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Their Brothers’ Keepers? : Ethnicity, Rebel Diplomacy, and State Support for Insurgency

Abstract: This work…

**Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review**

 **Researchers have examined many of the dimensions of external intervention in ethnic civil war. One such dimension of this research is the analysis of state support for armed rebel groups. Most literature on this topic has been dedicated to decision calculi of states choosing to support rebel groups, examining the factors that influence governments’ decisions to provide training, arms, intelligence, and other forms of support to rebels. Comparatively little however has been said about the other side of this relationship: the demand for these goods and services by rebel groups themselves. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) introduce the concept of the “demand side” into the literature, maintaining that “Just as states consider the costs and benefits of offering support to rebels, the rebel organization must also evaluate the costs and benefits of accepting external support”. However, despite the fact that the role of ethnic ties in civil war and its internationalization has been well-examined, no scholars have sought to explore the role of these ties in the “demand side” of the state-armed group relationship. This thesis aims to contribute to the filling of a theoretical lacuna by asking: “what role do ethnic ties play in rebel groups’ efforts to lobby for state support?” I seek to answer this question by examining extant literature, developing a novel theory of rebel diplomacy, and testing my assertions through case studies of the Palestinian National Movement.**

**1.1: Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Groups**

Ethnicity matters, particularly as an organizing principal in conflict situations. A relatively large body of literature has analyzed the impact of ascriptive identities on civil war and its internationalization (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Saideman 2002; Koga 2011, and others). Other works examine how identity can be a key variable in territorial disputes, irredentism, and on the recognition of new states (Ayoob 1995; O’Lear , Diehl, Frazier, and Allee 2005; Coggins 2008). However, it is important to begin this analysis with a conceptualization of identity itself. Fearon and Laitin (2000) maintain that identities are social categories are “sets of people given a label (or labels) and distinguished by two main features: (1) rules of membership that decide who is and is not a member of the category; and (2) content, that is, sets of characteristics (such as beliefs, desires, moral commitments, and physical attributes) thought to be typical of members of the category, or behaviors expected or obliged of members in certain situations (roles)”. Hale (2004), following psychological research by Mead (1934), further extrapolates the logic of identity as a means of distinguishing between self and others; a kind of “radar” that aids their navigation through the social world. **Symbols and rituals related to out-groups and enemies, and even minor differences between one’s group and other can be coded as belonging to an “other” and vilified, whereas such categories coded as belong to the in-group are celebrated (Volkan 1999).** **This study aims to analyze the role of such processes in international diplomacy.**

Ethnic groups are defined by Rothschild (1981: 2) as “collective groups whose membership is largely determined by real or putative ancestral inherited ties, and who perceive these ties as systematically affecting their place and fate in the political and socioeconomic structures of their state and society”. Following Coser’s (1956) concept of in-group bias , defining oneself as a member of an ethnic group is as much a statement of belonging to a group as it is a statement of not belonging to others (Young 1976). Hale (2004) corroborates this by stating that, like other identities, ethnicity is a means of distinguishing oneself from others, albeit by means of categories commonly referred to as “ethnic”[[1]](#footnote-1). There are a number of ways that ethnicity has been conceptualized: different scholars have conceived of it through primordial (Geertz 1963), instrumentalist (Brass 1991), constructivist (Fearon and Laitin 2000; Chandra 2012), and other views. Indeed, Horowitz (1998) notes no fewer than ten different ways that ethnicity has been theoretically examined. Yet these distinctions may ultimately be unhelpful. Whether or not ethnicity is socially constructed or primordial, it can still be of great use as a factor in explaining patterns of mobilization and violence (Newman 2014). The abundance of scholarship on the origins of ethnicities and their political salience has greatly influenced scholarship on conflict. Yet some work disputes the labeling of conflicts as “ethnic” or posit that the term lacks empirical validity (Mueller 2000; Gilley 2004). Indeed, Gilley maintains that “there is a strong case for severely limiting the field of ethnic conflict studies, if not abandoning it altogether”. However, an abundance of literature[[2]](#footnote-2) finds that ethnic cleavages and the usage of ethnic affinity as an organizing principal have a significant impact on conflict processes and behavior. Indeed, a preponderance of evidence indicates ethnic conflict is itself a distinct element within the broader spectrum of contentious political processes. Illustratively, Newman and DeRouen. (2014) accurately note that while the essentialization of the term “ethnic conflict” can be problematic and counterproductive, ethnicity still plays a significant role in conflict behavior.

**1.2: Ethnicity and Conflict**

Conflict is a form of collective action, thus ethnic conflict is a form of ethnically-oriented collective action, or “ethnic mobilization”. Olzak (2006) defines the latter term as “collective action based upon ethnic claims, protest, or intergroup hostility that makes reference to a group’s demands based upon one or more cultural markers”. A significant body of scholarship explicates the importance of such affiliations within intrastate wars. Posen (1993) applied international relations theory to intrastate conflict, positing that situations of ethnic conflict resemble the anarchical structure of the international system and that the concept of the Security Dilemma can be applied to analyze them. Alternately, when conceived of as an element that influences the micro-level dynamics of conflict, ethnicity is salient as an organizing principle in “ethnic wars”; i.e. conflict fought over power relations between groups within an ethnically-biased polity (Sambanis, 2006). These conflicts are theorized by some as being difficult to resolve due to the “stickiness” of ethnic identities and their tendency to be reified by warring parties (Kaufmann 1996a, 1996b; Horowitz 1985). Other works conceive of identity at the macro-level, drawing upon the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF)[[3]](#footnote-3) to gain insights about civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Others still reject this reasoning about the role of ethnicity and take a constructivist approach that emphasizes the potential for identity change and ethnic defection to occur within conflicts (Kalyvas, 2008). This position, which Kalyvas, Chandra, and others maintain can indeed offer insights into the dynamics of conflict behavior. As Jones (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) notes, the case of Rwanda is particularly illustrative of this phenomenon. Indeed, the manipulation of the different social categories that constituted the labels “Huti” and “Tutsi” at the hands of elites within the ruling Rwandan *akazu[[4]](#footnote-4)* was a major contributing factor to the 1994 genocide*.* **Oberschall (2000) develops another explanation of this phenomenon by examining-as we have- the usage of strategic framing: individuals in former Yugoslavia did not perceive their neighbors of different ethnicities as threats until a “crisis frame” was promoted and activated**. It is thus apparent that ethnicity can effectively manipulated by “ethnic entrepreneurs” and made into a salient organizing principal for violent actors, even in the absence of obvious racial and linguistic differences.

An abundance of literature theorizes the ways in which ethnicity influences intrastate conflict dynamics, but what of the salience of ethnicity within international contexts? Davis and Moore (1997) maintain ethnicity is an attribute that can make certain dyads more conflict prone. This follows work by Zinnes (1980), who posits that certain characteristics of states are the root causes of international violence and Carment and James (1995, 1997). The former work emphasizes the salience of “politically relevant ethnic cleavages”, such as those that are present when a certain ethnic group in a society receives political or economic benefits that others lack. Following this, Carment and James find that when “advantaged” ethnic groups in one state that have ties to a “disadvantaged” group in another state, conflict is more likely to occur. The transnational dispersion of minority groups also has a significant effect on conflict dynamics and behavior. Piazza and Arva (2015) find that the transnational dispersion of minority groups increases terrorism, playing a “pivotal role in the funding and functioning” of ethnic terrorist organizations. Likewise, Forsberg (2014) explores the transnational “contagion” of ethnic conflict and finds that transnational kin ties can result in ethnic warfare spilling across borders. **Though these studies identify the salience of ethnicity as an explanatory variable, they do not entirely address the specific processes and mechanisms through which it becomes actionable.**

It follows that many civil wars become internationalized. Indeed, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, this is one of the most common forms of war in the world today, with 13 internationalized intrastate conflicts occurring in 2014. One form of this phenomenon is state support or intervention on behalf of an ethnic group in conflict. Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan (2001) note that between the end of the Cold War and the publishing of their article, 44 of 74 insurgencies received state support. They maintain that states will support insurgent groups for a variety of reasons, including a desire for regional influence, to destabilize neighboring states, spark regime change, further irredentist aims, and to support members of the same ethnic and religious groups. Such support can take a variety of form: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)’s External Support Dataset codes seven different types. These include troops as secondary warring party, access to territory, access to military or intelligence infrastructure, weapons, materiel/logistics, training/expertise, funding/economic support and intelligence material (Högbladh et. al 2011).

