
Comprising the War on Terror

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Introduction

The president is perhaps the most visible arm of government to the American people. Through the drama of highly televised election campaigns and public speeches, the president is, for most people, the face of government. The president’s communication to the public is spotlighted and given much more attention than other public officials’, such as representatives or senators. Since the president receives more public attention than any other individual in government, it seems natural to analyze presidential rhetoric.

However, why exactly should we examine presidential rhetoric? Are there not other ways to examine a president’s goals and aspirations? One could examine the implemented policies that the president supports. However, one cannot examine the president’s support for a policy without scrutinizing the language and rhetoric he uses to express such support. Additionally, a president can provide support for a policy in a number of different ways using different types of language. Voicing explicit support is obvious, but a president can also support policies by invoking imagery, symbols, and metaphors to give credence to those issues he deems important.

This paper will focus on the imagery, symbols, and metaphors that constitute George W. Bush’s rhetoric on the current “war on terror.” Through an examination of the language that the president employs when speaking about the war on terror, I will elucidate several different categories of rhetoric he uses to describe different aspects of this conflict. Though largely descriptive, I will briefly compare Bush’s current conflict rhetoric with the conflict rhetoric of past presidents. Through this comparison, we will be able to identify any rhetorical strategies that Bush may have borrowed from past presidential conflict language. Moreover, if we accept the premise that presidential rhetoric matters for policy implementation and public opinion
(though some scholars argue we cannot make this assumption, based on the current literature [Medhurst 1996, 214]), then we must move beyond the rhetoric of the current president and examine that of past presidents in similar situations.

Text analysis

As stated above, this examine paper attempts to provide a broad description of Bush’s “war on terror” rhetoric. I examined all presidential weekly radio addresses from September 11, 2001 until August 7, 2004, the televised public statement made by the president on September 11, 2001, and the three State of the Union addresses since September 11, 2001 1. For purposes of this paper, since I am only interested in the symbolism Bush draws upon when speaking on the war on terror, I limited the public statements I examined to those after September 11. Additionally, time constraints forced limitations on how much of the President’s public statements I was able to scrutinize. The president, of course, makes many more public statements than weekly radio addresses and the annual State of the Union. Press briefings and campaign trail speeches are also a major component of presidential rhetoric, and any complete study of Bush’s “terror” language would look at these statements.

When scrutinizing these speeches, I searched for a number of things. First, I wanted to isolate any kind of imagery Bush employed that was unnecessary for the exposition of the main message(s) of the speech. In other words, I looked for symbols and imagery that could have been omitted from the speech, while still allowing the speech to remain cogent to a public audience. Second, after locating such symbols, I attempted to unravel any actor dynamics the symbol or metaphor set up. For example, when the President speaks of the present conflict as

1 Transcripts of all State of the Union addresses and weekly radio addresses were downloaded from www.whitehouse.gov. The President’s address to the nation on September 11, 2001 is widely available, but for this paper, was downloaded from www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911addresstothenation.htm.
“America and the civilized world” against terrorists who “have no regard for innocent life” (3/30/02), this seems to not only be indirectly labeling terrorists as “uncivilized,” but also presenting the goals and actions of the US as more legitimate than the goals of those who are “uncivilized.”

**Varieties of imagery constituting the “war on terror”**

A reasonable question to ask is why I categorized the varieties of symbols I found in the President’s rhetoric. I would contend that Bush himself (rather, his speechwriters) categorized his language on this matter by invoking different metaphors at different times. From the following examination, it is apparent that Bush uses a few common kinds of symbolism most frequently when describing the present conflict.

**Religious imagery**

It is well known that Bush frequently invokes religious imagery when speaking about the war on terror. Most often when this kind of imagery is employed, it seems intended to provide comfort to the listener. In Bush’s televised address to the nation on Sept. 11, he read a quote from Psalm 23 at the end of the speech: “even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for you are with me.” This line was quoted after the president called for prayers for those “whose worlds had been shattered” and to help comfort those whose “sense of security had been threatened.” In other public statements, Bush invokes God toward the end of the speech, usually closing with a reference to God. For example, on November 24, 2001, he ended his radio address by thanking God for “turning suffering into strength and grief into grace.” On December 25, 2001, he maintained that “even in this time of war…we continue to ask God’s blessings on the United States.” On March 30, 2002, after appealing to all those who worship in a church, synagogue, mosque, or temple, he stated that “we
can be confident that evil may be present and it may be strong, but it will not prevail.” This declaration, stated after a relatively lengthy mention of diverse religious imagery, may have been intended to leave the listener with the feeling that “we will prevail” because of the strength stemming from such religious diversity.

