The Militarization of Refugee Camps and its Implications for the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Times of War

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Abstract: This chapter provides the introduction to a larger dissertation project on the causes of refugee camp militarization. Collecting data on individual camps for the years 2003-2004, I test various hypotheses on the causes of militarization, and examine whether baseline assumptions held by UNHCR and humanitarian organizations hold true about the factors related to militarized camps. At the camp and state levels, I examine correlations between size, distance from the border, the presence of security personnel, the nature and cause of the refugee flow, wealth, state capacity, and other factors to examine how and under what conditions refugee camps become sites of conflict, violence, and where military activity takes place, thus undermining humanitarian relief operations. The research is intended to provide policymakers and scholars with insight into the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly in times of war and to shed light on ongoing debates about the role of refugees and non-state actors in contributing to regional conflict processes. This chapter provides an overview of the literature and basis for hypothesis testing.

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Introduction

Much of the literature on conflict and war in international relations theory draws a sharp distinction between inter-state and intra-state wars.\(^1\) While many international relations scholars in the aftermath of World War I and II tended to focus on the dynamics of inter-state wars, the end of the Cold War has led many scholars to shift their attention to the study of civil wars – those that happen within the recognized boundaries of the state.\(^2\) Such studies have focused either on the causes of wars as elite or mass driven phenomena, or they have focused on the strategic interaction and environment in which such conflicts take place.\(^3\) There has also been a burgeoning literature on the role of third party intervention in successfully terminating civil wars as well as studies attempting to explain the duration of wars.\(^4\)

Regardless of whether conflicts are depicted as inter-state or intrastate, however, wars are often accompanied by or even preceded by the displacement of large numbers of innocent civilians. In 2003 alone, ongoing war in Sudan led to the flight of over 112,000 people into Chad. From Liberia an estimated 87,000 fled into neighboring Cote D’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ghana. Approximately 30,000 individuals from the

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1 This idea is taken from Kristian Skrede Gleditsch’s essay, “Transnational Dimensions of War,” Manuscript, University of California, San Diego, May 2003.
Democratic Republic of Congo fled to neighboring regions due to internal war. Cote D’Ivoire drove out an estimated 22,000 civilians and Somalia also saw the disappearance of 14,800 people into neighboring countries due to violence and war among rebel factions and government forces. In all these cases, not only were refugees fleeing war, but violence and war followed these refugees into neighboring countries. In some cases, refugees have been not only the unfortunate by-products of conflict, but have also engaged in violence, contributing to the spread of many of the ongoing wars in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Not surprisingly, the largest refugee populations typically occur in regions that are also the site of regional and ongoing wars. Yet few international relations scholars have undertaken a systematic study of the impact of refugee flows on the spread of war or the durability of peace. In fact, much of the major theoretical perspectives in the literature on international relations theory tend to focus on internal or international rather than transnational dimensions of war. As one scholar has recently stated, “the omission of

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7 According to a recent study by Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugee Flows and the Spread of Civil War,” Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research, Oslo (PRIO), “the presence of refugees from neighboring countries leads to an increased probability of a state experiencing civil war onset. However, political institutions can mediate the effects of migration flows on conflict.” From Abstract.
9 See Gleditsch 2003. A notable exception is in the growing literature on resources as a basis for fueling conflict. Moreover, a few scholars have noted with regard to duration of civil wars, a seeming rise in the duration of civil wars in recent decades, due globalization: “The chances of peace were much lower (in civil wars) in the 1980s and 1990s than they had been previously. It was speculated that this may reflect the
transnational factors from studies of conflict onset is problematic, as there are strong reasons to suspect that the risk of civil war may be influenced by participants and processes outside the boundaries of the nation state.\textsuperscript{10} Such processes and participants include, though they are by no means limited to, refugee flows and the host countries and humanitarian organizations which assist them. Much of our understanding of the dynamics of inter-state and intra-state conflict and war in international relations theory would be enriched by the incorporation of transnational dimensions of war. Examining the impact of refugee flows on the spread of war, and the role of state and non-state actors in mitigating or exacerbating the security impact of these flows is thus meant to fill in a large gap in the literature on the dynamics of conflict in international relations theory.

As scholars and organizations responsible for protecting refugees have noted, the successful management of refugee protection is consequential for the establishment of peace and security in the aftermath of conflict. While state and humanitarian organizations have established numerous institutions to manage refugee flows, it has been done primarily as a humanitarian effort.\textsuperscript{11} Currently the “centerpiece of the international refugee regime,”\textsuperscript{12} the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was established in the aftermath of World War II in 1951 under a limited three-year mandate

\textsuperscript{10} Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego and Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, (PRIO), Norway. May 2003. p. 4
\textsuperscript{11} The UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, established in 1951 confers legal status on refugees, who are defined people who are outside their countries because of a “well-founded fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group, and who cannot or do not want to return home.” UNCHR, State of the World’s Refugees, 2001.
to deal with the massive number of displaced people in Europe. Since then, the mandate of the UNHCR has expanded dramatically to include the protection of refugees, asylum seekers and returnees. In more recent years, numerous humanitarian organizations have arisen to assist refugees in conflict situations and areas undergoing widespread violence and massive human rights violations. As a result, UNHCR has also developed programs and policies meant to address the security implications of refugee assistance. The recently established “Agenda for Protection” and “Global Consultations on Refugee Protection” highlight the growing awareness of the political impact of assistance and the concern on the part of non-state actors to address the security dimensions of humanitarianism, particularly as refugees and humanitarian workers have become targets of violence in various regions.