Saideman (1997, 2002, 2012) and Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) provide us with an excellent starting point for examining the salience of ethnicity in determining whether or not states give support to rebel groups. Saideman (2002), following scholarship by Mayhew (1974), examines the state-level role of ethnic politics in states in determining their foreign policy behavior. He argues that states will give support to rebel groups outside their borders because of the ethnic affiliations of “politically relevant individuals”, i.e. the winning coalition[[5]](#footnote-5). These individuals are responsible for keeping leaders in office, and when they share a kin tie with a vulnerable, external group, leaders will seek to appease them by providing support to said group. Koga (2011) follows this logic and identifies three assumptions of the ethnic tie hypothesis: that “ethnic identities influence the preferences of individuals… that politicians care primarily about gaining or retaining office…that politicians need the support of others to maintain political office”.Saideman (2012) further develops this argument, stating that “ethnic ties influence foreign policy decision-making because support for ethnic kin abroad can be a litmus test for a politician’s sincerity on ethnic issues at home” and that leaders will lose face among their constituents if they take symbolic stands on ethnic issues but do not credibly back up their talk by failing to support ethnic kin abroad[[6]](#footnote-6). Likewise, politicians will oppose groups with whom they share a history of ethnic enmity due to pressure from their constituents. Saideman’s (2002, 2012) quantitative tests find a statistically significant relationship between ethnic ties and states’ support for external groups. His results were insignificant when he disaggregated ethnicity into different (racial, religious) categories, but he found that the existence of a state near the conflict area dominated by an ethnic group’s kin significantly influenced the level of support an embattled group received. This suggests that more powerful kin will give support to nearby co-ethnics. Byman et. al (2001) suggest as Saideman has that domestic politics are salient in determining state support for ethnic rebels, but also maintain that support for members of a state’s dominant ethnic group abroad can be a convenient guise for expansionist actions, as in the case of Russia’s support for Russian-speaking insurgents in Moldova and Tajikistan[[7]](#footnote-7).

**1.4 Ethnicity and Principal-Agent Theory**

Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham (2011) take a different approach to the question of state support for insurgent groups[[8]](#footnote-8). Instead of examining the role of domestic politics in this phenomenon, they posit that ethnicity can act as a “screening device” in a principal-agent relationship. Mainstream economics has long explored the dynamics of principal-agent relationships and problems in the scope of behavior within firms and markets (See Smith, 1776; Akerlof, 1970; Laffont and Matimort, 2001; many others), but efforts to apply this theory within political science are comparatively limited (See Miller 2005; Raucchaus 2009; some others). Following Raucchaus (2009)’s work on humanitarian intervention[[9]](#footnote-9), this work will apply principal-agent theory to internationalized civil conflict.

In such a relationship, states (principals) will contract rebel groups (agents) to fight for them. In a principal-agent relationship, principals will, to the greatest extent possible, seek to avoid the costs imposed by delegating responsibility to other groups. Raucchaus (2009) details the types of costs that principals can face through delegation, i.e. moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs when insured or supported groups behave irresponsibly because they are guaranteed support by a third party. These actions occur in the absence of information after support has been assured (the contracting period). The other risk that principals face from delegating responsibility to agents is the risk of adverse selection. This occurs due to an absence of information in the pre-contracting phase about agents’ preferences. As Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham (2011) note, this is where ethnicity is salient. States examine ethnic ties *ex ante* to determine preference similarity between themselves and potential agents, thus reducing the probability of adverse selection.

Principal-agent theory offers many insights into the nature of state-rebel group relationships. Most importantly, perhaps, is that it gives us a theoretical toolkit with which to analyze the state-rebel relationship from a rebel-centric perspective rather than a state-centric perspective[[10]](#footnote-10). The trend of analyzing this phenomenon from the perspective of states is ubiquitous in the literature. As previously noted, Saideman, Koga, and others frame their studies around how ethnicity influences the domestic politics of states and how leaders choose which groups to support based on its influence. Though undoubtedly important, there is fertile intellectual ground to be broken through studying the other side of the coin: **how ethnic ties are salient to rebel groups’ efforts to gain state support.**

**Chapter Two: Rebel Diplomacy and Ethnic Talk**

**2.1: What is Rebel Diplomacy?**

Sir Earnest Satow defined diplomacy as “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states” (Satow 1917). Historically, scholarship on diplomacy focused exclusively on the usage of talk between states. Indeed, as Coggins (2015) notes, it has been defined as the exclusive province of states, and that the term “rebel diplomacy” may at first appear to be a contradiction in terms. However, rebel groups and other non-state actors can and do engage in diplomatic activity. Such activity mimics state diplomacy, as rebels seek to apply the norms of legitimacy afforded to state actors in the international system to themselves (McConnell, Moreau, and Dittmer 2012). Non-state diplomacy in general is theorized to be ““more functionally specific and targeted” as well as “more opportunistic and experimental” (Keating 1999, cited in McConnell et. al 2012).. Rebel groups’ diplomacy often takes the form of efforts to lobby for support from external patrons: a means of engagement that is targeted, opportunistic, and likely experimental (Coggins, 2015; Bob 2005; Jones and Mattiacci, 2015; Huang 2015: Asal, Conrad, and White 2014).Coggins (2015) introduces the term “rebel diplomacy” to describe this tactic and other forms of external engagement by rebel groups. When engaged in civil conflict, rebel groups will often engage diplomatically with external actors in order to gain support and legitimacy for their cause. This strategic use of talk abroad is employed in addition to violent tactics domestically as a tactic in civil wars. The literature on this topic is still nascent, but several clear assumptions can be drawn from the extant material.

First, rebel groups dedicate time and effort to non-violent international engagement with state and non-state actors. Bob (2005) maintains that since external support is of critical importance to many groups, competition in the global marketplace for the material and normative goods that support provides is frequent and fierce. Rebels have employed a variety of different diplomatic strategies, including “Creating political parties, relief funds and pseudo embassies abroad”, “using media outlets and personal contacts to spread the insurgents’ ideology, propagandize, and inform [to] win the favor or neutrality of key constituencies”, and “diplomatic envoys and lobbyists [to] influence third party states' policies” (Coggins 2014). **As depicted in Figure 1, rebel groups have been prodigious in establishing front groups to establish these aims.**

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| --- | --- |
|  | **Rebel Front Groups**  |
| Name | Rebel Group | Country | Type |
| United People’s Front  | Communist Party of Nepal  | Nepal | Political Wing/Diplomatic Corps  |
| Union Patriotica | FARC | Colombia | Political Wing/Diplomatic Corps |
| Indigenous People’s Front /of Tripura | National Liberation Front of Tripura\*  | India | Political Wing/Diplomatic Corps |
| Eritrean Relief Association | Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)\* | Eritrea | Humanitarian organization/relief fund  |
| Relief Society of Tigray | Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)\*  | Ethiopia | Humanitarian organization/relief fund  |

Figure 1 : A chart of rebel front groups listed in Huang (Forthcoming))[[11]](#footnote-11)

Movements will both contact potential patrons directly and engage in “rebel public diplomacy” over social media sites like Twitter (Bob 2005; Jones and Mattiacci 2015). Indeed, such non-violent engagement over social media was key in Libyan rebels’ efforts to gain international support during the 2011 effort to overthrow the Qaddafi regime as it gave rebels a quick and effective means of presenting their narrative, clarifying their aims, and framing it to appeal to an international audience (Jones and Mattiacci 2015)[[12]](#footnote-12).

Next…

<http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/4914/2/4914.pdf>

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718512000322>

Next, such engagements are strategic and targeted at achieving specific outcomes. These outcomes may be normative-seeking the same privileges and legitimacy under international law usually accorded to recognized states-or material, i.e. arms, training, and financial resources. These objectives are broadly conceived of by the CIA as efforts to “reduce or neutralize the government’s coercive power while strengthening the capabilities of the insurgency” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009).Coggins notes that “if the rebels convince outside states of their cause, they may provide the rebels with resources, training, or other wartimes support” or engage in mutually beneficial trade, alliance formation, or other symbiotic behavior. As Bull (1977) posits, the international state system is a high-status social group with strong barriers to entry. As rebel groups seek, through secession or the overthrow of their host state’s government, to become part of this group, rebel diplomatic efforts are as much attempts to gain international political capital and legitimacy as they are attempts to gain material benefits (Huang, forthcoming)[[13]](#footnote-13). Huang thus maintains that rebel diplomacy is, like statecraft, a form of “rebelcraft”, and “through it, rebel groups aim to signal to international audiences that they are serious political contenders for state power, can adopt state-like behavior, are amenable to peaceful talks, and champion causes that may have wider international appeal”.