One may also examine the timing and frequency of the invocation of religious imagery. From September 11, 2001 to December 25, 2001, Bush utilized references to God and other religious symbols in three separate weekly radio addresses. However, during 2002 there were only two public speeches that used such references: the State of the Union in January, and the radio address of March 30. In 2003, there were three such references: the State of the Union in January, and the radio addresses of April 12 and 19. Thus, religious symbols and references were used more frequently in the months immediately following September 11 than any period since. We can speculate on possible reasons for this irregular usage of such symbols. Perhaps in the months following September 11 the administration felt that the invocation of such symbols could help ease a populace rattled from the attacks. Perhaps the president felt that the use of such commonly known images would provide an opportunity for him to “connect” to the populace, the majority of whom not only shared the concepts and beliefs behind such imagery, but also presumably shared the same emotions (vulnerability, anger, fear, etc.) following the attacks.

Shadow metaphors, darkness, and “evil”

In addition to religious language, another type of frequently employed linguistic device used by the president can be placed in a broad category of references to certain actors as hidden, shadowy, and “evil.” This is the most frequently employed type of imagery used by Bush when
describing the current conflict. He uses these kinds of images more than any type of imagery in the public statements examined here.

Despite the variety of language and characterizations of this theme, some representative statements of this type can given. The word “evil” is invoked in many, if not most, of the speeches examined. On September 15, 2001, Bush tells the listener that the government is planning to “eradicate the evil of terrorism,” and on October 20 states that the “attacks reveal evil at the heart of terrorism, the evil we must fight.” Additionally, on November 24, he reminds the listener that “Thanksgiving this year comes 72 days after…and act of evil that caused…so much suffering,” and on December 11, before Christmas, he again reminds the listener of the “few acts of terrible evil” of a few months before.

Thus, the very word “evil” was invoked quite frequently in the closing months of 2001, immediately following the attacks. However, beginning in 2002, the president’s language shifts slightly. While still mentioning terrorists in his speeches, he seems to ease the use of the word “evil.” For instance, on June 8, 2002, he calls for attacking the “enemy where he hides and plans,” and on September 7 adds that we “must protect our country by relentlessly pursuing terrorists across the Earth.” Shortly after, on September 14, he poses that “we must choose between a world of fear or a world of progress,” and on September 28 declares that “we refuse to live in this future of fear.” Beginning in 2003 on February 15, Bush’s language seems to become slightly more aggressive in his label of terrorists as a “hidden network of killers.” Arising again on August 23, he proclaims that terrorists want the “civilized world to flinch and retreat so they can impose their totalitarian vision,” and on September 27 designates the war on terror as a “struggle between terrorist killers and peaceful nations.” Much later, on May 15, 2004, after the
murder of American journalist Nicholas Berg, the president stated that “terrorists rejoice in the killing of the innocent,” and that “their barbarism cannot be appeased.”

Also present in Bush’s language are characterizations of terrorists as hidden, shadowy actors. For example, on October 13, 2001, he states “our enemy prefers to attack the helpless” and that “he hides from our soldiers,” thus US troops’ efforts to “take away their hiding places.” On November 24, 2001, Bush reasserts that “our enemies hide and plot in many nations,” and that they are “devious and ruthless.” On December 22, when referring to the conflict, he invokes a light/dark metaphor by stating, “a light shines in the darkness, and the darkness shall not overcome it;” this was the speech just before the Christmas holiday. In 2002 on June 8, Bush argues that we must “attack the enemy where he hides and plans,” again invoking an image of terrorists as shadowy, hidden actors.

