**Muslim Immigrant Integration Avenues: Comparative Analysis of Berlin & London**

***Religion is invariably a social phenomenon and the state inevitably finds itself dealing with religious communities and institutions that transcend the individuals involved. – Emile Durkheim***

**Introduction**

Europe is no longer a “mono-cultural and mono-faith continent” (Open Society Institute, 2009, Pg. 7). Muslims, both as citizens and migrants, make up the largest minority population. As the demographic landscape rapidly expands, it ushers in challenges for the political, social and economic fabric of European communities as the emerging Muslim population redefines its identity. Religion and institutional policies are important factors in the identity re-construction process of Muslim integration in Europe, while discrimination remains salient in the background. The Open Society Institute (2009) indicates in its report on eleven EU cities that fifty percent of Muslim respondents (compared to nine percent of non-Muslims) residing in European cities experienced religious discrimination. While over fifty-five percent of all respondents felt a strong connection to their neighborhoods and cities, fifty percent of Europe’s Muslims nonetheless believed that they were not perceived as “belonging to the country by the wider society” (Open Society Institute, 2009, Pg. 2).

The construction of identity has its roots in modern liberal democracy. Hobbes and Locke claim that individuals possess certain natural rights as human beings and that these rights can be secured through a social contract which, in essence, “prevents one individual’s pursuit of self-interest from harming the rights of others” (Fukuyama, 2006, Pg. 6). Identity is developed while conforming to certain social environments, whether introduced through parents, religion, or culture. Fukuyama (2006) argues that identity demands recognition. Since Muslim identity is a product of a legalistic religion, which strict adherence to a particular code of Islam without a formal structure, and fosters conforming to a set of social rules; Roy (2004) argues that the Muslim identity is therefore challenged when transplanted to the foreign environment of European society. This results in a widening gap between the Muslim individual’s inner identity and the expected cultural acceptance of and inclusion into the new host society.

Although principles of liberalism in Western Europe encourage pluralism, religious tolerance, and the pursuit of religious goals in the public sphere, studies similar to the Open Society Institute (2009) indicate that a high percentage of Muslims do not identify with the communities of London or Berlin where they reside, work, and raise families. These disconnects lead Muslims in these cities to struggle continuously in reconciling their traditional and religious identities with those of European cultures and values. These complex divisions often exacerbate the segregation of Muslims from mainstream society and encourage Muslim communities to maintain parallel ethnic enclaves, hindering their proper inclusion as active participants into European society.

The marginalization of Muslim communities is a by-product of an inability to integrate successfully into the dominant society (Pew Forum, 2009). In order to comprehend these asymmetric Muslim identities in Europe, we need a broader discussion of religion and institutional policies. According to the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy adopted by the European Union (2004), employment and education play a key role in the integration process and participation of immigrants in host societies. In this cross-national comparative study, I describe, analyze, and explain the similarities and differences in the construction of Muslim identities across London and Berlin. I focus on the availability of opportunities and avenues of integration for Muslims into mainstream European society as framed by the European Union which are safeguarding religious practice and improving access to national citizenship in London and Berlin. I argue that Muslims in Berlin have better opportunities for integration through educational and employment policies than those encountered by Muslims in London. I further propose that when the constructed multiple realities of religion, citizenship, and institutional policies, and coupled with the nature of instersectionality of the ethnicity, education, and social class, work together in explaining the challenges to the Muslim identity.

**Methodology**

Through this descriptive, comparative study of both religion and citizenship regime and their implications on educational and employment policies, I examine successful Muslim integration practices in London and Berlin. I utilize the historical institutionalism approach to analyze the creation and implications of the following theoretical constructs: first, the differences between official state Church of England and Germany’s concordant system (also deemed the formal recognition system) of shaping church-state relationship; and second, the differential impact of *jus soli*, (right of the soil), citizenship regime of Britain and *jus sanguinis*, (right of blood), birthplace system in Germany affecting Muslim communities in these societies. In order to evaluate successful integration, I use the success of education policies and employment policies in both London and Berlin as measurement tools in assessing proper social inclusion of Muslims.

I highlight the theoretical approach of intersectionality which is used to grasp the interconnections between gender, ethnicity, race, age, sexuality, and class. Staunaes (2003) argues that intersectionality is a useful tool in tracing how certain people are marginalized. I examine the differences in institutions (church and state, and citizenship regimes) and their multifaceted effects of marginalization on Muslims as ethnic groups (for instance South Asian in London and Turkish in Berlin) in regards to their education and employment opportunities. These manifold attachments of Muslims in both cities helps construct an identity for these individuals as they themselves define their religion, social class, ethnicity, and culture. I point out that the different categories used by individuals to define their identity are not static, but rather an evolving interaction between the individual and the institutional factors. I further argue that inequality is a social construction and to understand it, the approach of intersectionality must be utilized as race, class, ethnicity and other factors shape public opinion and political behavior. The concept of social constructionism rests on the notion that social reality is constructed out of human awareness of consciousness, understanding of ideas, and interaction. I note that intersectionality plays a dynamic role in comprehending the constructed relationship between institutional structures and Muslims integration in London and Berlin.