Lastly, rebels will choose communication strategies tailored to their audiences and frame their cases so as to increase their appeal to potential supporters. Sociological theory can provide further insights into this phenomenon. Actors within social movements such as rebel groups, according to Snow and Benford (1988) are “signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers”. Frames are interpretive modes that allow individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label" phenomena in the world (Goffman, 1974). The framing employed by rebel groups in their efforts to gain external support is strategic. Benford and Snow (2000) identifies such strategic framing processes as “deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed” in that they are “developed and deployed to achieve a specific purpose-to recruit new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire resources, and so forth”. This work seeks to identify the means by which movements seek to “link their interests and interpretive frames with those of prospective constituents and actual or prospective resource providers”. These four strategies, or frame alignment processes are frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation (Snow et al 1986; Benford and Snow 2000). Frame bridging occurs when a group links two congruent but unconnected frames together, as when activists successfully mobilize support across different issue frames (Gerhards & Rucht 1992)[[14]](#footnote-14). Frame amplification is the “idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs” (Benford and Snow 2000). Berbier (1998) identifies an example of this phenomenon in efforts of white supremacist groups; such groups employ “ethnic affectations” to invigorate their supporters[[15]](#footnote-15). Frame extension is when a movement depicts its interests as extending beyond their primary concerns to issues that may be of concern to its potential constituents, and, lastly, frame transformation occurs when a movement “[changes] old understandings of meanings and/or [generates] new ones” (Benford and Snow 2000).

Within the study of rebel diplomacy, Jones and Mattiacci (2015) work to identify the means by which rebels engage external actors, positing that they will seek to increase their likelihood of gaining support through such strategic usage of framing. Rebels will promote specific accounts of events, such that they can show “their side of the story” and their host government’s purported atrocities against them (“diagnostic framing”) while promoting themselves as strong and worthy opponents of the regime (“prognostic framing”), capable of defeating their opponents: if supported (“motivational framing”).

The extant literature on rebel diplomacy provides an excellent starting point for this project. However, there is substantial room for increasing this body of work’s theoretical depth. The extant work on this topic details the means through which rebels pursue diplomatic engagement, the reasons why they engage in such activities, and the nature of the groups that are diplomatically active. However, though formal theories of rebel behavior[[16]](#footnote-16) are common, as are discussions of the role of ethnicity in conflict behavior, such topics have thus far not been introduced into the scholarly conversation on rebel diplomacy. This work strives to accomplish both of these aims. I argue that shared ethnic ties are of deep salience to the efforts of rebels to gain support from external patrons such as states. This assertion is based on several judgments that will be substantiated in the following pages.

**2.2: A Theory of Ethnically-Based Rebel Diplomacy**

My first contention is that ethnic ties will play a significant role in determining to whom rebel groups address their diplomatic efforts. As previously evinced, rebels’ diplomatic efforts are undertaken with the purpose of gaining normative and material goods from patrons. However unlimited rebels’ desires for support may be, the resources they have at their disposal to establish support-providing relationships and states’ willingness to supply said support are both finite Bob (2005) maintains that the level of “material resources, technological know-how, preexisting contacts, and organizational expertise” needed to engage a potential supporter varies greatly across groups, and states may not be willing to support certain groups at all. As Smith (1776) notes, “the workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible”. In order to “get as much” rebels will seek to limit the transaction costs of bargaining with potential sponsors and maximize the likelihood that they will receive support. This is where ethnic ties become salient. In and of itself, an ethnic tie implies shared history, cultural memories, and language[[17]](#footnote-17). These different dimensions can make the bargaining environment more favorable for rebel groups seeking support from states. Shared history and culture can be credible, *ex ante* signals of common preferences. To quote de Borda (1781), a principal’s ideal contracting relationship with a potential agent is a “scheme only intended for honest men”. In order to assure potential patrons of their “honesty” (i.e. their credible commitment to the contracting relationship), rebels that share a common ethnic tie with the government will engage in a strategy that I will henceforth refer to as “ethnic talk”.

I conceptualize ethnic talk as the strategic use and invocation of shared language, cultural symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context.Some argue that at the domestic level, ethnic violence can result in the reification of such ascriptive identities and that identity change is highly unlikely during periods of conflict due to the impact of “national memories” (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Van Evera 2001). However, as will we soon note, this may not actually be true across all cases, ethnic “entrepreneurs” and activists can enhance the salience of ethnicity as an organizing principal and drive leaders to take more ethnically-aligned positions (Van Evera 2001; Mueller 2000). This theory expands their logic, positing that rebel diplomats will seek to influence opinion at the international rather than domestic level. Likewise, it extends Salehyan et. al (2011)’s logic of ethnicity as a “screening device”: we should expect rebel groups to target states whose populations or governments share a common ethnicity with them.

 Like other strategies of rebel diplomacy, ethnic talk employs multiple frame alignment processes. First, ethnic talk includes the usage of frame amplification through the previously described strategy of ethnic entrepreneurship. Rebel groups need to present themselves as capable representatives of the interests of their respective ethnic group in order to credibly signal their capabilities to potential patrons, such as when Palestinian armed groups framed themselves as at the forefront of an “Arab Revolution” (Mishal 1986). Implicit in this is the assumption that leaders and populations care about the well-being of their co-ethnics. In addressing this assumption, we must be careful to not reify ethnic categories through reliance on “ethnic common sense” and “folk sociologies” (Brubaker 2002; Hirschfeld 1996). As Brubaker notes, “Participants[[18]](#footnote-18), of course, regularly do represent ethnic, racial and national conflict in such groupist, even primordialist terms. They often cast ethnic groups, races or nations as the protagonists—the heroes and martyrs—of such struggles. But this is no warrant for analysts to do so.We must, of course, take vernacular categories and participants’ understandings seriously, for they are partly constitutive of our objects of study. But we should not uncritically adopt categories of ethnopolitical practice as our categories of social analysis[[19]](#footnote-19)”.

 Ethnic talk may also involve frame extension. As previously mentioned, frame extension is when a group presents its cause “as extending beyond its primary interests to include issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance to potential adherents” (Benford and Snow, 2000). Such framing strategies are common in rebel diplomacy, but what of their specific relevance to ethnic talk? Individuals have a diverse range of motivations for participating in war, including personal values, the potential for financial enrichment, and personal grievances manifested as a desire for revenge. For some individuals, these motivations may prove to be more salient than ethnic affiliations and we may witness the phenomenon of ethnic defection. Kalyvas (2008), working from constructivist theories of ethnicity (such as those presented by Chandra) notes that, contrary to the assumptions of Van Evera, Kaufmann, and others, individuals can support actors explicitly opposed to their own ethnic group. This logically follows the assertion that the framing of conflict is a conflictual process in itself (Brubaker, 2002) Citing the example of the Mau Mau insurgency, Kalyvas notes that thousands of members of the Kikuyu ethnic group supported the British colonial government against their kin through service in the colonial Home Guard. Anderson (2005, quoted in Kalyvas, 2008) notes that: “these people did not like colonialism .In taking a stand, these so-called loyalists were in fact motivated by more prosaic and personal concerns: by the interests of their families; by the need to protect their property; by their sense of social status; and by their own values”. Though this is an extreme example, it makes a point of fact starkly clear: members of an ethnic group will not always support their kin and may in fact work against the efforts of rebels within it. This poses a challenge to rebel diplomats engaging with members of a state’s population. “Prosaic concerns” such as those that Anderson mentioned may drive them to stay neutral or even oppose the efforts of a rebel group, even if this rebel group shares a common ethnicity with them. Thus, rebel diplomats will engage in the “ethnic entrepreneurship” described by Mueller and Van Evera by means of the strategic usage of frame extension. Rebel groups will seek to make their cause seem as germane as possible to the ethnic affinities of their potential patrons in an effort to make this identity frame more salient and actionable. These affinities can be described as part of a sense of “we-feeling”, rooted in individuals’ senses of ethnocentrism (Sumner 1906). Brubaker (2002)’s conceptualization of “groupness” is a similar concept: an “event” or process that results from the reification of ethnic categories and can result in the mobilization of actors around these categories. If we follow Brubaker’s reasoning that increasing levels of groupness can result from ethnic entrepreneurship and result in mobilization along ethnic lines, an increase in such sentiment should thus have a positive effect on rebels’ efforts to win support. If we accept Kalyvas (2003)’s assertions that the actions of actors in civil conflict are driven by “local motives and supralocal imperatives” and that “actions “on the ground” often turn out to be related to local and private conflicts rather than the war’s driving (or “master”) cleavage”, it logically follows that rebels, seeking to overcome this difficulty, will work to increase the salience of the “master” cleavage, exploiting ethnic affiliations in order to win material rewards. Brubaker and Laitin (2000) note: “there may be positive incentives to frame such contests in ethnic terms. With the increasing significance worldwide of diasporic social formations (Clifford 1994, Appadurai 1997), for example, both challengers and incumbents may increasingly seek resources from dispersed trans-border ethnic kin (Tambiah 1986, Anderson 1992)”. Ethnic categories are easily accessible and actionable especially when placed into organizational and mobilization-based contexts (Brubaker 2002).