As with the religious imagery discussed above, one may also examine the timing and frequency of these kinds of metaphors and symbols. In 2001, there was a relatively high frequency of these kinds of images in the president’s language. From September 11 to the end of 2001, the president used these kinds of images seven times, in seven different radio addresses. By comparison, in all of 2002, he employed these images seven times, in as many speeches. In 2003 and 2004, the frequency of these images had fallen considerably, with only three in 2003 and two in the first eight months of 2004. We may speculate as to possible reasons behind this uneven frequency. Perhaps in the months immediately following September 11, the president felt that, as with the religious imagery, characterizing the attackers in such ways would help him connect with a shaken populace; labeling terrorists as “evil” and as acting in shadowy ways would emulate the emotions of the populace at that time. As the attacks became more distant in the past, perhaps Bush and his speechwriters felt that the use of such images were much less
needed, due to a developing focus on Iraq that public shifted attention away from al Qaeda members.

Thus, one can see that the use of “evil” and similar characterizations is quite prevalent in the rhetoric constituting the war on terror.

*Parallels between the war on terror and past conflicts*

While religious symbolism and references to “evil” in Bush’s terror language have been widely noted, less noted are other kinds of metaphors he invokes to characterize the war on terror. One of these types of metaphors occurs when Bush discusses the current conflict in relation to past conflicts. Frequently, he draws parallels between the war on terror and what could be characterized as historically “good” conflicts. The conflicts to which Bush relates most frequently seem to be World War II and the Cold War.

Some examples will illustrate these types of symbols. For instance, on September 29, 2001, Bush tells the public that the “war on terror will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past.” Becoming much more specific, on October 6, as U.S. troops fought against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the president stated that “even as we fight evil regimes we are generous to the people they oppress. Following World War II, America fed and rebuilt Japan and Germany, and their people became some of our closest friends in the world.” On May 25, 2002, he draws an lengthy parallel between Europe and the U.S. working together in the two world wars, and Europe and the U.S. currently working together against “terrorism, poverty, and evil regimes seeking terrible weapons.” Additionally, in the State of the Union address in early 2003, Bush declared that “Hitlerism and Communism were defeated by the allies and the U.S.…and we are called upon again to defend the safety of our people and mankind.”
In addition to these kinds of specific references to past wars, the president also invokes slightly more vague references to images of wars past, without naming them or the actors that were involved in them, while still seeming to want to develop a vision of the war on terror as similar to past conflicts. He attempts this by adopting language traditionally used when discussing the dynamics of past wars. For instance, just after the attacks in the U.S., on September 15, 2001, Bush states that the upcoming war on terror will be “without battlefield or beachheads, but the enemy will still be exposed.” However, shortly after in the radio address on September 29, he states that the “war on terror will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past.” This language seems to be attempting to draw a parallel between the war on terror and the assaults on beaches in the past while simultaneously telling the public that the conflict will be of a different type. However, shortly after on October 13, Bush speaks of “opening new fronts,” and on December 29 informs the listener that there has been “progress on the battlefield.” Mentions of “fronts” are recurrent in late 2001 and throughout 2002. On April 20, August 23, September 21, and November 16, Bush speaks of advances in the war on terror as “advancing on all fronts,” or that the current conflict is a “new kind of war, fought on many fronts.”

While arguably not a war in the traditional or historical sense, Bush’s use of these kinds of images and metaphors seem to be pursuing a certain goal. A possible goal of the employment of this language is for purposes of legitimacy. In general, World War II and the Cold War are two conflicts whose legitimacy is rarely contested (in contrast to the Vietnam War). The United States’ engagement in those wars is regarded by most to be legitimate and/or “just,” given the circumstances and possible losses at stake. The current war on terror, on the other hand, has been a conflict whose legitimacy has been more contested. Critics, both domestically and
abroad, argue that the Bush administration’s particular style of involvement in this war lacks substance and legitimacy. Thus, it is possible that the president has employed the kind of rhetoric described above in order to bring some level of legitimacy to the war on terror. By drawing parallels between past wars whose legitimacy is not questioned and the current war whose legitimacy has been questioned, this would seem to be an attempt to emphasize or create similarities between the two, thus perhaps bestowing an appearance of legitimacy to the war on terror.