13 According to a 2002 report published by the UNHCR, the total number of “people of concern” was 19,783,100 (as of January 1, 2002). Of this figure, refugees numbered 12,051,100; asylum seekers, 940,800; returned refugees, 462,700 and IDPs, 6,328,400. “Refugees by numbers 2002.” Since the establishment of the Convention and the 1967 Protocol, regional instruments, such as the 1969 Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention and the 1984 Cartegena Declaration in Latin America expanded have the mandate of the 1951 Convention to include person who have fled because of war or civil conflict. “Refugees by numbers 2002,” p. 5.
14 See Adelman, Howard. “The Use and Abuse of Refugees in Zaire.” In Refugee Manipulation: War Politics and the Abuse of Human Suffering. Stedman, Stephen J. and Fred Tanner. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003: 95-134. The number of NGOs has increased dramatically throughout the 1990s, such that, while UNHCR is often the lead agency in addressing humanitarian crises, such as that which occurred in eastern DRC in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, NGOs are usually called upon as implementing partners to deliver food, medical supplies, water and other relief aid. Among such NGOs, Refugees International, CARE, Oxfam, World Vision, the United States Committee for Refugees, Doctors without Borders and a host of other NGOs. Issues related to coordination and consistency in response have been sources of ongoing discussion and debate within the humanitarian community.
15 Initiated in December 2001, the Global Consultations Process is described on UNCHR’s website as is its “Agenda for Protection” which highlights a renewed commitment and attention to issues of refugee protection. See: http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home?page=PROTECT&id=3b7cea1b4&ID=3b7cea1b4&PUBLISH ER=TWO
While refugee crises has been cast by various international and non-governmental organizations as primarily a humanitarian issue,\textsuperscript{16} the deliberate use of neighboring countries as military bases by refugees has occurred in numerous regions in recent decades: refugees from Namibia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Eritrea launched cross-border attacks from refugee settlements throughout the 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{17} In the 1990s, rebel soldiers who fled as refugees to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Guinea, East Timor and Pakistan also engaged in cross-border combat, drawing upon resources and manpower obtained in these host countries. Population movements have posed significant security problems both for sending and receiving states. According to former US Agency for International Development administrator Brian Atwood: “disintegrating societies and failed states with their civil conflicts and destabilizing refugee flows have emerged as the greatest menace to global stability.”\textsuperscript{18}

Moreover, the “paradox of humanitarian action,” action which “can contradict its fundamental purpose by prolonging the suffering it intends to alleviate,” is the subject of increasing debate as non-state actors responsible for aiding refugees have become implicated in the dynamics of these regional conflicts.\textsuperscript{19} In some regions, such as the Great Lakes region of Africa, Afghanistan, Thailand and Kosovo, humanitarian aid to

refugees has increased the scope of violence by inadvertently providing sites for recruitment and rehabilitation of soldiers outside their home states. Humanitarian aid to refugees has also been diverted to fund and support cross-border raids. \(^{20}\) Refugee camps in particular, have become sites of militarization. \(^{21}\) Rebel groups have used refugee camps in neighboring states to further their political goals at home. \(^{22}\) Yet many existing refugees have not engaged in violence. In Pakistan, refugees engaged in organized political violence during the 1980s but did not in Iran despite the fact that similar populations from Afghanistan flowed into both countries. \(^{23}\) Similarly, refugees from Burundi and Rwanda during the 1990s flowed into the Democratic Republic of Congo, a state that was to become the site of numerous cross-border raids, while Tanzania, another receiving state, remained relatively unaffected by refugee violence, at least among Rwandan refugees on its territory during the same time period. \(^{24}\) Some refugee crises

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\(^{20}\) In fact, there is a burgeoning literature on the role of humanitarian aid organizations in contributing inadvertently to exacerbation of war through the politicization of aid. See works by Terry (2002), Lange & Quinn, Rieff (2003), Barber (1997).

\(^{21}\) Militarization refers to the “non-civilian attributes of refugee populated areas, including inflows of weapons, military training and recruitment. It also includes actions of refugees and/or exiles who engage in non-civilian activity outside the refugee camp, yet who depend on assistance from refugees or international organizations.” Yu, Lisa. “Separating ex-combatants and refugees in Zongo, DRC,” UNHCR, Working Paper No. 60, August 2002. p.1. See also, Karen Jacobsen’s “Memorandum Re: Preserving the Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps and Operations.” October 31, 2000. Fletcher School of Diplomacy. Militarization “happens when a camp becomes subject to military recruitment activities, or houses combatants mixed in with bona fide refugees, or falls under the control of military elements, or is used by military forces as a rear base or as part of a broader military strategy. These kinds of developments lead to the perception by antagonistic forces, either in the country of origin or in the host country, that camps are giving assistance and protection to their enemies, and they are therefore targeted.” p.1 <http://www.lchr.org/conference/MEMOJacobsen.htm>

\(^{22}\) For an excellent discussion on the use of refugee assistance to further rebels’ war aims, see Ben Barber, “Feeding Refugees or War?: The Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1997.