It is important to note as well that rebel diplomats may utilize ethnic talk both in dialogue with leaders and in outreach to states’ populations. Davis and Moore (1997) maintain: “even if members of an ethnic group are divided by an international border, their ethnic affinity will serve as a conduit for the exchange of information and as a potential motivation for action”. Ethnic talk serves to provide a theoretical explanation for how communication through said affinity functions. Following this logic, we assume that if members of an ethnic group are dispersed across two or more states, they will monitor the status and behavior of their brethren across the border”. This reflects the assertions of Anderson (1983), who conceived of ethnic groups as “imagined communities” whose members feel connected to one another despite geographic distance and, in some cases, a lack of shared historical experiences. Though many states within the international system are nation states, the members of many ethnic nations live within more than one discrete political entity in the international system. Indeed, the presence of ethnic kin in adjacent states has a statistically significant impact on support for rebel groups from the governments of these states.

This component of the rebel-state relationship can be explicated by the domestic politics model presented by Saideman, Mayhew, and Koga. To reiterate their assumptions, politicians care about maintaining power and need the support of their constituents. **Ethnic lobbies and minority interests are of particular importance to states’ conduct of foreign affairs. Though perhaps a unique case due to the relatively high responsiveness of its government, within the United States, lobbying by ethnic groups is common: “Irish Americans lobbied 19th-century presidents to endorse Irish autonomy, and they joined with German Americans in pressing Woodrow Wilson to keep the United States out of World War I” and “The Greek lobby had brief success in persuading Congress to impose an arms embargo on Turkey, and the Armenian lobby has made Armenia one of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. aid” (Lindsay 2002). Even so, as Lindsay notes, ethnic lobbying is only employed-and employed effectively-in certain contexts. One such situation is one of crisis: “Ethnics whose real or symbolic ancestral homelands are threatened by their neighbors (think Armenia, Greece, or Israel) are also more likely to lobby than those who come from countries that are secure (think Norway or Portugal)” (Lindsay 2002). A situation of civil war would provide just such an impetus for ethnic lobbying, and rebel diplomatic efforts would doubtlessly amplify this.**  If, in such a context, politicians fail to support a group’s their kin abroad, they could suffer a loss of credibility and subsequent political consequences at home: audience costs (Fearon 1994). If rebel groups directly engage with members of the state’s population and utilize frame amplification to “radicalize” their opinions towards the conflict they are engaged in, then the potential costs of not supporting the rebels increases as the state thus risks inflaming an already incensed segment of the population.

In order to theorize this critical component of the ethnic talk interaction between rebels and populations, a return to the literature on domestic ethnic mobilization-and the behavior of “ethnic entrepreneurs”-can be highly useful. Olzak (1983) provides us a starting point in the form of her definition: “the process by which groups organize around some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends”. Jones (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) makes light of this phenomenon by using the case of the Rwandan genocide. Noting that Rwandan identity was “fluid enough to manipulate”, the *genocidaires* and *Akazu* elite were successfully able to play upon fears of the encroaching Tutsi RPF, “[raising] the stakes around ethnicity”. These actors deemed the Tutsis “cockroaches” who would “take revenge on all Hutu, regardless of clan or religion” making it necessary for Hutu to stand together and take up arms against them. The tragedy of the Rwandan genocide gives us an example-albeit horrifying-of the efficacy of ethnic talk, albeit in an offensive rather than cooperative frame. The literature on elite manipulation and competition can offer further insights into the nature of this phenomenon. Gagnon (1995) notes that, when threatened, elites will shift the focus of the population “by drawing selectively on traditions and mythologies and in effect constructing particular versions of that interest”. This “ethnification” of politics was practiced by elites in Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. De Figueiredo and Weingast (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) further explain this phenomenon through the case of the collapse of Yugoslavia. De Figueiredo and Weingast identify three factors that produced ethnic violence in this case: “leaders with a tenuous hold on power fear among the citizenry, and uncertainty about the true intentions of propagators of violence”. They argue that their second assertion was, in fact, entirely rational: “citizens are willing to support extreme ends when they fear for their lives, livelihoods, and families”. Frame extension via ethnic talk provides a mechanism that makes this phenomenon possible.

These domestic nationalist invocations can offer insights into the ethnically-based lobbying strategies of armed groups. Like Gagnon’s embattled elites, actors will strategically frame their causes to appeal to the “subjective security demands” of potential patrons (Jervis 1978). In essence, they must present their struggle and the threats that they face as ones shared with those whom they are lobbying. By creating and reinforcing affectations along the easily accessible dimensions of ethnicity, it is logical to assert that rebels should be able to internationally employ similar strategies to those employed by leaders at the domestic level of analysis.

However, as previously evinced, individuals can mobilize along different lines and be driven to conflict by “prosaic concerns” (Kalyvas 2008). Rebels, being rational actors, will seek to maximize their utility and the likelihood of their diplomatic efforts’ success. In order to emphasize the “master” ethnic cleavage, ethnic entrepreneurs will “selectively [draw] on traditions and myths in order to construct suitable and popular versions of their own interests”, “exaggerate threats” to legitimize political mobilization along ethnic lines by making such ascriptive categories more salient (DeMaio 2009). Though not explicitly mentioned in DeMaio’s work, such ethnic entrepreneurship utilizes the framing strategies previously described in this work. As aforementioned, when Hutu elites in Rwanda fomented hatred of the country’s Tutsi population, they strategically employed frame bridging and frame amplification processes, as evidenced through their rhetoric that played upon existing ethnic insecurities (amplification) and linked Tutsi political and economic empowerment to Hutus’ political worries (bridging). Identities that are both easily malleable and easily accessible, like ethnic identities, are thus are the easiest to emphasize. Thus, we may see variation across cases of ethnic talk.

 There is an implicit assumption in all of the following: that, from the perspective of the potential patron, the benefits of providing support to an ethnic rebel group must outweigh the costs. Byman et. al (2001) note, states will support rebels for a number of reasons, ethnic or ideology affinity is not central to their decision: these “less strategic” categories have figured in to their decision calculi, but *realpolitik* aims are more central. Though Saideman (2002; 2012) disputes this assertion, this point is important to address: and not irreconcilable with the broader thesis of this analysis. If we assess that states are predominantly concerned with military performance and strategic goals, we must also accept that these goals are costly to attain and that rebel groups, especially near the start of their insurgencies, will lack the manpower and *materiel* to completely signal their resolve. We also know that states are concerned with agency costs (Raucchaus 2009). If we incorporate Brubaker (2002)’s reasoning into our analysis, we can further assert that ethnic groupness is a variable category that can be increased through the activities of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs. Taking these factors into account, we can conclude…

1. Rebel groups will seek to signal that they have similar preferences to state patrons
2. Facing a dearth of resources, they will choose less-costly (or costless) means of signaling their preferences to risk-averse states
3. Rebels will employ ethnic talk to signal similar preferences to states
4. Such signaling will take the form of frame-extending ethnic entrepreneurship
5. States will thus assess that their expected agency costs are sufficiently low and that they will be able to accomplish their strategic aims due to rebels having similar preferences

As previously evinced, ethnic talk is a signaling strategy as well as a framing strategy. In international interactions, the actors involved face a lack of information about the motives of the other involved parties. Uncertainty of motives is a critical component of much of international relations theory; as Rathbun (2007) notes, “it is arguably the most important factor in explaining the often unique dynamics of international as opposed to domestic politics” and figures in different ways to the different theoretical approaches to the study of international relations. Following this scholarship, we can thus maintain that uncertainty will be of critical importance to rebel groups seeking transnational support. Elitzur and Gavious (2003) note that information asymmetry between two actors is especially important when one party is concerned about the other’s intentions. Hence, we should expect rational actors to attempt to resolve this asymmetry in order to realize the benefits they are seeking. Spence (1973)’s seminal formulation of signaling theory utilized the labor market as an example: a candidate seeking a job will signal their capabilities to an employer through obtaining educational qualifications. We can continue this metaphor by following Bob (2005)’s concept of a “marketplace of rebellion”. If rebel groups are in competition for limited resources, the most (apparently) capable will be the most likely to receive support.

When written in sequential order, the steps of ethnic talk are:

1. An ethnic rebel group, i.e. an armed group in conflict with a state government, decides to lobby for external support
2. This group, seeking to maximize their probability of success and minimize their costs, chooses to lobby for support from a co-ethnic sponsor
3. In the process of lobbying for support from this sponsor, rebel groups will frame their situation and their demands using language that invokes common ethnic ties, historical memories, and other ascriptive links

In summary, the previously outlined theory of ethnic talk draws upon and extrapolates conclusions from several established bodies of literature. First, it draws upon the literature pertaining to ethnic entrepreneurship. Ethnopolitical entrepreneurs will “raise the stakes” around ethnic categories, reifying them and turning the “political fiction” of the group into an actionable category for mobilization (Brubaker 2002; Walter and Snyder 1999). The causal mechanism for this process is through reifying, invoking, and evoking ethnically-coded language, events, and memories.

Lastly, it draws upon established sociological research on framing and social movements. As previously evinced, rebels are “signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers” (Snow and Benford 1988).