For this study, I draw upon conceptual definitions from publications of the European Union and the Open Society Institute. The European Union’s Common Basic Principles of Integration define integration as a “two way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the European Union” (Council of European Union, 2004, Pg. 19). Table 1 highlights these EU principles to include collection of data, expansion of initiatives, and the endorsement of multiple religious and ethnic minorities as benefitting to the European society. The Open Society Institute regards social inclusion as a “positive action taken to ensure the provision and promotion of equal rights in socio-economic spheres and greater participation in decision making” (Open Society Institute, 2009, Pg. 30).

I draw heavily on data from the 2009 Open Society Institute report on eleven EU cities, as well as government data from Britain’s 2001 Census and Berlin’s 2006 Statistisches Landesamt (Office of State Statistics). I further utilize the following surveys: the 2007 Gallup World Poll on Muslims in Berlin, London and Paris (Bridges and Gaps in Public Opinion); the 2009 *Muslimisches Leben* in Deutschland Survey (sponsored by German Federal Ministry of Interior), and the 2009 Pew Research Center report on Global Muslim populations as sources of interpretive data. I incorporate scholarly findings from researchers in the fields of international migration, politics and religion, and ethnicity and migration studies. The study includes discussions and observations from books on the nature of multiculturalism as an integration policy in Europe, on identity formation of immigrant Muslims, implications of citizenship and identity on communities, and challenges of Muslim minority demands.

The study begins with an historical overview of Muslim immigration to urbanized locales in both London and Berlin, including settlement patterns, enclave presence, and identity formation. Second, I investigate the theoretical concepts of church-state relations and the citizenship regimes of both Britain and Germany in order to outline the structured and institutionalized paths formulated for immigrant naturalization. Third, I address integration and social inclusion in the context of education and employment policies. Fourth, I assess the avenues of integration and their implications for the reconstruction of the Muslim identity in both London and Berlin.

**Muslims in London and Berlin**

Population dynamics are changing in London and Berlin as the Muslim populations are increasing in comparison to the aging European population. Savage (2004) notes that the Muslim factor adds to the “contours of Europe’s domestic and foreign policy landscape in more than just demographic and geographical terms”; he regards the European-Islamic nexus as “spinning off a variety of new phenomena, including the rise of terrorism; the emergence of a new anti-Semitism; the shift of established European political parties to the right; the recalibration of European national political calculations; additional complications for achieving an ever closer EU; and a refocusing if not a reformulation, of European foreign policy” (Pg. 26).

The OSI Report (2011) highlights challenges of focusing on Muslims collectively because they “are not a fixed group with defined boundaries, but rather a diverse set of individuals with different religious practices and attachments, who are currently defined and marked as such mainly from the outside” (Pg. 30). According to the report of the Office of National Statistics, released in 2003, approximately 50% of the Muslims in the country were born in Britain, of whom 54.5% were of Pakistani descent and 46.5% of Bangladeshi decent. Similarly, the 1991 national census displayed an increased growth in the South Asian population, especially among Kashmiri Pakistanis and Bengalis (Phillips, 2001). The report also indicates that nearly half of the South Asian Muslim population is under 1 to 14 years of age, signifying that first generation immigrants who arrived either for employment purposes as refugees have settled down in Britain and are raising families, like as all other residents. In contrast to the general population, Muslims in London attend religious services, participate in programs, and charity frequently in efforts to form their own identities in the foreign environment. Records indicate that there are approximately 170 mosques in the London area for the 1 million Muslims residing in the boroughs[[1]](#footnote-1).

Berlin likewise has a large number of Muslim populations that resides spatially isolated. The 2007 Soros/Open Society Report highlights the size of the Muslim population in Berlin, roughly estimated at 200,000 people, which is approximately 9% of the total population of city; Muslims comprise one third of the 7.3 million foreigners in Germany). The dominant sects of Islam present in Berlin are the majority *Sunni* (consisting largely of Turkish immigrants and workers) and minority *Shia* (mostly Iranian) (Koopsmans & Statham, 2000). As similar with London estimates, it is difficult to capture exact figures on the Muslim populations because the Census does not record religion, in attempts to not violate privacy; and therefore, approximations stem from ethnicity data.