\(^{23}\) For an excellent discussion of the Pakistani case, see Grare, Frederic. “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan.” Refugee Manipulation; War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering. Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner, Eds. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. pp. 57-94. Different outcomes here may be due in part to the fact that Iranian government provided much of the assistance to incoming Afghani refugees. In contrast, its neighbor, Pakistan, coordinated its assistance to refugees with UNHCR but utilized political parties to deliver aid, with the military activity flourishing as a result.

\(^{24}\) In his report to the Security Council on January 25, 1995, Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote, “the refugee population in Zaire tends to include more political, military and militia elements of the former Government than the camps in the United Republic of Tanzania or Burundi and their hostility towards the
have increased the scope of conflicts from civil to regional wars, as occurred in central Africa after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, but many have not. Empirical evidence on refugees and refugee flows indicate that the scope of violence has also increased through the trafficking of small arms and light weapons and the arming of refugees within neighboring states by rebel militias infiltrating and recruiting civilians in refugee settlements.25

While the involvement of displaced persons in rebel movements and conflict is not a new phenomenon, policymakers have become increasingly concerned about the involvement of refugees in organized political violence in recent years. As one scholar Edward Newman has stated: “Refugee flows are demonstrably a source of international – mainly regional – conflict through causing instability in neighboring countries, triggering intervention, and sometimes providing a basis for warrior refugee communities within camps that can form the source of insurgency, resistance, and terrorist movements.”26 Refugee flows have contributed to the spread of conflict in some cases, such as the Great Lakes tragedy of 1994-1997, though it is not clear to what extent host states and humanitarian organizations have been responsible. Moreover, refugees have not only been passive victims, but active participants in many of these conflicts. The complexity of refugee involvement in violence has resulted in an equally varied and ever-

expanding set of policies and measures to promote protection and security on the part of UNHCR.

This dissertation is aimed at examining the causes of refugee violence and the role of host countries and agencies responsible for humanitarian assistance to refugees in addressing the issue. Explanations for the rise of various types of refugee-related violence are presented and examined using original data on incidents of refugee violence in individual refugee camps using information collected from a variety of media sources, interviews, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UNHCR.

Nature and Prevalence of Organized Violence of Refugees

Research presented here provides insight into the prevalence and nature of refugee camp militarization in recent years from 2003-2004. “Militarization” is a term coined by the UNHCR to describe the use of refugee settlements and camps for non-humanitarian purposes, usually as part of a larger ongoing conflict in the host state or neighboring state. An oft-cited UNHCR research paper by Lisa Yu refers to militarization as the “non-civilian attributes of refugee populated areas, including inflows of weapons, military training and recruitment. It also includes actions of refugees and/or exiles who engage in non-civilian activity outside the refugee camp, yet who depend on assistance from refugees or international organizations.”

Preliminary evidence suggests that the factors that contribute to violence among refugees are related in part, to various policies and programs instituted by receiving states and UNHCR. Systematic data collected on state characteristics, policies instituted by aid

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agencies, state and international organizations highlights those factors and conditions which have resulted in the involvement of refugees in violence and its persistence or rise in some cases. As the findings of this research suggest, a one-size-fits-all approach to refugee security may be ineffective in addressing the problem of organized violence given the specific nature and scope of the violence in different countries in recent years.

A systematic quantitative approach to the study of organized violence on the part of refugees is undertaken here to supplement at least several qualitative studies of refugee flows and the spread of conflict.28 Stephen Stedman notes in a recent publication on the impact of refugee assistance on regional security: “Because research into refugee manipulation is so limited, we find it necessary to develop theory rather than test it and have chosen a case study approach for this purpose. Hence our findings about manipulation writ large are tentative and await further research, especially work incorporating larger datasets and quantitative methods.”29 Similarly, Karen Jacobsen has written that “better data collection is needed to fill out significant empirical gaps in our knowledge of refugee populated areas.”30 As of yet, there is no existing database of refugee-related violence nor have hypotheses implied by these qualitative approaches been tested against empirical evidence in any systematic way. Developing a database from which to test hypotheses regarding refugee-related violence would yield greater insight into the validity of existing explanations of refugee violence based on qualitative studies and provide a foundation for further theory development in this under-theorized

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28 See in particular, Sarah Lischer’s work and Fiona Terry’s book, Condemned to Repeat?
area of research.\textsuperscript{31} Systematic data collected on state characteristics, and the policies to promote refugee security and protection are used to test various hypotheses for how and under what conditions refugees settlements become sites of violence.

**Methods and Data for Research on Refugee-related Violence**

Data is obtained primarily from the database of the UNHCR on annual and bi-annual data collected on individual camps worldwide as well as numbers of refugees and settlements within individual countries. Information on refugee settlements and refugees populations within each country are contained in its annual Statistical Yearbook,\textsuperscript{32} in field reports, detailed annual maps and figures as well as UNHCR working papers released by its Evaluation and Policy Unit.\textsuperscript{33} Information is also collected through interviews with officials from UNHCR, and various NGOs, as well as aid workers and field officers responsible for maintaining camps and administering aid to refugees.\textsuperscript{34} In general, I examine only those regions where the UNHCR was the lead agency in delivering aid to refugees since data is obtained from UNHCR.\textsuperscript{35} However, data and