Though we have established a theoretical basis for how ethnic talk works, we still have insufficiently addressed why rebel groups should choose this strategy. The decision to use ethnic talk, like any other strategic decision, is the product of a process of cost-benefit analysis by prospective rebel diplomats. A formal decision-theoretic model can aid us in describing the inner workings of this process and answer the question: “why ethnic talk”?

**Chapter Three: Why Ethnic Talk? Rebel Groups’ Decision Calculi**

Rebel groups…

**3.1: A Theory of Rebel Decision Making**

In cases of insurgents groups seeking support, we can posit that if would-be rebel diplomats face the following calculation[[20]](#footnote-20):

**L iff EPr(S)-TCD-CL>0**

Or: “Rebels will engage in lobbying if and only if their expected probability of success minus the total cost of diplomacy and cost to their legitimacy is greater than zero”

This model, like other rational choice models of politics[[21]](#footnote-21) assumes that:

1) Rebels are purposeful and goal-oriented

2) That they have ordered sets of preferences (utilities)

3) When choosing a course of action, rebels will make rational calculations with respect to:

 A) The utility of other options with reference to their hierarchy of preferences

 B) The opportunity cost of each alternative

 C) The optimal course of action to maximize their utility

The first variable, EPrS, or the Expected Probability of Success (of diplomacy) can be conceived of as the expected utility of rebels’ lobbying efforts and analyzed as such using von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)’s expected utility model. Thus, rebels will face a finite set of outcomes, *X*.

*X=*{State gives high support, state gives low support, state gives no support}

These outcomes are written probabilistically, and thusly will sum to 1. We can represent these probabilities as *p, p’,* and so on. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theorem maintain that rebels preferences over these outcomes are *transitive*, i.e. that actors will prefer p>p’>p’’ such that p>p”. The next axiom of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory, the continuity axiom, posits that the preferences of rational actors over sets of utilities are continuous. Levin (2006) states: An implication of the continuity axiom (sometimes called the Archimedean axiom) is that if p is preferred to p’, then a lottery “close” to p (a short distance away in the direction of p’’ for instance) will still be preferred to p’ ”. The other axioms of von Neumman and Morgenstern’s expected utility model are monotonicity and substitution. The former denotes that, *ceteris paribus*, a lottery that gives a higher likelihood to a more preferred outcome and a lower likelihood to a less preferred outcome will be preferred to one that assigns a higher probability to a less preferred outcome. The latter posits that if actors are indifferent between two given outcomes, they will be indifferent to the “lotteries” in which they occur, thus, if these lotteries are otherwise identical, they can effectively be substituted. In the case of ethnically-based rebel diplomacy, this entails [EXPAND]

 Holding all of these axioms true, von Neumann and Morgenstern posit that we should see an expected utility function of the form:

U([p’,p’’…$p\_{n}$])=$p'\_{u'}$ +$p''\_{u''}$ +…+$pN\_{uN}$

A rebel group’s EPrS is the expected utility of one of these outcomes. We should only expect to see them engage in lobbying if the probability of a favorable outcome is sufficiently high.

Rebels will calculate this variable based on several factors. One such factor is their targeted audience. Seeking to maximize values on this variable, rebel groups will target actors whom they believe are the most likely to give them support. To quote Asal et. al (2014), “assuming the separatist ethnopolitical group is a strategic actor, the group will focus its efforts on states or organizations where its ethnic group has significant influence”.

As previously evinced, Salehyan et. al (2011) posit states can use ethnicity as a “screening device” for shared preferences. Noting that Principals that are unlikely to trust Agents that do not clearly signal a commonality of aims, they maintain that “Ethnic or religious ties to the rebel organization are likely to reduce concern with preference divergence since a common worldview and shared cultural understandings often indicate similar preferences ~or are at least perceived to”. The authors also note that common ties of language and culture can ensure the easy monitoring of agent actions. Logically, it follows that rebel groups seeking support can thus use this same strategy for selecting potential patrons, thus we should expect to see the *PrS* that rebel groups calculate trend towards higher values in the presence of ethnic ties between themselves and a potential patron. Another factor is rebel groups’ own political capacity.

Our next variable, the Total Cost of Diplomacy (TCD), can also be conceived of as probabilistic. It is a function of rebel groups’ known political and economic capacities, but it is also a function of the future, unknown costs of continued diplomatic activity and lobbying, which shall be further evinced in the following paragraphs .Given that this variable is conditional on other factors, it can be calculated using Bayes’ Theorem, or:

P(A|B)= $\frac{P(B∩ A)P(B)}{P\left(A\right)+P(B|Not A)(P|Not A)}$

 Though a simplified representation of the reality of calculating a certain cost, Bayes’ Theorem can still proffer insights into rebel groups’ decision calculi. Rebels will want to calculate the likely cost of a diplomatic action given the costs of other actions. Seeking to maximize their utility in the long-run, rebels will plan ahead and assess the future-i.e, the probable-costs of actions. Koller (2005) explains the process by which firms make decisions using Bayesian probability. Before the start of an operation, firms will assign conditional probability values to different possible states of the variables important to their activity. Koller gives the example of an environmental remediation project: the firm responsible will take into account the costs of acquiring permits from local and state agencies and assign prior probability values to the different possible states of each of these variables, making their decision based on the conditional probability of their actions costing below a certain threshold (Koller 2005). If we follow the logic of rational choice theory and the “rebel groups as firms” perspective[[22]](#footnote-22), Koller’s insight into the decision making practices of businesses regarding their expected costs should hold true for the behavior of rebel groups determining whether or not they should engage in diplomatic activity.

What are the variables that rebels will assign probable future states to in their decision calculi? As previously evinced, the Total Cost of Diplomacy (TCD) is partially a function of a rebel group’s political and economic capacity. Rebels must be able to shoulder the explicit costs of engaging in diplomatic activity. Huang (Forthcoming)’s operational definition of rebel diplomacy defines this process as when a rebel group: “Opens a political office abroad, sends representatives abroad on political missions; or creates a political body devoted to the conduct of foreign affairs (such as a ministry of foreign affairs”. As Asal et. al (2014) notes, “sending representatives abroad to talk to NGOS, diaspora supporters, or foreign governments is a potentially-resource intensive activity” and requires an outlay of financial and logistical resources. Hiring lobbying firms, opening and paying rents on offices abroad, and other diplomatic activities can prove costly. For example, UNITA paid a Washington, D.C-based Public Relations firm $600,000 to allow their leader, Jonas Savimbi, access to officials and media outlets in the U.S. (Huang, 2015). Explicit costs, however, may decrease over time. Implicit in Asal et. al (2014)’s argument is the notion of an initial start-up cost of diplomatic activities: “the costs of engaging in various foreign political activities should be reduced *ceteris paribus* when an organization receives external support”. Thus, when a rebel group has already paid the initial costs of diplomatic activity and has started to receive external support, further engagement should be at a lower cost than their initial diplomatic efforts. Indeed, after diplomatic ties have already been established, rebels can establish offices in their patrons’ home countries, eliminating travel costs and making diplomatic engagement easier in the future (Asal et. al 2014). Over time, the explicit costs of diplomatic engagement are reduced as rebels gain resources and political capacity, making future outreach efforts easier to pursue.

 Rebels must also shoulder the implicit and opportunity costs of diplomacy as well. Diplomatic activities, as with all activities, have associated opportunity costs. As Huang (Forthcoming)) notes, diplomatic activities abroad are just one tool that rebels have available to them to help them further their aims. It follows that rebels will have to forgo other courses of action in order to dedicate time and resources to engagement abroad. For this reason, not all rebel groups equally value diplomatic engagement, thus we should see differing scales of preference among rebel groups and thus differing opportunity costs reflected in each group’s individual TCD (Huang, 2015).

The final variable, CL, reflects a crucial (but often ignored) cost of external support: the cost of such support to their domestic and international legitimacy. Rebel groups will generally seek support from local networks, both as a way to reduce transaction costs and as a way to increase their legitimacy among local constituents (Staniland 2014). Salehyan et. al (2011) contend that support from foreign patrons can adversely affect a group’s legitimacy among its local constituency. An example of this phenomenon is the Mujahiden e-Khalq’s loss of legitimacy among Iranians that resulting from the support that they received from the Iraqi government. This lead to the MEK being perceived as “foreign”: agents working on behalf of a rival power and not in the interests of their prospective Iranian constituents. However, if ethnic ties exist between a rebel group and a potential sponsor regime, the value of CL should trend towards zero, /as co-ethnic sponsors may not be perceived as “foreign” as other states. Thus, due to the lower transaction costs of engaging in diplomacy with co-ethnics, we should see rebel groups target these states for lobbying. For greater insight into this phenomenon, we can examine Fearon (1994)’s concept of audience costs. Fearon posits that leaders who “back down” in an international dispute will be perceived as weak by their constituents and suffer the associated costs to their domestic political wellbeing. Though the phenomenon that this work seeks to describe is qualitatively different from the “wars of attrition” described in Fearon’s paper, it is important to note that activity on the international level can have severe repercussions at the domestic level.