*War on terror as “just,” and as a “triumph of freedom”*

Another brand of rhetoric the president has employed is that of the war on terror as a “just” war, and of “freedom” overcoming the enemy. This kind of language does not seem to be used as often as religious imagery or the parallels to past conflicts discussed above, but it still constitutes a distinct approach used by the president in speaking of the war on terror.

Some examples of this type of language will illustrate such imagery. For instance, in the months immediately following the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., Bush ensured the public that “the cause of freedom will prevail” (September 29, 2001), that “freedom will win” (October 20), and that the war on terror can only end “in victory for America and the cause of freedom” (December 29). In 2002, Bush stated that terrorists will not “blackmail freedom-loving nations” (November 23), and that “Americans seek peace in the world, and war is the last option for confronting threats” (December 27). The theme was carried into 2003, with the president claiming that “by our actions in this war, we serve a great and just cause” (April 5), and that “free nations will press on to victory” against terrorist enemies (May 3).

As with the previous categories of imagery and rhetoric, Bush employs this kind of “freedom” and “just cause” language more in the months immediately following September 11,
2001 than in the years after. In the last three months of 2001, the president used instances of this kind of language three times; in 2002, he used it only twice, and three times in 2003. Thus, while the frequency of this language in his radio addresses, and the State of the Union, is clearly less than the previous types of rhetoric, it is similar in that it is used more just after the attacks than anytime after.

The purpose of using this kind of language seems apparent; if the U.S. is on the side of freedom, the enemy cannot be. The U.S. is conducting the war in the name of freedom, and since, through Bush’s language, freedom is “the cause of all mankind,” the U.S.’s conduct of the war presumably has the support of freedom-loving mankind. Thus, this brand of rhetoric may be serving the same purpose as do the parallels with past wars that the Bush has utilized, that is, to bring legitimacy to the war on terror.

Unity

Another particular brand of rhetoric employed, though less so than others, can be categorized as attempting to promote unity. Occasionally in his radio addresses and in the State of the Union, Bush uses such language to remind the public that the U.S. “has suffered a great loss, and found a new unity,” and that the “strength of America is in countless acts of kindness, compassion, and courage” (December 29, 2001). On April 20, 2002, the president affirmed that “the will of our people is strong,” and later on July 7 stated that “more than ever in the lifetimes of most Americans, our flag stands for a true united country. We’ve been united in our grief and we are united in our resolve to protect our people and defeat the enemies of freedom.”

As stated, this language is used less frequently than others discussed above. In 2001, Bush only used a statement such as this once. In all 2002, he used this kind of language five times, and in 2003, once.
Parallels between “war on terror” and rhetoric of past presidents

From the preceding examples, one can see that George Bush employs several different kinds of symbols and metaphors in his rhetoric on the war on terror. These characterizations range from language defining the enemy and the goal(s) of the conflict to unifying rhetoric perhaps utilized to foster a collective sense of “us against them.” I have only examined here the conflict rhetoric of one president. However, if the argument is to be made that presidential rhetoric is important for public opinion formation, presidential goal delineation, and policy implementation, then examination of the rhetoric of one president is not sufficient; one must examine similar rhetoric from past presidents to determine if such rhetoric was important for the same reasons in their respective political contexts.

George Bush’s language constituting the war on terror does seem to bear some similarities to past presidential conflict rhetoric. His characterization of the enemy, his definition of goals for the U.S. in the conflict, and the definition of the range of symbols applicable to the conflict are similar to Eisenhower’s and Reagan’s cold war language describing the nature of the Soviet threat. A brief offering of representative language from each of these presidents will illustrate these similarities.

Presidential Cold War language

Medhurst (1994) offers an in-depth examination of Eisenhower’s presidential language during the cold war. He argues that Eisenhower’s speech, as part of his administration’s psychological warfare program against the Soviets, employed two major themes. The cold war would have to be “extended indefinitely” because 1) the global spread of Communist “barbarism threatened to engulf civilization” and 2) “blocked the road to peace, thus condemning the world

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to a dark and perilous road of nuclear deterrence” until Communism seceded (14). Medhurst argues that Eisenhower’s campaign rhetoric presented a “total threat to freedom” from communism by relying upon the oft-used image of civilization being endangered by a “primitive and barbaric” communism; a general kind of symbolism of “civilization against savagery” (15-16). Eisenhower presented images such as “the forces of good and evil massed and armed” ready to fight, of two roads to peace with the Soviets, one lighted (for the way of peace and cooperation) and one dark (the way of possible mutual annihilation), and of “freedom never being safe in an uncivilized world” (Medurst 1994, 15-18).