\textsuperscript{31} Loescher, Gil and Monahan, Laila. *Refugees and International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Loescher’s comment regarding the lack of theorizing and systematic research on refugee violence in this volume is applicable today: “Little systematic research has been done into either the political causes of different types of refugee movements or the political, strategic, and economic factors that determine the policy responses of states to refugee crises. Nor has any comprehensive theoretical framework been developed to explain and compare government policies, to analyze the policymaking process in individual countries…(sic) Until recently, there was neither a few data base on refugees, nor any particular coherence in such refugee literature as did exist.” p. 4. For recent books attempting to provide some basis for theorizing refugee violence, see *Global Migrants and Global Refugees: Problems and Solutions*. Aristide R. Zolberg and Peter M. Benda, Eds. New York: Berghahn Books, 2001; *Refugee Manipulation: War Politics and the Abuse of Human Suffering*. Stedman, Stephen J. and Fred Tanner, Eds. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003; Sarah Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil Wars, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*. Ithaca: NY. Cornell University Press, 2005.

\textsuperscript{32} See UNHCR’s website at: [http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics](http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics)

\textsuperscript{33} See UNHCR’s website at: [http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/research?id=3b850c744](http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/research?id=3b850c744)

\textsuperscript{34} Interviews are being conducted with UNHCR officials and the largest NGOs affiliated with UNHCR in its field, operations, such as Doctors Without Borders (MSF), International Rescue Committee (IRC), CARE International, Oxfam, Save the Children and World Vision.

\textsuperscript{35} This is mainly because documented reports on aid and programming is more uniform and can be found and compared more easily than if different agencies are compared across disparate cases. For detailed
information also is available from NGOs since they are often used as implementing partners, designated by UNHCR to assist the agency in procuring and delivering aid. UNHCR works in conjunction with these organizations as well as other partner United Nations agencies, including World Food Program (WFP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to assist refugees, often taking a lead role in coordinating their efforts.36

Literature on Refugee Violence and Theory Debates

Refugee violence has often been understood to be part of an ongoing civil conflict that has spilled across borders into a neighboring state, or part of a regional conflict where porous state borders have resulted in the use of neighboring state territories as de facto military bases (and thus targets) by roving militias.37 Yet the relationship between refugee camp militarization, recently a high priority for humanitarian agencies and UNHCR concerned about the impact of humanitarian assistance on conflict processes, is still under-theorized. The relationship between refugee violence and ongoing violence or war in the host or neighboring countries is unclear. In some cases, refugees are recruited and armed to assist in the fighting of an ongoing civil war in the host country, as occurred in Cote D’Ivoire, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, evidence shows that numerous cases of refugee camp militarization also occur in

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36 In 1993, UNHCR and numerous NGOs established an official agreement, “Partnership in Action,” (PARinAC) with the intention of formalizing coordination among the NGOs and UNHCR for response to emergency humanitarian responses. For more detailed discussion of the agreement and events leading up to it, see, Romero-Perez, Santiago. “Partnership in Action,” Refugees Magazine, Issue 97, September 1, 1994.

37 Numerous examples exist of this type of refugee related violence. Contemporary examples include the Lords’ Resistance Army (LRA) with bases in southern Sudan, Sudanese Liberation People’s Army (SPLA) forces in northern Uganda, ex-Rwandan soldiers in eastern DRC, Burundian militants in Tanzania and Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) soldiers with bases in western Uganda during the 1980s and early 1990s.
countries that are not undergoing civil conflict or inter-state war, as evident from cases of militarization recorded in Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana in 2003. Some scholars have noted that refugees from the same sending states have organized themselves militarily in some host states but not in others. Moreover, the violence occurs in a variety of different forms. In some cases, militants mingle with refugees and use humanitarian assistance within refugee settlements as resources. Refugees may also be recruited for military service, conscripted as child soldiers, or may be used as a cover to provide protection and basic security for kinsmen or family members of soldiers. In other cases, refugees have engaged in violence with members of the host community, local police within the host state, or with aid workers.

*Camp Management and UNHCR Policy*

The UNHCR has established a number of measures to address the problem of violence among and directed at refugees in recent years, including a Global Consultations process and the framework for a graduated response to militarization and refugee violence called the “ladder of options.” Instituted to maintain and promote the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, the procedure calls for the deployment of security and monitoring personnel to refugee hosting areas to assess possible threats to the humanitarian and civilian character of camps, to assess the capacity

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38 Preliminary data results show that 80 out of 236 or 30% of camps were militarized in 2003.
39 Sarah Lischer has written extensive case studies demonstrating this point by examining different levels of political violence instigated by Rwandan refugees in eastern DRC versus Tanzania, Burundian refugees in Tanzania, and Afghani refugees in Iran and Pakistan. See Lischer 2005
40 As occurred in Pakistan when mujahadeen warriors were recruited from the ranks of Afghani refugees in refugee camps along the Pakistani border in the 1970s and 1980s.
41 A recent example of this type of violence is highlighted in refugee camps in eastern Chad where aid workers and local police have become victims of refugee attacks. As well, Jan Egeland, the UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator has indicated that there are tensions between the host and refugee communities over scarce resources. IRINnews “Chad: Four dead, at least three injured in refugee camp clashes,” 12 May 2005.
of states to provide security, and to identify ways of enhancing the capacity of existing
security personnel within host states.\textsuperscript{42} As part of its “ladder of options,” the UNHCR
has also called for technical measures to prevent militarization from occurring in refugee
camps. In much of its publications, UNHCR emphasizes the actual conditions of the
camps themselves as making them more or less susceptible to military activity and
violence. In its most recent \textit{Handbook of Emergencies}, UNHCR recommends variety of
technical measures to address the problem of militarized camps. Such policies include,
but are not limited to:

- Placing camps away from the border\textsuperscript{43}
- Limitations on the population density and size of camps\textsuperscript{44}
- Presence of military protection officers within camps

The \textit{Handbook on Emergencies} provides a list of technical provisions to promote
and protect refugee livelihoods and prevent refugees from becoming targets of violence
or providing officials with the appropriate means to deter the mixing of civilian and
military populations among refugee populations. For example, the closer the camp to the
border of the sending state, the more susceptible it is to militarization. Numerous reports
suggest that camps that are situated close to the border of the sending state are highly
susceptible to militarization. The incidents of violence within these settlements may be
due in part to the experience of violence and genocidal killings in the camps in eastern

\textsuperscript{42} Executive Committee of the UNHCR. “The Security, Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee
Camps and Settlements: Operationalizing the ‘Ladder of Options,’” 18\textsuperscript{th} Standing Committee Meeting, 27

\textsuperscript{43} See \textit{UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Edition, 2002. p. 16: “Refugees should be accommodated
sufficiently far away from the borders of the country of origin to avoid security problems.” See also, p. 19:
“Threats of military attacks originating from the country of origin may be reduced by locating or relocating
camps or settlements a reasonable distance from the border...”; and p. 38, As noted in \textit{UNHCR Handbook
for Emergencies}: The OAU Convention states: “For reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as
possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin (Article II,
paragraph 6, OAU Convention).”
Zaire close to the border with Rwanda that became overrun by genocidiaries and *interahamwe* in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. More recent incidents of militarization have occurred in other countries, such as Uganda and Guinea in settlements close to the border of sending states.

**Cause of Displacement and Level of Political Organization**

In contrast, Sarah Lischer has argued that the level of political organization and group identity of refugees, resulting from the type of conflict or situation they flee from, is likely to affect the likelihood of refugees to engage in violence abroad. She distinguishes between several categories of refugees according to the cause of displacement and level of political organization at the onset of a crisis to indicate the level of probability that refugees will engage in violence. In her formulation, state-in-exile refugees have the highest level of political organization and have experienced direct conflict over the control of the state. “State-in-exile” refugees or those refugees fleeing their native countries due to ethnic cleansing or violence due to their ethnic, linguistic, religious affiliations are more likely to instigate attacks against the sending state or engage in cross-border conflict with the sending state. Persecuted refugees possess some level of a group identity and organization because they have experienced direct oppression based on ascriptive or political ties. Situational refugees are the least likely to engage in violence because they flee due to general chaos and war and are more willing to return to their native country without fundamental changes in the political or social climate.

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44 According to UNHCR policy, camps should be limited to 20,000 individuals per camp. See *UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies*, 2nd Edition, 2002. p. 148
In addition to the level of political organization and the cause of displacement, Sarah Lischer also posits that the propensity for refugees to engage in violence in neighboring counties depends on the receiving state’s capacity and willingness to secure the camps and the borders from their neighboring country. In the case of the DRC in the mid-1990s, President Mobutu Sese Seko failed to secure the borders with neighboring Rwanda, in part because of a weak government that was hamstrung by opposition from numerous factions, particularly in the eastern Kivu province, where many of the Rwandan and Burundian refugees had fled following the genocide.\(^{45}\) Mobutu’s inability to secure the eastern borders of his country, given the lack of control he had over warring factions in this same region, made camps there susceptible to military activity and violence. The situation in eastern Kivu contrasts starkly with Tanzania, where police and military forces were able and willing to secure the border with Rwanda and where the level of military activity and cross-border attacks were minimal during this time period. More importantly, the Tanzanian government had no special interest in encouraging or abetting military activity in their camps; while President Mobutu is reported to have been perceived as abetting ex-FAR and interahamwe forces against the RPF regime after 1994.\(^{46}\)

Lischer’s analysis of the types of refugee flows, characterized by varying levels of political organization gets at an important factor: the propensity of refugees to organize themselves politically and militarily in the host state. However, she emphasizes the

\(^{45}\) President Mobutu faced significant opposition from ethnic groups comprised of Banyarwanda (both Hutu and Tutsi) and indigenous groups in the eastern Kivu province. *State of the World Refugees*, 2002. p. 258.

\(^{46}\) See the *State of the World Refugees Report, 2002*. p. 251-252. “For the shaky government in Kinshasa...the refugees were a potential proxy force, useful to help reassert control of the eastern provinces. For President Mobutu, the refugee issue deflected attention from his government’s mismanagement of the country and thereby offered a chance to regain the international stature he had lost since the end of the Cold War.” See also David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night.*
likelihood of political organization as something intrinsic to the refugees’ identities prior to arriving in the host state, rather than highlighting the incentives refugees face vis-à-vis their standing in the host and the sending state. Though she explains that host state characteristics are also an important determinant of the propensity of refugees to engage in violence, to the extent that host states must be “capable” and “willing” to prevent militarization, these factors are secondary to the baseline requirement that some level of pre-existing political organization must exist for violence to be undertaken by refugees in host states. The burden is then placed on host states (and the international agencies involved in assisting the displaced) to provide the resources needed to make the state “capable” and “willing” – if the will does not already exist – to prevent violence from occurring.