Likewise, I posit that CL can assume negative values in certain cases. Increased levels of support can result in increased levels of political and military strength, and such increased strength can result in an enhancement of rebels’ abilities to exercise control over territory. The increase in Weberian capacity that can come as a result of external engagement and bargaining for support can legitimize rebels’ governance and aims in the eyes of their prospective constituents. Rebel organizations seek to cast themselves as capable of governing territory and enforcing a political order as a way of gaining and maintaining the support of populations under their control[[23]](#footnote-23). As Huang (Forthcoming)) notes, rebels engage in diplomatic activity for both material and normative benefits: means to “advance their cause on the global stage”. One such benefit, international recognition, is elucidated by Coggins (2011). International recognition can indeed “make the state”, and that such processes, contrary to domestic politics-based theories of state emergence, are critical in state birth. Shelef and Zeira (2015) illuminate the domestic-level impact of such processes. They found that recognition of statehood by the United Nations had a significant impact on domestic attitudes towards partition, illustrating how this international phenomenon made individuals within a rebel-governed polity[[24]](#footnote-24) less likely to support territorial compromise. We can interpret this as an emboldening of a populace and a legitimization of the efforts of their leaders to gain international support. Likewise, as Huang (Forthcoming)) notes, during the Angolan Civil War, UNITA used diplomatic efforts as a means of enhancing their domestic legitimacy. The U.S-backed rebels invited journalists and patrons to their territory to showcase their accomplishments in state building, enhancing its international credibility. Huang also maintains that these public relations efforts “may have served as a significant boon to its domestic image and credibility as well, doing much to reassure the populace that this was not an isolated movement but one with the backing of powerful international allies”. It is thus clear that in these scenarios, CL would have a negative value. Thus, we could expect CL to be a function of the form of:

[FUNCTION HERE]

Despite the aforementioned, there are conditions under which all components of this model may not hold. Ethnic rebel groups do not exclusively use ethnic talk[[25]](#footnote-25), and even the presence of an ethnically similar diaspora population, state, or other patron is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ethnically-based appeals to occur. In short, we may see a degree of variance in our dependent variable. What explains such variation?

First, some rebel groups may simply not seek external support. Salehyan et. al (2011) state that “rebels that are quite strong relative to the government [that they are fighting] and can rely on domestic constituencies and local resources have less of a need for foreign funding and will be unwilling to give up their autonomy”. Likewise, rebels may fear losing their autonomy: “accepting funding from foreign patrons will often come with strings attached as the principal assumes some degree of control over the rebel’s agenda; rebels give up some control over their aims and tactics in exchange for outside help as sponsors are not likely to offer resources for free” (Salehyan et. al, 2011).

I anticipate that rebel groups will seek external patronage when they require out. Though this statement may sound tautological, when one considers that rebel groups may solicit support from local networks or simply not require support due to a surfeit of materiel and financial resources, its logic becomes more apparent. States can provide qualitatively different types of support than private individuals or diasporas can: one’s neighbors usually do not have attack helicopters and tanks parked in their backyards. Rebel groups are rarely as well-armed as the governments that they oppose and may be significantly outnumber and outgunned: states are the actors most capable of providing them with the necessary materiel (Salehyan et. al 2011). Rebel groups often require training and intelligence support: things that state actors can provide while local networks and diasporas cannot. Likewise, if a group has separatist aims, recognition by states-especially great powers-is key to the success of their statebuilding endeavors (Coggins 2011). Rebel diplomacy could prove to be the start of a relationship that leads to such recognition.

Among groups that do seek support, ethnic talk may not occur. Such groups may employ other framing processes and diplomatic methods. One variety of non-ethnic appeal common among rebel groups are those that appeal to actors whom Asal et. al (2014) refer to as “conscience constituents” [[26]](#footnote-26)and whom Salehyan et. al (2011) refer to as a “transnational constituency”. Members of this constituency of patrons may not share a common ethnicity with the group, but will support them out of concern for humanitarian and other normative concerns. Goulka, Hansell, Wilke, and Larson (2009) note how the Iranian Mujahidin e-Khalq “has become increasingly adept at crafting and promoting its image as a democratic organization that seeks to bring down Iranian tyrants, both secular and religious”. By framing its appeals around the group’s democratic character, it has gained support from non-Persian actors in the United States and Europe. (Goulka et al 2009). However, the authors of this paper note a pitfall that rebel groups seeking transnational support may encounter when seeking support: designation as a terrorist organization. They note: “ despite the MeK’s ongoing attempts to build political support from the West through a multifaceted public-relations campaign,6 it was not enough to prevent the group from being designated an FTO[[27]](#footnote-27) by the United States as well as by the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the European Union. According to U.S. law, providing any type of support—political, financial, or otherwise—for an FTO is a federal crime”. This issue may lead some groups to seek state support or support from groups or individuals in countries with more lax anti-terrorism laws.

Likewise, support-seeking groups may be sought out by patrons at the start rather than vice versa. Byman et. al (2001) maintain that state support for insurgents can be a form of “war by other means”; their claims are corroborated by statistical analyses by Saideman (2002) and Salehyan et. al (2011) that find rivalry between the government that a rebel group is fighting and the state that they receive support from has a strong, statistically significant effect on the likelihood of them receiving support[[28]](#footnote-28).

Despite the aforementioned, I still anticipate that ethnic rebel groups will still seek support from co-ethnic state patrons. Though Asal et. al (2014) posit that ethnic separatist groups are less likely to solicit support due to how their goals are “inherently narrow”, [DISPUTE]

**3.2: Ethnic Talk as Strategic Interaction**

Ethnic talk is a form of strategic interaction. Though the decision calculi of rebel groups can be modeled using decision theory, a different approach is required to model the role of ethnic talk at the international level. This requires a return to the tenets of Principal-Agent Theory.

An ethnic talk interaction between a rebel group and a state is a signaling game in which one party, the rebels (R, seek to strategically offer information about their unobservable type to the state (S). Such games are Bayesian: unlike games where the players have perfect information about others’ preferences, players in a Bayesian game probabilistically assess other players’ types and update their beliefs of them as play continues. Sobel (2007) defines this type of game as including “any strategic setting in which players can use the actions of their opponents to make inferences about hidden information”. Thus, a player will be able to determine, for some other’s action, *X*, the expected probability of some other action, *Y*, or Pr(X|Y).

In a signaling game between rebels and a state, the rebels will have full knowledge of their type, but the state will not. A “type” is a player’s private information, i.e. their characteristics that are not known to other actors involved in the game. A player’s beliefs about others’ types are presented in a probability distribution of possible types. At the outset of a typical signaling game, the rebels’[[29]](#footnote-29) type *t* is assigned by nature and represented in a set *T*. In this game, rebel groups have two possible types: convergent (*tC)* and divergent (*tD*)[[30]](#footnote-30). The goal of rebel groups is to signal their preference similarity *ex ante* to principals who will, *ceteris paribus*, prefer agents with similar preferences. The state’s prior beliefs over this set of preferences are common knowledge and represented in a set $π(T)$. After being assigned a type, the rebels will send a signal, *s*, to the state, drawn from a certain set of outcomes, *M*. The state then receives this signal and responds with an action, *a*, drawn from a set *A*. The strategies available to rebels are dichotomous: use ethnic talk or do not use ethnic talk. Likewise, the strategies available to available to the state are also dichotomous: provide support or do not provide support. The preferred outcome of the rebel group is to receive support; states fear agency costs and do not wish to give support to an agent that has preferences dissimilar to its own.

Given the aforementioned, the steps of the game will be as follows:

1. Types will be assigned by nature to the rebels (R), producing type *tC* or *tD* with corresponding probabilities
2. R signals their type to S by either using ethnic talk (E) or not using ethnic talk[[31]](#footnote-31) (N)
	1. Payoffs for “convergent” rebels will be maximized if ethnic talk is used, and payoffs for “divergent” rebels will be maximized if ethnic talk is not used
3. Based on R’s action, S chooses a response
	1. S will ascertain that rebels with convergent preferences will use ethnic talk and rebels with divergent preferences will not: the state determines the rebel group’s type from the signal they send
	2. Responding appropriately to R’s type will maximize S’s utilize, i.e. if rebels have convergent interests and they support them, if rebels have divergent interests and they do not support them
	3. R’s utility will be maximized if their interests are convergent with S and S chooses to support them.