Migration patterns reflect the larger Muslim settlement into poor districts of large industrialized cities. Along with job opportunities, the concentrated enclaves provide “networks of support and development of goods and services to meet cultural needs” (Open Society Report, 2011, Pg. 24). Whereas in London most of the Muslims are of South Asian descent, in Berlin predominately Turks are identified as Muslims. The concentration of Turks in Berlin traces back to the 1960s wave of guest worker immigration and settlement policies of former West Germany. The second largest Muslim population is from Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by Iranian, Moroccan, Afghani, Lebanese, Pakistani, Syrian, Tunisian, Algerian, and Indonesian Muslims (Office of Statistics, 2005). As the Turkish Muslims workers arrived in Germany as labor migrants in the 1960s and 1970s, they intended to eventually moving back to their home countries. Therefore, they neglected to put integrating into German society on their priority list and resided in congregated enclaves of urban areas. Refugees and asylum seekers fleeing conflict and persecution, such as Kurkds, Yezidis, and Assyrians ofTurkey from conflict ridden areas became a part of German population in the 1980s (Soros/Open Society, 2007).

The city of Berlin is divided into twelve districts[[2]](#footnote-2), with larger Muslim concentration in the following districts: *Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg*, *Mitte*, and the *Northern Neukolln* district. A survey of over 40 Muslim communities in Berlin, sponsored by Gunter Piening, the Commissioner of Integration for Berlin concluded that Berlin’s Muslim population is “getting younger and more professional, and that cooperation with non-Muslim organizations has been considerably intensified” (Soros/Open Society, 2007, Pg. 67). Berlin’s Muslim community is ostensibly fused together with Turkish cultural aspects. The Islamic Centers and Islamic organizations have strong Turkish ties. For example the oldest Islamic organization is of Turkish orientation, *Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren* (Union of Islamic Cultural centers, VIKZ).

Although avenues for participation in mainstream society are present between the political/governmental organizations, discrepancy between actual participation rates still seems apparent as recorded by the 2007 Soros/Open Soceity Report. Islam fosters an individual relationship with Allah and it is not mandatory for Muslims to affiliate themselves with Islamic Centers or Mosques in order to practice religion. It is difficult to capture the any sort of participation (political, social, or economic) by simply looking at Islamic Center and Mosque participants. The *Muslimische Akademie* (Muslim Academy)[[3]](#footnote-3) fosters political education through independent inter- and intra-religious dialogue and strives to promote cooperation with institutions and organizations. Along with promoting civic engagement and political participation, the group also works on projects surrounding the empowerment of Muslim women, and democracy and media literacy of Muslim youth (Soros/Open Society Report, 2007).

I point out that integration policies for both London and Berlin differ as London follows a top down approach and Berlin administers integration at the states level. Due to the lack of integration policies at the national level, Germany developed state level local polices out of experience and recognition of the importance of immigrant integration. The OSI Report (2011) points out that the analysis of the data from the European Social Survey finds that views about national identity are more significant in explaining differences in attitudes towards immigrants than the size of the immigrant population in the country of the economic circumstances of the country” (Pg. 38). Muslims are viewed as a cultural threat to the general population, and therefore, as the notion of cultural identity of the country plays a crucial role in shaping the popular views of migration, it is necessary to create positive imaging of national identities. Table 2 indicates self identification of Muslims, both born in the EU states and outside the EU states. Majority of Muslims born in the EU state indicate that they do not self identify with being German or British.

**Church-State Relationships**

I now examine the evolution of church-state relationships in each case to understand the distance in association between organized religion and the state. As Britain follows the organized established church model, the Anglican Church, the Church of England, and the Church of Scotland are headed by the British monarch. The country has no written constitution that outlines principles of religious exercise and freedom. However, religious groups, including Muslims, are allowed to associate, promote and publish their views, and worship alongside the established churches.

The established state religion, the Anglicanism, and the British monarchy hold special privileges: the monarch serves as the supreme governor of the Church, and thus may not become nor marry a Roman Catholic. The Church carries out the coronation and all other state functions where prayer or religious ceremonies are required. Also, the twenty six bishops hold ex office seats in the House of Lords, and Church of England chaplains are employed for religious and pastoral duties in the armed forces and the prison services. Furthermore, the ecclesiastical courts are part of the legal system, and the doctrines and sensibilities of Anglicans alone are protected from blasphemy by the law. Although these duties of the Church are reserved, there has been a progressive weakening of the establishment as political forces have sought to abolish the church-state link altogether (Modood, 1994).

In contrast to the lack of written religious rights under a British constitution, the German constitution explicitly guarantees freedom of religion. Germany officially recognizes religions under the corporation of the public law ( *Korperschaft des offentlichen Rechts)* system. Although Germany regards itself as neutral in religious matters, it is not completely separated from religion. This concordant model of religious recognition allows the collection of taxes for the religious community based on membership declarations. The inter-relation of church and the German state is further noted by the inclusion of religious instruction in the school curriculum (controlled by explicitly by state governments). However, there is debate concerning the marginalization of other religions who have not received official recognition.

