build a correlation with was the US. As table 3 demonstrates, Tonga seemed to be very active in terms of voting for issues concerning the Middle East, and even appeared to be in sync with the voting behaviors of three Western Powers. In keeping with this analysis, however, it seems that Nauru did not vote in a pattern that reflected any other country’s voting behavior. Also, in this section, contrary to previous sections, Nauru did not even form a voting alliance with the other Pacific nations.

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<td><strong>NAURU</strong></td>
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

What seems to be happening in terms of votes on Middle Eastern conflict is similar to what happened in the US-Cuban section. Though Nauru did not form an alliance with anyone, Tonga
seemingly tended toward every Western country except the US. The correlations that Tonga had with the UK and France were moderately strong, coming just short of the initial .70 standard by which this paper considers a strong relationship. Additionally, its correlation with Australia is larger than the previously stated .70 standard for alliance formation. Thus, it can be said that in terms of the Middle Eastern conflict, Tonga seems to be forming a voting alliance with Australia, and is on the verge of such a friendship with France and the UK. Again, this section tends to demonstrate that if any voting alliances are forming between the Pacific states, they are certainly not occurring with the US. Again, the confusion is in the fact that the US would probably be able to offer the most military protection for the Pacific states, but there is little to no strength in these relationships. At this point it will be useful to compare the results from all of the previous sections, in one overarching analysis which will include data from all five Pacific states at the same time.

**Final Analysis**

As was stated at the beginning of this paper, this section will deal specifically with the issue of alliance formation between all five Pacific states and all four Western powers. Whereas the other sections selected only the two Pacific countries with the most votes, this section will combine the results from all previous analyses. In general, this analysis will do two things. First, by looking at all of the Resolutions together, the sample size will be large enough to interpret the results from all of the Pacific states. And the second thing that this analysis will do is that it will give an overview of whether or not there are political alliances forming between the Pacific states and Western powers across particular issues. The previous sections were diverse enough to show whether alliances were forming on particular issues. But, this section will balance out the entire paper by determining whether overall alliances are forming. By conducting the study in this way, it should be possible to eliminate the possibility for over generalizing simple trends that have occurred in the individual analyses.

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12 Refer to Table 3.
13 Out of the ninety-six Resolutions recorded, Kiribati only voted six times (UN, 2003d), reducing the statistical significance below the standards of this paper.
First of all, it will be most useful to compare correlation outputs for all of the Pacific states, as they compare to the Western powers. The interpretation will be much the same as the previous sections, insomuch that only statistically significant correlations will be considered, and the threshold for alliance formation will be set at a Pearson’s correlation of approximately .70 or above. However, much the same as previous sections, if there is a correlation close to the .70 level, the situation will be at least be considered for significance.

To begin, running a simple correlation output for all ninety-six Resolutions is suggesting that the previous sections were somewhat correct insomuch that political alliances were not forming with great frequency between the Pacific states and the Western powers. In fact, as table 4 demonstrates, by comparing votes from Pacific states and Western powers, there is only one statistically significant relationship that has a Pearson’s correlation above .50. The interesting fact, though, is that this relationship occurred between Palau, and the US. The previous sections tended to discount alliances forming between Pacific states and the US, but it seems that when comparing voting behavior with data spanning across multiple issues, Palau is most in line with the US.

Tonga has, in essence, formed statistically significant relationships with France, the UK and Australia. Albeit, the problem is that the Pearson correlations are not strong enough to suggest a strong relationship.14 Similarly, Tuvalu’s correlations tended to suggest that if any sort of voting pattern were to emerge, it would be in the form of a negative voting alliance with three of the four Western powers. Concerning Nauru, its voting behavior can be characterized by all sample sizes, but is nonetheless tending to suggest a similar result as Tuvalu, insomuch that no strong relationships seem even remotely possible in the near future. Table four illustrates all of these findings in a very comprehensive manner.

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14 The Pearson correlations between Tonga and France, Tonga and the UK, and Tonga and Australia were .360, .347 and .443, respectively.
## Table 4

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<tr>
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<th>KIRIBATI</th>
<th>NAURU</th>
<th>PALAU</th>
<th>TONGA</th>
<th>TUVALU</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>FRANCE</th>
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Note: data developed from the United Nations, 2003d.

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
(a) Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.
In bringing this section to a close, other than the strong relationship that Palau showed with the US, specific investigation of the other Pacific states tends to agree with the findings from the previous sections. Voting behavior seems to be so varied between Pacific and Western Powers that no real alliances seem to be emerge. Rather, according to table 4, the major alliance that has emerged is one between France and the UK.

Conclusion

The ultimate conclusion to emerge from this research is that UN voting behaviors tend to suggest small state alliances are not always forming between Pacific states and some of the Western world’s most powerful countries. As the review of literature suggested, the occurrence of alliances between small and large states is a phenomenon that is generally accepted by scholars. But, as this study suggested, alliance formation might not be the norm for all small states. Rather, it seems that the selected Pacific states might actually tend more toward intrastate alliances.15

Though this analysis did encounter problems such as small sample sizes, and a lack of voting by Pacific states; by analyzing the largest samples in each section [e.g., US-Cuban relations, nuclear weaponry, territory/colonial issues, human rights and Middle Eastern Conflict], it was nonetheless possible explore correlations between Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu in comparison with four large Western states. Moreover, if the suggestions of this paper are correct, then it stands to reason that the general theories of small state alliance formation need to be further analyzed. Without doubt, the review of literature demonstrated that popular alliance theories have been well tested with European examples. But by testing these theories with examples from the Pacific and UN voting behavior, it seems that they might not be universal.

15 With the exception of the relatively strong relationship between Palau and US voting behaviors.
References