Refugee Warriors – The Static or Dynamic Identity of Refugees

A different approach to the phenomenon of refugee violence has been put forward by Aristide Zolberg. In his analysis of refugee violence, he designates as a distinct category, “refugee warriors,” who have the “capacity for organized violence.”47 According to Zolberg, refugees engage in violence because there is an independently existing motive or predisposition to engage in violence on the part of certain populations or groups that have a prior history of engaging in violence, or they are victims of persecution and violence themselves. According to both Lischer and Zolberg, certain groups of refugees are more likely to engage in violence than others because of the nature and reason for their displacement.48

48 See Lischer 2000, 2002 and Zolberg 1989. The literature on militarization of camps from UNHCR also stresses examining “root causes” of displacement as a means of understanding why refugees become
However, there is a growing awareness among scholars of the open-ended nature of the identity of these so-called “refugee warriors.” Refugee warriors are not the inevitable product of conflict and displacement, but may emerge from a variety of political and social factors that are particular to the host countries and the actions taken by humanitarian organizations to care for the displaced. For example, Liisa Malkki’s anthropological account of Burundian refugees in Tanzania challenges assumptions about the static nature of the identity of refugees by revealing the extent to which the memories, identity and even desires of refugees to assimilate into the host country or go back to their native countries was contingent, to some degree, on the manner in which they were cared for and received by their host country. For those refugees who were placed in remote camps, and prohibited from assimilating into Tanzanian society, there was a stronger sense of solidarity with their fellow native country members and a stronger desire to go back to their country of origin. In contrast, refugees living in towns and cities had assimilated to Tanzanian life – their memories and sense of identity were tied less to their native countries.49 As indicated by Liisa Malkki’s study of Burundians refugees in Tanzania, the types of settlements host states use to manage refugee influxes may help to explain how and why some refugee populations have a higher propensity to engage in violence.

How does one reconcile both refugee motives and the conditions which contribute to refugee violence in the host state as explanations for how and under what conditions involved or implicated in violence. Reference Handbook on Emergencies and other related texts, such as State of the World’s Refugees, 2002.

refugees engage in violence? Is it possible to yield generalizable findings that would account for the emergence and types of refugee violence in different contexts?

**Incentives for Militarization in the Host State**

Barbara Walter’s explanation of the recurrence of civil wars can be applied to refugee violence by highlighting individual incentives civilians have to engage in military conflict. In the absence of conscription policies or measures to rally support for military operations, rebel leaders must tap into the discontent of civilians. According to Barbara Walter, “Enlistment (sic) is likely to become attractive when two conditions hold. The first and most important is a situation of individual hardship or severe dissatisfaction with one’s current situation…a condition” I call ‘misery.’ The second is the absence of any nonviolent means for change. Violence must be perceived as the only available tool for the average citizen to improve his or her situation, a condition which can be termed ‘lack of voice.’” Her main argument is that “for civil wars to resume, hundreds or thousands of individual citizens must actively choose to re-enlist with a rebel organization.”

With regard to refugees, there are rarely cases where the two conditions, “misery” and “lack of voice” do not hold. Conditions within the host state, if better than those of from which refugees flee, may provide disincentives for refugees to engage in violence, even if there were incentives within their native country. For the most part, UNHCR has come to rely increasingly on strategies of deterrence, i.e., by placing security officers within camps, moving them away from borders and decreasing the size of camps to make militarization of camps less likely.

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While these factors may discourage rebel recruitment among refugees, refugees also engage in cost benefit analysis to determine whether the costs of using violence exceed the costs of simply accepting the status quo. If the individual incentives facing refugees is a determining factor in explaining why refugees participate in military violence (as opposed to criminal, non-organized or politicized violence), one should see a direct correlation between the conditions – political, social, economic – facing refugees in the host country, vis-à-vis the conditions in their native countries. When their circumstance improve along these lines, refugees are less likely to engage in violence; when they are not, violence is more likely to ensue.

One may therefore hypothesize that states that encourage assimilation and integration of refugees among their citizens are less likely to experience militarization than those that do not for these same reasons. As an indicator of integration we should find that those host countries that encourage a higher percentage of refugees to reside in isolated camps rather than in urban or rural settings are more likely to experience militarization than those that allow refugees to settle in urban or rural areas. Moreover, protracted refugee settlements should also be more susceptible to militarization. The longer the stay in a host country or in a refugee camp or settlement, the greater unaddressed grievances are likely to fester and grow over time.52

Highlighting the incentives faced by refugees in the host state to engage in violence adds an explanatory dimension to existing hypotheses about the causes of refugee camp militarization, by pointing both to the indeterminate nature of refugee militarization and the circumstances facing refugees as they enter a new political,  

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economic and social environment. Militarization may be understood not only in terms of the nature of displacement or the level of political organization of refugees, but also in terms of the motives and incentives of refugees to engage in violence in the host country. That is, host state policies and conditions, camp conditions, in addition to the level of political organization may affect the relative cost calculations refugees undertake to decide whether it is in their best interest to engage in violence.