More so in Germany than in Britain, one fundamental impediment to the communication between the government and the Muslim organizations is a result of the “lack of a single official head of the Muslim church” (Ewing, 2000, Pg. 50) due to Islam’s lack of hierarchical. Ewing (2000, Pg. 50) further argues that “Muslims have threatened the status quo no, ironically, because they have group expectations…but because there is no single clear organizational structure that subsumes all Muslims.” However, Muslim representation is organized through an effort by Muslim leaders to forge partnerships, dialogues and to be granted the German corporation status. Corporation status is not the same as receiving national recognition of religion. Mushaben (2010) reviews the criteria for religious recognition in Germany which grants corporate status under public law. She argues that it marginalizes certain minority religious groups and hinders them from getting accredited teacher training, tax funded salaries, construction subsidies and other institutional privileges.

I point out that both models foster the church and state relationship in regards to its direct link with Muslim integration differently. Britain’s tolerance and acceptance of other religions under the official Church of England allows for recognition of Muslims in London. In contrast, Germany’s model of official recognition only accepts certain religious groups who have successfully attained the corporation status, while alienating other religious groups.

**Naturalization Regime**

Naturalization is a process by which citizenship is granted to a foreigner, is one of the first steps towards integration of immigrants into the host society because it provides a sense connection to the place of residence. A sense of belonging, pride, and new national identities are formed through the acquisition of citizenship. The naturalization law, thus, offers an avenue for better integration and reintegration policies (Koopmans & Statham, 2000). The British model of a civic community coalition defined by common political values and institutions based on the residence of state territory, *jus solis*. In contrast to Germany, the British model of multiculturalism (the appreciation, acceptance or promotion of multiple cultures) recognizes and facilities the rights of migrants to retain their ethnic or religious differences (Joppke & Morawska, 2002). Britain’s approach of multiculturalism promotes tolerance and allows immigrants and ethnic groups to maintain their cultural identities and customs, while providing relatively easy, open and active naturalizing policies. It does not force assimilation; rather it fosters the retention of cultural identity through its institutions of schools, military and media. Although the British government indicates commitment to maintain multiculturalism, it simultaneously advocates and encourages the instillation of British values and citizenship. Modood (1994) argues that although multiculralism in Britain represents a step towards integration, it needs to address cultural racism in regards to language, religion, family structures, and dress and cuisine.

As the events of the 2005 London bombings, new citizenship and English language requirements have surfaced. Immigrants must demonstrate knowledge of the English language, British history, culture, and customs through a short test or by attending a government approved class. Further, the citizenship ceremonies are mandatory and require swearing allegiance to the Queen and pledging respect to the rights and freedoms of the country. The official requirements outlined by the Home Office in regards to naturalization include: legal residency status for five years; indefinite leave to remain must be held for twelve months; intention of residing in the country and working for a British corporation; good character check; and sufficient knowledge of the English language.

In contrast to British naturalization law, the German citizenship regime supplies an example of an ethno-cultural community of descent and common cultural traditions based on *jus sanguinis*. Regardless of Germany’s openness to foreigners seeking asylum or residency for work purposes, the process of naturalization is restricted and based sole on German ancestry. The German model requires assimilation of potential new citizens to accept the dominant national culture as the unitary focus of its identity in the public sphere (Joppke and Morawska, 2002). This model makes political community access difficult for migrants and foreign origin residents. Even foreigners who do not wish to become naturalized citizens are expected to adhere to the German cultural requirements. Most Turkish immigrants and workers are regarded as *Arbeitnehmer*, individuals who transformed their residency status from foreigner to worker (Koopsmans & Statham, 2000). *Arbeitnehmer* required legal status in the country as employees with employment contract allowing them to work and reside in Germany.

Joppke and Morawska (2002) conclude in their analysis of migrant claims-making (the demand for what should be awarded) in European countries that transnational communities and diasporas[[4]](#footnote-4) have an effect on participation of ethnic minorities in public spheres. They report that migrant claims-making does not play an important role regarding the German Muslim population (in contrast to the British Muslim population). This is a result of lack of race relations and anti-discriminatory framework available in Germany where migrants are excluded as foreigners from the political community. Rights, therefore, depend on the conception of citizenship and national identity “in a particular setting and are not a quasi-automatic consequence of the cultural difference of today’s migrants” (Pg. 46).

The new citizenship law of 2000 granted German born children of foreign parents’ easier access to citizenship. Although the new citizenship laws have granted easier access, the Soros/Open Society Report of 2007 claims that the number of Muslim naturalizations has steadily declined since 2001. A majority of German Muslims, accounting for approximately 80%, do not have German citizenship. The Muslims born and raised in Germany are not regarded as German citizens because of the historical institution of *jus sanguis* which creates a division between being “German” and being “other.” According to the Office of Statistics (2005), 50% of individuals (approximately 40-50,000 people) who received naturalization from 1995 to 2005 were from majority Muslim countries. I argue that this is reflected in the inner dimensions of German societal fabric as marginalization of Muslims is salient. Table 3 demonstrates that Muslims born in Europe regard their ethnic minority as the largest barrier to being British or German and Muslims born outside of Europe regard language, their immigrant status, and their ethnic minority as contributing to their sense of belonging. I argue that both Britain and Germany exclude foreigners from political communities. While Germany views naturalization as the last step in securing integration, Britain regards it as an important beginning step by allowing relatively easy access to citizenship.