As previously evinced, signaling games are Bayesian; i.e. they incorporate an element of conditional probability into calculating outcomes. A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is a strategy profile that maximizes a player’s expected payoff given their beliefs about other player’s types and the strategies they play. In order for there to be a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, two conditions must be fulfilled: sequential rationality and consistency. Sequential rationality is…

 Such an interaction can be graphically represented in the following extensive game. In this game, the probability of nature generating rebels with converging interests will be represented as *p*, whereas the probability of nature generating rebels with diverging interests will be represented as *1-p*. We can chart the payoffs of this game in Bayesian normal form as follows.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Rebel Typ** | **Rebel Action** | **State Response** | **Payoffs** |
| Convergent | Use Ethnic Talk | Support | (1,0) |
| Convergent | Use Ethnic Talk | Refuse | (3,1) |
| Convergent | No Ethnic Talk | Support | (0,0) |
| Convergent | No Ethnic Talk | Refuse | (2,1) |
| Divergent | Use Ethnic Talk | Support | (0,1) |
| Divergent | Use Ethnic Talk | Refuse | (2,0) |
| Divergent | No Ethnic Talk | Support | (1,1) |
| Divergent | No Ethnic Talk | Refuse | (3,0) |

 There are no Bayesian Nash equilibria in which the different types of rebels choose actions that do not match their types: each player will always have an alternate strategy that maximizes their utility. For example, if rebels used ethnic talk when their interests were divergent with the state (or did not when their interests were convergent), then the state must believe that they were dealing with the opposite type. Thus, the state’s best response would be to support when the rebels use ethnic talk and refuse support when they do not. However, this would result in divergent rebels wanting to change their strategy to no longer using ethnic talk. What then, are the Bayesian Nash equilibria? In order to determine this, we have to assign probabilities to the rebels’ strategies, as the best response functions for the state depend on the probability of rebels having convergent or divergent interests. We can represent the probability of rebels having convergent interests as C and the probability of rebels having divergent interests as C-1. If the value of C<.5, then there are no Bayesian Nash equilibria[[32]](#footnote-32). However, if the value of C ≥.5, then there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, which both rebels with convergent interests and divergent interests choose the same strategy and the state’s strategy is a best response for them.

There are two different types of equilibria in a signaling game such as this: separating equilibria and pooling equilibria. In a separating equilibrium, Player One (i.e. the rebels) will choose different actions, thus allowing Player Two (the state) to infer

 Consider the probabilities assigned to the different

Formally, this can be expressed as [MODEL HERE]

Can ethnic talk be accurately modeled by a traditional signaling game? Though Bayesian game theory proffers insights into this strategic rebel-state interaction, issues exist with the direct application of a basic signaling game as outlined above to this scenario. In such games, the signals sent by players have associated costs. The classic example given in Spence (1973) is that of a worker distinguishing himself from other workers to a hiring manager through educational attainment. Like many other signals-like peacocks growing full tail feathers[[33]](#footnote-33) and terrorists conducting suicide attacks[[34]](#footnote-34)-this is a costly signal. Though other parts of the rebel diplomatic process have associated costs, the practice of ethnic talk itself is costless. It is, essentially, cheap talk.

 Scholars studying the role of signaling in diplomacy and conflict have maintained that signals need to have an associated cost in order to be credible and thus effective (Fearon 1994; Fearon 1997; Morrow 1999). These “costly signals” signal “clear and direct positions from an external actor that are costly to establish and maintain”; they are expected to be effective due to the rational expectations of the signal receiver towards the sender’s future actions (Thyne 2006). The body of literature that maintains the effectiveness of costly signals dismisses that cheap talk can be as credible of a means of signaling. However, another, growing body of literature has countered this assertion and posited that cheap talk can be an effective means of signaling. Farrell and Rabin (1996) conceptualize cheap talk as: ““costless, nonbinding, non-verifiable messages that may affect the listener’s beliefs”. Sartori (2002) posits that cheap talk can be effective if an agent has a reputation for being honest, i.e. if previous cheap talk directed to the principle has been true. Thyne (2006) finds that costless signaling by a third party has a significant effect on civil war onset. Using experimental methods, Tingley and Walter (2011) find that bluffing-while costless-can still have an impact on actors’ behavior.

Given the aforementioned, we can assume that cheap talk may be an effective method of signaling.

[Cheap talk game here?]

Formally, this can be expressed as [MODEL HERE].

Another factor to note is that the bargaining environment between states and rebels is significantly altered when rebel diplomats engage with their co-ethnics among the population of a state. An illustrative example is that of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) who “cultivated a network of Eritreans living abroad” (Coggins 2014). Rebels engage with diasporas abroad in order to receive financial backing, as in the case of Irish-American groups’ support for the IRA. Coggins notes that individuals in diaspora groups are often wealthier and less politically repressed than their co-ethnics within rebel movements. An important implication of this is that these diaspora members are able to lobby their host governments in favor of supporting rebel groups with the direct or indirect support of rebel diplomats. Indeed, rebel diplomacy can become a coercive instrument under these circumstances. Nicolson (1963; cited in Coggins 2014) identifies two approaches to rebel diplomacy: the “shopkeeper” approach and the “warrior” approach. The “shopkeeper” will attempt to bargain for a durable agreement mutually beneficial to both involved parties; Coggins posits that this agreement will usually categorize rebel groups’ interactions with external states; i.e. potential patrons. The “warrior”, however, will view diplomacy as zero-sum: “when warriors use talk, their strategy is to secure their own goals at the expense of the other states and state leaders involved”, perhaps even to the point of having “diplomacy fully integrated as a tactic of war-fighting” (Coggins 2014) Coggins states that rebels will take a more coercive, warrior-like approach when engaging with the government they are fighting and gives the examples of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) exploiting periods of negotiation with their respective host governments to rearm, relocate, and retrench their forces. However, I maintain that such diplomatic tactics will be employed by rebel groups seeking external support under certain circumstances: particularly in the presence of large, supportive diaspora populations in the states they are attempting to gain patronage from. Coggins (2014) notes that members of diaspora populations, due to their greater levels of freedom of expression and movement, may often harbor more radical and hard-line views about the rebellion than their co-ethnics that live within the rebel group’s host state. It follows from this assertion that these individuals have a high level of means and willingness to engage in lobbying activities on behalf of the rebels they support.

 In sum, the previously outlined theory of Ethnic Talk, assumes that:

1) Rebels are rational actors who seek to maximize the utility and probability of success of diplomatic interactions

2) Being utility maximizers, rebels will target actors for lobbying from whom they expect to have the highest likelihood of receiving support and the lowest associated bargaining and transaction costs

3) Rebels will thus lobby states with whom they share ethnic linkages to increase their probability of success and utilize ethnic talk to reduce their cost of bargaining

An implication of this that will be further explored is that the level of regime responsiveness and regime fragility will influence the bargaining environment and thus the nature of rebel diplomatic efforts. Previous scholarship argued that states who were themselves vulnerable to ethnic conflict and secessionism would themselves refuse to support secessionist rebels. Touval, citing the example of West African states, notes “Since most states are vulnerable to external incitement to secession, it was obvious to the majority of states that reciprocal respect from boundaries, and mutual abstinence from irredentism, would be to their advantage” (Touval 1972). This argument, however, lacks empirical support (Saideman 2002; Saideman 2012). I concur with Saideman and argue that the opposite may be true: weaker states will actually be more likely to support ethnic rebel groups. This is both due to the fact that they are more vulnerable to the coercive efforts of rebel groups and that the process of supporting co-ethnic insurgents is a key part of the process of state formation and legitimization. As previously evinced, if leaders failed to support co-ethnic rebel groups, they would face backlash from their populations and run the risk of losing their positions of power. The impact of rebel diplomatic efforts should be magnified when a regime is more responsive to the demands of its population as well as more vulnerable to the demands of its population. The most fragile states are, in general, far from the most democratic. Many states in the so-called “Third World” have authoritarian forms of government but suffer “inadequate stateness”, i.e. a lack of coercive capacity, infrastructural power, unconditional legitimacy (Ayoob, 1995). Even so, authoritarian leaders cannot repress all sectors of the population, thus giving rebel diplomats some level of freedom of action as they move amongst and lobby their co-ethnics in a state’s population (Morgan and Palmer, n.d.).