Moreover, by disaggregating the types of militarization that one may observe, ranging from actual involvement in violence to recruitment, trafficking of weapons and diversion of humanitarian assistance, one should see correlations with different facets of militarization. For example, the resort to violence by refugees may be more common in countries that are experiencing internal conflict, while violence internal to the camp may be associated more with camp level factors and the availability of resources within the camp.  

Scholars adopting the rationalist-resource approach to explaining civil conflict focus on factors that drive rebels and civilians to take up arms and fight when the opportunity and means are available. Walter, Collier and Hoeffler and other scholars suggest that soldiers, particularly in numerous conflicts in Africa, are often recruited among the ranks of civilians by warlords or rebels. The incentive for such individuals to engage in war may be high when there are no other attractive alternatives for people to improve their future prospects for social advancement and their well-being, and when

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53 For full explanation of various hypotheses to be tested see Chapter 2. For various facets of militarization and coding, these are highlighted in Chapter and contained in the Codebook in Appendix A.

displaced populations are attracted to opportunities to engage in conflict. As reported in a UNHCR publication on Refugees in Africa 2003:

“Cooped up in their camp, there is no work, no money, spreading poverty, little education and few other activities for the refugees – only stifling boredom and growing resentment and fear. In such circumstances many feel they have no alternative but to “join up.””

More generally, Barbara Walter supports this perspective in stating: “civil wars will have little chance to get off the ground unless individual farmers, shopkeepers, and workers voluntarily choose to enlist in the armies that are necessary to pursue war, and it is the underlying political and economic conditions that make enlistment attractive.” Thus refugees are more likely to engage in violence in protracted refugee situations. The longer the stay for a given population of refugees the more likely they are to engage in military activity or be susceptible to attack. The lack of economic opportunities among refugees is particularly acute with regard to protracted refugees. To the extent that refugees are either integrated into the population or allowed to return to their host state, the problems associated with recruitment and involvement in military activity on the part of refugees is likely to be alleviated.

Among policymakers concerned with the effective delivery of humanitarian aid to refugees in complex humanitarian crises, emphasis is often placed on the provision of better security and policing of refugee camps. Recently, UNHCR has undertaken a series of collaborative meetings to coordinate their responses to humanitarian crises with UN

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peacekeeping forces from UNDPKO. According to numerous policymakers, strong policing provides a deterrent to would-be militants and prevents camps from becoming militarized.

**Testing Competing Explanations**

The perspectives discussed above provide a basis for examining the phenomenon of refugee violence and providing a stronger theoretical framework to understand the relationship between refugee camp, militarization and war. Each of them also imply different prescriptive approaches for addressing the issue of refugee violence. The approaches outlined above may be separated into four separate categories, with different explanations for why and under what conditions refugee violence occurs.

1. **Camp level factors**

According to UNHCR and NGO officials, refugee violence is associated primarily with the conditions of the camps and settlements themselves. Camps that are close to the border of the sending state, dense in population (over 20,000 people), and lacking in adequate security personnel will be more likely to become sites of violence or militarization.

2. **Sending State characteristics and the Nature of the Refugee Flow**

According to Sarah Lischer, “socio-economic” explanations are inadequate and fail to explain why refugees in similar types of settlements engage in violence in some cases and not in others (as with the Rwandans and Burundians in Tanzania, the Afghanis in Pakistan and Iran; among other examples). The nature and cause of the refugee flow as may offer an alternative explanation for why and under what conditions refugees engage
in violence. Refugees fleeing genocide are more likely to militarize than refugees fleeing natural disasters or general political violence.

3. **Host State Capacity**

According to Lischer, state capacity and will are absolute distinctions, a state is capable and willing to accommodate refugees and prevent militarization or it is not. UNHCR has measures of capacity which may be used to test whether factors related to capacity, for example the proportion of refugees in comparison to the population, the country’s GDP and land mass, is correlated with the likelihood of militarization.

4. **Spillover effects**

In many media accounts and in much of the literature on civil and regional wars, refugee violence is depicted as a by-product of some ongoing conflict or war. Using data on the existence and levels of violence in sending and receiving states, I test whether militarization is correlated with existing violence in the sending and host state, or is affected as well by the existence of the number and type of violence in neighboring states.

5. **Greed and Grievance - Incentives Facing Refugees and Host State conditions**

   Alternatively, Barbara Walter’s explanation for rebel wars that highlights individual incentives to engage in war may be applied to refugee violence to explain the kinds of incentives that must exist in order for refugees to choose to engage in violence. Drawing from the greed and grievance framework of explaining civil wars, one should expect a positive correlation between the capacity of the government, measured in terms of level of development (HDI), density of refugee population and the likelihood of militarization. Indicators of state capacity include wealth, as measured by gross domestic
product per capita and the human development index (HDI) of a given country. Thus, the higher the GDP per capita and HDI, the less likely will camps become militarized. If the incentives explanation holds true, the economic, social and political conditions facing refugees in the host state should make them more or less willing to engage in violence. Thus I test whether the level of development and wealth in the receiving state are correlated with an increased likelihood of refugee violence. However, if the incentives explanation holds true, it should also be the case that relative capacity, in terms of the relative economic, social and political conditions facing refugees in the host state, makes them more or less willing to engage in violence. Thus I test whether absolute or relative differences between the sending and receiving state are correlated with an increased likelihood of refugee violence.