**Education**

The EU’s Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration, adopted in 2004, affirms that “efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society” (Pg. 21). Education prepares not only new immigrants, but all people to participate in society, to participate better in all areas of life, and to interact with others. Further, it asserts that “given the critical role played by education in the integration of those who are new in society – and especially for women and children – scholastic underachievement, early school-leaving and of all forms of migrant youth delinquency should be avoided and made priority areas for policy intervention” (Pg. 21).

Although it is difficult to specify exact education levels of Muslim students because the official statistics do not identify students by religion, performance can be estimated by looking at schools with higher foreign and or Muslim enrollments. The National Literacy Trust in Britain found in one study that, although other minorities in the country achieved significant improvements in GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Education) results over the past few years, South Asian Muslim students have dropped in their average performance levels at an alarming rate. The gap between the highest and lowest achieving ethnic groups has widened. The office of Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (OFSTED) indicates through its inspection of the Bradford local education that it ranked 148th out of 150th in the country and that these schools have been underfunded and provide poor service to Muslim children (OFSTED, 2000).

The OSI report (2011) points out the importance for Muslim parents to understand the formal educational system in order to avoid disadvantage in their children’s education. Germany’s education system locks children early into educational streams is “disadvantaging young people from minority groups, who need more time to develop the linguistic skills to excel in education” (Pg. 23). Although research indicates that schools respond positively to diversity and cultural heritage, Muslim students fall victims to racism and prejudice at schools, appropriate training and support is necessary for teachers to ensure efficiency in diverse ethnic and religious classrooms.

Similarly, evidence also suggests underperformance by foreign children in German schools, both in regards to exam results and in pursuit of higher or professional education following secondary school. Second-generation children of migrant descent do worse than first generation children, and the Soros/Open Society (2007) report attributes this surprising finding to “the concentration of immigrant children in schools where the majority of the pupils are disadvantaged, in terms of their economic and social background” (Pg. 6). Children of migrant descent deal with language hurdles since German is hardly spoken and or understood in their households and enclave communities. Further, teachers in Germany make recommendations regarding the educational track of the student at a young age.

Due to delayed language and other skills, the Muslim students are at a disadvantage as the teachers peg them into educational structures based on their qualifications. Insecure residency status can also affect opportunities for education and training beyond secondary school for Muslims. As Mushaben (2010) also draws on the EU Common Principles of Integration and recognizes the need for access to education as an avenue for migrant integration, she argues that development of strict religiosity among the young Muslim population is a product of state neutrality which deepens the “patterns of minority discrimination” (Pg. 518).

I argue that schools are an important venue for contact of immigrant children with the mainstream society and therefore, the accommodations and respect fostered by the school system is an indicator of the societal values, belonging, and acceptance the children. Further, educational opportunities are important determinants of employment opportunities and improving future life chances. School systems should work towards stricter measures to eradicate racism, and Islamophobic bullying because of their effect on the poor academic results of Muslim children. The OSI report (2011) recommends the EU to work towards developing a forum among cities for exchanging information and best practices about collecting educational data on minority students, and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Education and Culture to devise programs and activities which allow educators and communities to share information about the best practicing for harassing students’ cultural heritage and diversity for the purpose of improving learning.

While education in Britain is managed through the Department of Education and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, it is the responsibility of local authorities to implement public education policies and administer state schools. Similarly, the German education system is primarily run by the discretion of the individual states and each state decides its own educational policies. However, in Britain education his compulsory for children between the ages of five and sixteen and in Germany it is only compulsory for children up to the age of twelve.

**Employment**

Employment is an important determinant of “the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society and to making such contributions visible” (Council of European Union, 2004, Pg. 20). The European Union recommends that employers promote integration by recognizing qualifications acquired in another country, offering sufficient skills demanded for the job or transitioning into the job, and incentives for immigrants to remain, seek, and obtain employment.

Table 4 indicates that in comparison to approximately 81% of the majority White British, only 51% of Muslim minority British residents participate in the labor market. Similarly, while the majority White British resident averages 11.80 Pounds an hour as wage, the Muslim minority resident only receives an estimated 10 Pounds an hour as wage. Similarly, a 2002 BBC report indicates that South Asian residents are among the poorest groups in the country: 37% of the population resides in London’s poorest borough, Tower Hamlets. Furthermore, 75% of South Asian Muslims live below the poverty line (receiving below 60% of the median income) compared to 23% of all other households. With only two of every ten women active in the job market (“Women and Soceity,”2002) and given the disproportionate unemployment of men (South Asian Muslims are three times more likely to be jobless than other minority groups), they are twice as likely not to have a bank or building society account than the rest of the country’s population.