Medhurst finds that in general, the language Eisenhower utilized in creating these themes “drew upon culturally sanctioned imagery to reinforce deep national anxieties and inspire unwavering confidence in the face of ceaseless danger. Thus, the Cold War was conducted rhetorically as a profound struggle between absolute good and evil, with the enemy’s unconditional surrender as the only acceptable result” (14)

He also argues that through careful orchestration of his rhetorical strategy, Eisenhower “symbolically transformed the nation’s quest for security into a heroic crusade for universal freedom” (21).

Similarities between such language by Eisenhower and the rhetoric used by Bush seem apparent. Eisenhower’s language of Communist “barbarism threatening to engulf civilization” is quite similar to Bush’s assertions that the US and the rest of the “civilized world are joined together in a great struggle” against terrorists, that “America is leading the world in a titanic struggle against terror,” and that the US and its allies “oppose a great threat to the peace of the world.” Medhurst’s (1994) characterization of Eisenhower’s language pitting the “unwavering” US against the “ceaseless danger” of the USSR is reminiscent of Bush’s frequent characterization of the war on terror as “being fought on many fronts,” the call for an
“unrelenting war against terrorists,” and how the US refuses to “live in the shadow of this ultimate danger [from terrorists].”

It is well known that Reagan frequently used similar rhetoric when speaking of the “evil empire” and the Cold War generally. Kuypers (1997) argues that while these Cold War presidents used such language in describing the Soviets, the Soviets themselves were not necessary “for the creation of a melodrama that capitalizes upon the [notion] of good and evil.”³ After World War II, the USSR was the most dramatic threat to the US, thus it was the Soviets that filled the “evil” role in this “good and evil” metaphor (Kuypers 1997, 27). Fascism in World War II, Communism in the Cold War, and Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War filled the adversarial half of this dichotomy in other conflicts (28).

Similarly, Bush’s use of “good and evil” is reminiscent of Eisenhower’s and Reagan’s use of it. Kuypers’s (1997) argument that this metaphor does not need a specific adversary to be employed is apparent from George W. Bush’s frequent utilization of it. While fascism, communism, and Saddam Hussein may have been previous fillers of the dichotomy, by extension, Bush has placed “terrorists” in this role.

Discussion

From the above offering of some of Bush’s war on terror rhetoric, one sees several different types of symbols he invokes, how often he has invoked them, and how this rhetoric compares to that of past presidents confronting a threat. However, questions about the relevance of presidential conflict rhetoric inevitably arise. Is there any noteworthy reason why we should give any significant weight to the types of metaphors and symbols the president employs when speaking of wars or other conflicts? How is this relevant to policies that are actually implemented, and why should political scientists examine this rhetoric?
Many authors have offered answers to these questions. Edwards (1996) states that those who examine political rhetoric may have many purposes. Some researchers may look at rhetoric for clues it may yield as to the speakers’ goals. Others focus upon speakers’ strategies in “manipulating symbols to achieve those goals.” Others still see the constitution of rhetoric as a “window to the ideas, thought processes, and psychological make-up of speakers” (Edwards 1996, 199). Edwards also says that others have argued that State of the Union addresses fulfill such diverse functions as “creating national unity, sustaining the presidency, tying together the past, present, and future for the public, and adjusting the Congress to new circumstances” (208). Additionally, presidential conflict rhetoric “constitutes the audience as a united community of patriots and enlarges the president’s freedom of action” (209).

Tullis (1987) goes further in defining what presidential rhetoric does. Such rhetoric is “a very special case of executive power because simultaneously it is the means by which an executive can defend the use of force…and is a power itself” (Tullis 1987, 203). Furthermore, he argues that

Rhetorical power is thus not only a form of “communication,” it is also a way of constituting the people to whom it is addressed by furnishing them with the very equipment they need to assess its use—the metaphors, categories, and concepts of political discourse” (203).