This latter set of explanations emphasizes the role of UNHCR and the host states in addressing refugee violence – by emphasizing less ‘greed’ and more ‘grievances’ of refugees. It combines some elements of the previous explanations and does not exclude the factors highlighted in these other approaches, but places refugee grievances at the center of the analysis and suggests that unless these grievances are adequately addressed in the host country, the recipe for violence exists and is likely to erupt into organized violence.

**Policy Responses to Organized Violence**

Since the outbreak of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the spread of war to neighboring DRC in its aftermath, the humanitarian community has struggled to come to

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58 While this seems similar to Lischer’s emphasis on state capacity, according Walter’s formulation, it is not the absolute, but the relative conditions refugees face in the host state, whether worse or better than conditions they faced in the sending state that will explain whether refugees decide to engage in violence.
terms with the impact of assistance on the wider context of war.\textsuperscript{59} While much been written on the potential and actual negative externalities of humanitarian assistance, very little analysis has been applied to understand what policy options may be available to humanitarian organizations and states to address the possible impact their aid may have not only in prolonging or exacerbating war, but in preventing or mitigating the likelihood of its spread. Much of the recent literature on militarization of refugee camps and the impact of humanitarian assistance on conflict offer two basic solutions: withholding or unequivocally providing aid.\textsuperscript{60} Depending on the mandate of a given NGO, often a moral imperative to aid those who are victims of war or are in need of humanitarian assistance is given as a rationale to remain neutral or independent from the political context in which assistance is being provided.\textsuperscript{61} Yet the dilemma of providing or withholding aid to victims of conflict diverts attention away from the a constructive dialogue on how and under what conditions humanitarian agencies may deliver aid in a way that is effective and humane in the short and long-term. As Gerald Martone, Director of Emergency Response from the IRC states:

“\textit{When a humanitarian agency is outraged at a particular situation, abandonment of these victims is a particularly cruel and uncreative way to register protest. To


\textsuperscript{60} See Lischer, Terry, Rieff with regard to the general debate regarding humanitarian relief and assistance in times of conflict. Leveraging aid is another option that has been put forth as well, but what this entails is not clear. Perhaps more research will be done to explore how and in what forms leveraging aid has taken in the past.

withdraw lifesaving services from the very people that are supposed to be defended is ironic and thoughtless.”

This analysis focuses on the conditions in which aid may be more effectively delivered in the context of war, by recognizing the conditions under which both state and non-state actors affect the dynamics of conflict when they aid refugees. The current debate between withholding and providing aid in situations where refugees are found to be involved in or implicated in violence misses the mark in many ways. First the assumption underlying such a policy is that all types of refugee violence are the same. Empirical evidence demonstrates that there are different types of violence that occur in different circumstances. Establishing programs for refugee assistance as a fundamentally humanitarian enterprise places undue responsibility for the problem of protection and security on host states or the refugees themselves. In fact, refugee violence occurs in most cases, because of some kind of political motivation and when legitimate grievances have not been met. By responding simply with humanitarian assistance, UNHCR fails to address the underlying problem which leads to ineffectiveness in its assistance programs, and incurs greater costs financially and politically in the long term. To date, efforts by UNHCR to promote security have focused on technical measures or the provision of military manpower to protect aid-workers and refugees. As Gil Loescher has written in his seminal work, *The UNHCR and World Politics* (2001):

> For UNHCR staff, the general tendency is to perceive emergencies in terms of logistics and not as failures of politics, the development process or ethnic relations.\(^{63}\)

\(^{62}\) Ibid, p. 149.  
Thus this dissertation examines the conditions and causes of militarization in part, to highlight how aid may be more effectively delivered to refugees in the context of war. It also points to the conditions under which both state and non-state actors affect the dynamics of regional or transnational conflicts when they aid refugees. A range of alternative policy options emerge from a detailed examination of the circumstances under which refugee camps, as particular sites of conflict, are likely to become militarized. Scholars such as Sarah Lischer posit that humanitarian aid should be leveraged and some assessment of the likelihood of militarization of refugee conflicts made before aid is sent. In some cases where militarization seems likely, given the nature of the refugee flow and the characteristics of the receiving state, humanitarian aid should be withheld to prevent the spread of conflict. While leveraging aid may be one effective solution for preventing the militarization of camps, analysis from the data collected on refugee camp militarization in 2003-2004 suggests that a combination of different factors explain the outbreak of militarization in different regions.

The results of the findings from recent cases of militarization suggest a range of alternative policies which may be instituted to prevent militarization among refugee populations; for example, by promoting enrichment activities and vocational opportunities within refugee settlements. In general, socioeconomic and political explanations must be supplemented with an understanding the policies of the receiving states and non-state actors. Doing so would give policymakers more leverage on the range of effective methods for establishing and dispensing humanitarian aid to refugees in the context of war. The foregoing chapters examines the concept of militarization, examines the data on militarization in the year 2003, and tests the various hypotheses for
how and under what conditions militarization occurs. From the empirical evidence gleaned from this analysis, a theory of militarization is developed and elaborated. The dissertation closes with policy implications for humanitarian organizations and critiques existing efforts to address the problem by host states and UNHCR.