Since a majority of the South Asian Muslims consists of children and young adults, extreme social deprivation in the community and high levels of unemployment among them signifies marginalization of the population. South Asian Muslims are found in poor urban neighborhoods of London, trapping the residents into ethnic clusters. With poverty looming, a sense of cohesion, sustained by positive community links, traditions and a sense of ethnic identity become an avenue for identity formation. Further, the fear of racial harassment leads these ethnic clusters to remain highly isolated and create parallel societies.

OSI report (2011) that most Muslims would like to live in mixed communities and not be segregated into parallel societies of the enclave communities. However, discrimination in housing restricts Muslims from residing in mixed communities. The report’s recommendations argue that “policymakers must find ways to maintain areas that are ethnically and religiously mixed and to ensure that Muslims are able to choose where to live in a city unrestrained by discrimination and prejudice” (pg. 24).

Soros/Open Society report (2007) indicates that “the problem of unemployment is strongly linked to education and apprenticeship” (Pg. 6). Unemployment rates for foreigners are three times higher than for Germans. The young immigrants are concentrated in the unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, self-employed, or in lower skilled industry and commerce fields. Unlike Britain, where discrimination is experienced at all levels of the workforce, employment discrimination in Germany is not as significant in lower skilled jobs as much as it is in higher specialized jobs. Due to security issues, Muslims have a difficult time getting civil service jobs because of their Islamic beliefs. Higher workforce employers are also not tolerant towards religious duties such as Friday prayer or *halal*[[5]](#footnote-5) food provisions in the work cafeterias. Barriers to Muslims in gaining access to labor market include discrimination, lack of formalized educational or vocational training, and the insecure residence status. Table 3 highlights the following factors as barriers viewed by Muslims in Europe: language skills; being board abroad; belonging to an ethnic minority; accent; and not being Christian. The results indicate that 27% of Muslims feel that belonging to an ethnic minority serves as the biggest barrier to their integration into the European society. Similarly, 21% indicate that knowledge of language plays an important part, and 7% noted that their religious affiliations (other than Christianity) barricaded them from mainstream participation. I argue that these results are synonymous with barriers to and marginalization of employment opportunities for Muslims as well.

Finding employment is difficult for Muslims (especially non-naturalized Muslims) because “individuals without citizenship living in Germany are generally only entitled to work if no unemployed German, member of an EU member State or national of an already privileged third country, can be found for the job” (Soros/Open Society, 2007, Pg. 6). Similarly, Asylum seekers are not allowed to work in Germany until their case has been decided and that usually takes years and in some instances qualifications still are not recognized. This further marginalizes the Muslim community.

The disadvantage in employment is traced to the lack of human capital such as social networks, knowledge regarding labor market, and language capacity. OPI report (2011) note that “different measures are being taken to provide support for labor market participation, including working with Muslim communities to ensure that advice and information reaches those who are furthest from the labor market” (Pg. 34). Furthermore, on a local level, employers work towards ensuring diversity within their workplaces.

A more recent component in the employment arena is the 2005 German Neutrality Law (*Neutralitatsgesetz*) which prohibits citizens working in public service from wearing religious symbols. Public service includes teachers, judges, and police officers among others. Soros/Open Society Report (2007) notes that educators working at child care facilities are also included under the public servant umbrella, “but only if the parents bring up the issue.” Ewing (2000) emphasizes the cultural anthropological perspective presenting Emile Durkheim’s thought that “religion is invariably a social phenomenon, and the state inevitably finds itself dealing with religious communities and institutions that transcend the individuals involved” (Pg. 31). She argues that the role of religious policies of Germany on the Muslim population with the head scarf debates and the prohibition of other symbols and practices of Islam by Muslims in Germany, directly conflict with the principles of secularism and religious freedoms. Koopmans & Statham (2000) suggest restructuring productive mechanisms for integration of immigrants in the German economic system through apprenticeships, inclusive work councils, trade unions and integrated school policies.

The OPI report (2011) recommends the EU to work towards developing a forum among cities for exchanging information and best practices about collecting educational data on minority students, and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Education and Culture to devise programs and activities which allow educators and communities to share information about the best practicing for harassing students’ cultural heritage and diversity for the purpose of improving learning. It further recommends the European Commission’s Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities to compile and share examples of good practices for utilization by European cities in regards to increasing diversity in the workplace. Furthermore, the EU should “support city governments in developing local employment monitoring bodies to establish and evaluate objectives to increase Muslim and ethnic minority employment and economic integration” (Pg. 27).

This marginalization of employment participation and wage rates is also an issue for the Turkish Muslims in Berlin and the South Asian Muslims in London. While Turkish nationals in Germany are twice as likely to be unemployed, Table 3 demonstrates that Muslim residents in Britain are four times as likely to be unemployed (16.1 unemployment rate for British Muslims compared to 3.8% for White British). I argue that although minorities are vulnerable to employment marginalization due to language, differing pay rates because of ethnicity and or religion among other determinants, Muslims of Turkish descent in Berlin are relatively better off than Muslims of South Asian descent in London.