Thus, scholars have offered several reasons for the motivation behind examining presidential rhetoric. Applied to the present case, one can speculate on the possible reasons why George Bush employs such images in his language when speaking of the war on terror. The prevalence of religious imagery in his language may, as Edwards (1996) would suggest, reflect the president’s well-known evangelical religious views. The president’s understanding of the conflict through this perspective may be what is reflected in the religious and “evil” imagery.

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Edwards’s (1996) analysis may also suggest that Bush may be using such imagery as Christian symbols, parallels to past wars, and arguments to the righteousness of the conflict to “manipulate them to achieve his goals.” It is arguable that the reason Bush uses such imagery is because it is the kind of imagery with which the populace is familiar. If the populace is able to relate to the repeated use of images that have been culturally and historically ingrained, which are then tied to the rationale for engaging in conflict, this may make it more likely that they would support such a conflict when framed by such discourse. In other words, the use of different types of discourse described above seems to make it easier for the president to relate to the American people; if he is able to frame the war through the same (cultural, religious, etc.) perspectives that Americans have been socialized into, these frames may serve a legitimating function for most people.

This is, of course, speculation. Without evidence, the above claims, including the cited authors’, are conjectures on the likely influence of presidential conflict rhetoric. Edwards (1996) believes that we cannot assume that presidential rhetoric has a direct influence on public opinion or public policy, without having sufficient evidence (214). Edwards also finds that lack of sufficient evidence is a major weakness of the presidential rhetoric research program altogether (214-216).

Despite this drawback, finding evidence for the impact of presidential rhetoric is possible. With a research design that examines presidential rhetoric and combines it with either public opinion data, or combined with a controlled experiment, any influence on the populace that is a result of presidential rhetoric could be isolated. In designing a study using public opinion data, one would need data on public opinion that addressed the same issue the presidential rhetoric of

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interest addresses. Ideally, one would have public opinion data over time, in order to capture any changes in opinion that were influenced by changes or shifts in rhetoric.

On a smaller scale, the influence of rhetoric upon ordinary citizens may also be determined by an experiment. Through controlled conditions, an experiment may be better able to isolate such influence better than survey data, for the simple reason that survey conditions are uncontrolled. Focus groups could be one way of conducting such research. For example, a simple experiment could consist of two groups; researchers could expose the first group to the kind of presidential rhetoric of interest, through televised speeches, and show the second group nothing. This would give one group the “treatment,” while keeping the other group “uncontaminated;” the second group would retain the predispositions with which they started, and the only difference with the other group would be the exposure of the first group to the rhetoric of interest. Hence, any change of opinion in the exposed group may be the result of exposure to the rhetoric. A second experimental option may be to expose one group to presidential rhetoric, while exposing a second group to similar rhetoric from other highly visible public officials other than the president. This may help determine if presidential rhetoric is stronger or weaker in shaping public opinion than the statements of other public officials. A third option would be to examine these effects firsthand, in the field. If one could secure and maintain all the necessary conditions, one could ask to interview a select number of households over a period of time while the members (or select members, such as eldest, the parents, etc.) of the household watched selected types of presidential rhetoric (select speeches or press briefings, for example). If it were possible to maintain control over such an experiment, this could be a way to detect changes in public opinion due to specific language from the commander-in-chief.
Conclusion

As stated at the beginning, this essay is meant to provide a broad characterization of George W. Bush’s rhetoric on the war on terror. It is not an analysis of the effects or direct influences of this language on public opinion, nor does it make definite claims on causal relationships between such variables. However, it does offer informed speculation (original, and from other scholars of presidential rhetoric) on the possible motivations for and effects of the kinds of symbols and imagery used by Bush in the war on terror.

Another limitation of this essay is that it examines only a limited amount of presidential public statements. As stated, weekly radio addresses since September 11, the State of the Union speeches since September 11, and the public statement given by the president on September 11 are the only statements examined here. Ideally, to offer a full and complete characterization of Bush’s language constituting the war on terror, one would examine all public statements by him since September 11. This would include not only the above statements, but also such material as campaign trail speeches and press briefings.