**Muslim Identity**

Hirschman (2004) observes that religion can help to create a community which translates into a sense of belonging in the new environment for immigrants. It also provides a path to assimilation. The idea of community (of shared values and enduring associations) with other immigrants helps with the transitioning into the new environment, since extended families are not around. He explains that religion, thus, can work as an anchor of adaptation and change.

Franz (2007) highlights Muslim identity in the context of the growing perceptions of Europe as a breeding ground for jihadists (defined as radical young Muslims). In attempts to understand the reasoning behind the discontent among the Muslim youth, she investigates integration policies of individual countries and finds that the distinct settlement patterns of Muslims are continuous to their de facto segregation, as they “are contextualized for Muslims as a form of double exclusion, based on ethnic and economic factors” (Pg. 90).

Immigration is described as a theologizing experience and aspects of religious participation are salient to immigrants and at times, as a result, spark religious resurgency in host countries (Hirschman, 2004). Further, due to the parallel community formation of Muslim communities in Britain, there are disconnects between Muslims and non-Muslims is highlighted in the differences in culture, such as clothing, and lifestyle which are regarded by non Muslims as backward and traditional. Werbner (2000) argues that the implications of Islamophobia are “embedded in stereotypical assumptions and pronouncements regarding selected customs and, above all, the inherently fanatical, violent and irrational tendencies of Muslim leaders and their followers (Pg. 307).

Discrimination experienced by Muslims is noted as part of a broad anti-immigrant, non western prejudice against immigrants. As anti-Muslim stereotypes have generated in the past decades, anti-Muslim prejudice across Europe has increased compared to the anti-immigrant prejudice. OPI Report (2011) argues that although prejudice is not related to poverty, it does however decrease with increased levels of education and that over 50% of racial prejudice in Europe is towards Muslims. Non-Muslim perceptions indicate that “Muslim communities are turning inward and rejecting European institutions and traditions” (Franz, 2007, Pg. 89) when in actuality, argues Franz, it is the failure of integration policies that forces and isolates Muslims into vulnerable parallel societies. The 2001 riots in Europe, as a response to Salman Rushdee’s book[[6]](#footnote-6), not only mobilized Muslims as a collective group rallying around issues of values but also indicated an important realization for the non Muslim Britain that Muslim identity was much different and had a voice of its own. Statham (2003) argues that while this once again resurfaced the old state and religions debate, it increased the political presence of Muslim minorities.

In comparison to Germany, Britain’s model of integration polices have allowed for the mobilization of claims making. The German *Auslaenderpolitik* exclusively defines migrants and minorities and foreigners and therefore, minorities do not self-identify with Germany. Statham (2003) utilizes race relations as a framework in understanding Muslim integration and cultural diversity allotment of state policies. He claims that the race relations formula of Britain is inadequate and does not cater to the needs and expressed political demands of the Muslim population. This leaves ample room for negative attitudes and perceptions about Muslims. National and local policymakers should increase awareness measures regarding discrimination by utilizing public information campaigns outlining the “existing legal protections and mechanisms seeking redress against discrimination based on religion or belief” (Pg. 27).

Although the diverse Muslim population in both cities has been an integral part of the societal fabric for decades, they still experience discrimination and social and economic disadvantages.

Discrimination remains an important barrier to belonging. The greatest amount of discrimination and unfair treatment is experienced among young European-born Muslim men as media scrutiny reinforces negative stereotypes and prejudices. The OSI report (2011) indicates that “young Muslims, with more education and familiarity with political institutions, have greater confidence in their ability to effect local change than the older generations” (Pg. 25). Therefore, I argue that it is necessary to strengthen the sense of belonging by allowing room for a new Muslim European identity to flourish by eradicating marginalization in education and employment sectors.

**Conclusion**

As the Muslim populations in Western European continue to grow, it is necessary to focus on Islam as a religion in shaping institutional processes of the State. While Britain has room for multiculturalism, Germany is somewhat of a hybrid of British and French integration models in its responses to Muslim needs. Coalition building among Muslims and non-Muslims is necessary for successful integration of Muslims into the values of liberal democracy. Soper & Fetzer (2007) claims that “despite the common concerns, national governments vary widely in their response to the religious needs and practices of Muslim citizens and permanent residents” (Pg. 933) and each nation is bound by its own church-state traditions in the context of shaping integration measures.

British integration policies are multicultural. Khan (2000) indicates that “Muslim activism in Britain is influenced by the broad negative societal framework within which Muslims operate and by their disillusionment with the British state and society” (Pg. 40). He recommends that “cultural imperialism, social ascendancy and racial superiority, and indeed historic perceptions of such notions, therefore should be part of an open agenda for the 21st century” (pg. 41). Further, the lack of statutory protection for the 1.6 million Muslims in the country stating that anti-discriminatory laws are absent from the constitutional framework and therefore argues that the Muslim community is challenged with serious questions about their identity (Kilic, 2008).

The British Muslim population suffers from social and cultural inequality that results from the majority/minority dichotomy which “determines the nature and basis of minority integration” (Zafar, 2004,Pg. 29) and the level and nature of Muslim integration is reflected in the experiences and perceptions shared by the dominant society. This majority/minority dichotomy in the European society at large, he argues, “gives rise to and reinforces a confrontational relationship between the minorities and the dominant mainstream communities” (Pg. 29) of the host country. Germany fosters and facilitates migrant organization and political participation of racial minorities on the local level. Britain’s anti-discrimination legislation and the Commission for Racial Equality provide the grounds for ensuring equal treatment in the labor market. On the other hand, Germany’s disaggregate national policies from state-level policies proves difficult for Muslim communities as they try to build mosques or provide religious education in schools.

I argue that identity formation for Muslims in both London and Berlin are influenced by the intersectionality of marginalization they experience. As ethnicity, social class due to education and employment, and religion fuse together, along with the socially constructed perceptions and attitudes, these factors act as barriers to successful integration of Muslims to mainstream European society.

I conclude that because of the inter connections between church-state relations, naturalization regimes and their effect on policy issues such as education and employment, in comparison to London, Berlin offers better avenues of integration for Muslims in the mainstream society. Further, I agree with Mushaben (2010) that current policies regarding citizenship regimes, human rights frameworks, and religious claims-making limit the formation of social capital. As the Muslim demographics have changed in the past decades, it is important to provide avenues of integration such as education, employment to the Muslim populations. In addition, I would like to point out that the difference in the ethnic make-up, Turkish as opposed to South Asian in London, of the Muslim community in Berlin may have implications on integration and therefore, I suggest further investigation.

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Appendix

**Table 1. 2011 OPI Report Recommendations on Integration Improvement and Reform**

1. EU Statistical agencies and projects should collect accurate data on minorities in order to support evidence-based policies to facilitate integration and fight discrimination.
2. EU should expand efforts to increase the knowledge of civil society groups and local officials about the EU’s Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration.
3. EU cultural programs should include a greater acknowledgement of Muslims’ shared heritage with Europe, their contributions to European society, and endorse multiple religious and ethnic identities as a benefit to European society.
4. EU should treat integration efforts as a genuine two-way policy process that includes majority societies and communities.
5. EU’s Integration Fund should prioritize supporting initiatives that provide diversity training for public service workers.
6. Council of Europe and other organizations should continue and expand research efforts, focusing on the impact of media coverage on Muslims, and its effects on social cohesion at the local level.

*\*Data compiled from 2011 OPI Report: At Home In Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities.* [*http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles\_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20110214.pdf*](http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20110214.pdf)

**Table 2. Muslims Self Identification with City of Residence**

**City Born in EU state Born outside of EU state**

Berlin 34.9% 17.5%

London 83.7% 60.8%

*\*Data compiled from 2011 OPI Report: At Home In Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities.* [*http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles\_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20110214.pdf*](http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20110214.pdf)

**Table 3. Barriers to being British or German**

**Muslims Born in EU state Muslims Born outside of EU state**

Language 21.4% 20.8%

Born abroad 5.1% 12.6%

Being ethnic minority 27.3% 17.5%

Accent 1.4% 4.0%

Not being Christian 6.8% 5.5%

No barriers 7.3% 4.9%

*\*Data compiled from 2011 OPI Report: At Home In Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities.* [*http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles\_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20110214.pdf*](http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20110214.pdf)

**Table 4. UK Muslim Labor Market**

 **Labor Market Participation Unemployment Hourly Wage**

White Majority 81.8% 3.8% 11.8 Pounds

Muslim Minority 51.95% 16.1% 10.0 Pounds

*\*Data compiled from 2011 OPI Report: At Home In Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities.* [*http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles\_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20110214.pdf*](http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20110214.pdf)

1. The 170 mosques in London were accessed through the Salaam portal ([www.salaam.co.uk](http://www.salaam.co.uk)) on April 20, 2011 and the estimated count of the Muslim population of 1 million was from from the Office of National Statistis (<http://www.statistics.gov.uk>). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Berlin districts include Mitte, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, Pankow, Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, Spandau, Steglitz-Zehlendorf, Tempelhof-Schoneberg, Neukolln, Treptow-Kopenick, Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Lichtenberg and Reinickendorf. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Founded in 2004 with the support of *Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung* (Federal Agency for Civic Education). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Werbner (2000) defines diaspora as “a transnational network of dispersed subjects, connected by ties of co-responsibility across the boundaries of empires, political communities or nations and is thus de-territorialized, and yet complexly spatialized, imagined communities whose members conceive of themselves despite their dispersal as sharing a collective past and common identity, and hence also a simultaneity in time” (Pg. 308). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *Halal* refers to foods allowed under Islamic dietary guidelines. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The riots were held in opposition of author British born Muslim author Salman Rushdee who claimed in his book, *The Satanic Verses* that verses in Quran were the work of the devil. Muslims protested his work. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)