**Chapter Four: Hypotheses and Methodology**

**4.1: Hypotheses**

 Thus, from the previously outlined theory, we can discern that rebels are utility maximizing actors who will engage in strategic, ethnically-based framing processes in order to increase their likelihood of diplomatic success. As previously evinced, the ethnic balance of a population may have a significant impact on the bargaining behavior of rebels, as they might act as transnational ethnic enterpreneurs . From this, we can derive our first hypothesis:

**H1: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's population are more likely to engage in diplomacy with or in that state than other states**

 **H1a: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's population are more likely to lobby that state using ethnically-based language than other states**

 Alternatively, rebel groups may seek to directly lobby governments for support. This line of action is more accounted for in the previously described formal model than rebel groups engaging with the population. Indeed, it may be a more likely way for rebels to maximize their expected utility. Thus, we hypothesize:

**H2: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of a state’s government are more likely to engage in diplomacy with or in that state than other states**

**H2a: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of a state’s government are more likely to lobby the state using ethnically-based language than other states**

I will accept and reject these hypotheses on the following bases:

1. The presence of strategic, ethnically-based talk
	1. i.e. talk that invokes shared ascriptive ties, identities, and/or memories
	2. to achieve specific goals
2. The direction of said talk must either be to a state’s government or population

**4.2 Variables**

Our independent variables are

A) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s ruling coalition to a rebel group

B) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s population to a rebel group

Our dependent variables are :

A) The presence of rebel diplomatic efforts

B) The usage of ethnic appeals within said efforts

Huang (Forthcoming)’s operational definition of rebel diplomacy, which defines its occurrence “as a rebel group’s conduct of foreign affairs during civil war for the purpose of advancing its military and political objectives”. To reiterate, she operationalizes this as when a group:

A) “Opens a political office abroad”

B) “Sends representatives abroad on political missions; or”

C) “Creates a political body devoted to the conduct of foreign affairs (such as a ministry of

foreign affairs)”

Huang opts for this operational definition as it : “identifies rebel groups that demonstrate their commitment to, and investment in, conducting foreign affairs; it helps to distinguish them from groups that may engage in propaganda or strategic talk but which fall short of these clear indications of intentional diplomatic engagement”. **Insofar as this operationalization pertains to our hypotheses, H1 and H2 can be assessed on the basis of Huang’s first two categories: i.e. rebel groups will be more likely to open political offices and/or send representatives to states where they share an ethnic identity with either the majority of the government coalition or the population. Our sub-hypotheses, H1a and H2a, however, can only be assessed on the basis of Huang’s second category, as it logically follows that representatives can engage in strategic talk whereas simply opening a political office of ministry of foreign affairs does not denote such an action.**

As previously mentioned, I conceptually define ethnic talk as the strategic use and invocation of shared language, cultural symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context. To operationalize this definition, it is necessary to set ex ante criteria to determine whether or not the rebels’ usage of talk is ethnically-based and strategic.

1. Do rebels use language in their appeals to potential patrons that invokes common ascriptive ties? (e.g. “Support your Irish/Palestinian/Armenian brothers!”)
2. Do rebels seek to achieve specific outcomes with said appeals? (e.g. gains in terms of recognition, material or financial support?)

The presence of an ethnically similar state is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for ethnic talk’s occurrence. As Kalyvas notes, individuals of the same ethnic group may not always support their kinsmen’s rebellious aspirations or may be mobilized to action along other lines. Likewise, some rebel groups may value external engagement more than others. Groups may prefer to rely on local networks for support rather than open themselves to the agency and legitimacy costs that could potentially arise from external patronage (Staniland 2014;Salehyan, et. al 2011).

Another issue that could arise is that the usage of similarity between a group and a state’s population may capture the impact of diaspora support as well as state support in its effect. [EXPAND]

Likewise, the effect of state government interference in the affairs of rebel groups that they sponsor could impact said rebels’ diplomatic behavior and rhetoric. If a rebel group is backed by a strong foreign patron from the outset-or created by one-it will have no need for diplomatic interaction for purposes of gaining support. The impact of direct involvement by Arab governments in the creation and affairs of the PLO and its constituent factions is an example of this that will be further discussed in the case studies of this paper. Likewise, states can directly intervene in rebel groups, taking control of factions within them and playing them against each other as befits their strategic interests. Staniland (2014) notes how this phenomenon occurred in Kashmir when the Pakistani government assumed direct control over some factions within the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) when they did not act according to their policy directives. **We thus face a significant methodological issue: support and apparent diplomatic activity may be supply-side rather than demand-side driven. In some cases, the phenomena observed in this study will be endogenous. The following case studies will necessarily assess these potential confounding factors and seek to ensure to the greatest extent possible that the lobbying efforts we observe are demand-side driven.**

**4.2 Methodology**

In order to assess the aforementioned hypotheses and shed greater light on the efficacy of this work’s formal theory, I will assess the Palestinian national movement from 1967-1982[[35]](#footnote-35) and see if there is evidence that supports the previously mentioned hypotheses.

**In order to conduct a successful analysis we must assess the overall relationship between our dependent variables (the presence of rebel diplomatic efforts in general and ethnic talk in particular) and our independent variables (closeness in ethnic composition between a rebel group and a government/population). A starting point for the development of this relationship can be extrapolated in the following Pearson correlations[[36]](#footnote-36)**

|  |
| --- |
| Correlations |
|  | State Support | Close Kindred |
| State Support | Pearson Correlation | 1 | .189\*\* |
| Sig. (2-tailed) |  | .000 |
| N | 837 | 837 |
| Close Kindred | Pearson Correlation | .189\*\* | 1 |
| Sig. (2-tailed) | .000 |  |
| N | 837 | 852 |
| \*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). |

|  |
| --- |
| **Correlations** |
|  | Close Kindred | Political Support from Kindred |
| Close Kindred | Pearson Correlation | 1 | .105\*\* |
| Sig. (2-tailed) |  | .002 |
| N | 852 | 852 |
| Political Support from Kindred | Pearson Correlation | .105\*\* | 1 |
| Sig. (2-tailed) | .002 |  |
| N | 852 | 852 |
| \*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). |

These analyses were conducted with data from the Minorities at Risk project (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The variable “GC10” in this dataset is coded dichotomously, with 0 representing a complete absence of international kin, 1 representing “close kindred across a border which does not adjoin [a group’s] regional base (including groups that have transnational kindred but not a regional base)”, 2 representing “close kindred in a country that adjoins its regional base”, and 3 representing “close kindred in more than one country which adjoins its regional base” (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Thus, with nearer and greater numbers of kin members relative to the base of a group, the greater likelihood that they will receive support from a state’s government as well as their kin. Though these two phenomena may be endogenous, **our theory suggests that they share** a common root in rebels’ lobbying efforts.

**Additional statistical tests conducted using the Minorities at Risk data reveal further insights into our relationships of interest. [EXPAND]**

|  |
| --- |
| **Directional Measures** |
|  | Value | Asymp. Std. Errora | Approx. Tb | Approx. Sig. |
| Ordinal by Ordinal | Somers' d | Symmetric | .143 | .033 | 4.178 | .000 |
| KINSUP Dependent | .102 | .024 | 4.178 | .000 |
| STASUP Dependent | .238 | .053 | 4.178 | .000 |
| a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. |
| b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. |

 **Lastly, inputting the following variables into a regression can allow us to determine their impact on state support for insurgency:**

1. **KINSUP (Support from kindred)**
2. **GC10 (Kindred present nearby)**
3. **GC11 ( Kindred groups in power)**
4. **GC2 (Kindred groups present in regional base)**

|  |
| --- |
| **Coefficientsa** |
| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients | Standardized Coefficients | t | Sig. |
| B | Std. Error | Beta |
| 1 | (Constant) | .187 | .043 |  | 4.347 | .000 |
| GC10 | .074 | .022 | .146 | 3.414 | .001 |
| KINSUP | .234 | .053 | .151 | 4.453 | .000 |
| GC11 | .018 | .018 | .038 | 1.001 | .317 |
| GC2 | .054 | .043 | .054 | 1.250 | .212 |
| a. Dependent Variable: STASUP |



**These results indicate…**

We can theorize this relationship as occurring due to several key reasons. First, rebel groups face a dearth of resources. This lack is both what drives rebel groups to seek support in the first place as well as a factor that limits many groups’ abilities to conduct diplomatic efforts far afield (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011; Jones and Mattiacci 2015). Next, kin in countries adjacent to the rebel group’s host state are likely to share common historical memories and experiences with the members of the group targeted for lobbying. The case of the Palestinians (which will be explored in the next chapter) is illustrative, with thousands of Palestinians fleeing or being expelled from mandate Palestine in 1948 to the adjacent states of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan (Morris, 2011). Palestinians living inside historic Palestine (i.e. Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip) and the Palestinian refugees living in neighboring states share bonds of religion, family, culture, and the common historical memory of the 1948 *Nakba* (“catastrophe”)[[37]](#footnote-37). This common historical memory between members of this group lead to the concept of return to historic Palestine achieving great salience, so much so that rebel groups founded in neighboring states, such as the *Abtal al-Awda* (“Heroes of the Return”), incorporated it into their names and stated goals. These shared historical memories greatly increase the salience of ethnic linkages; i.e. the actionability of certain categories

**4.3: Assessing Relationships of Importance**

**In order to assess this relationship, we will begin by assessing the role of the independent variable, shared ethnic identity, in relevant group-state relationships. How shall we determine “relevancy”? As previously evinced, our hypotheses will be tested through case studies of the Palestinian National Movement between 1967 and 1982. We thus need to develop a criterion of political relevancy for states in this period to be examined across our cases.**

 **Lemke and Reed (2001) assess the examination of politically relevant dyads-pairs of states that include at least one major power-in international relations and determine that the analyses of these pairs does not pose threats to valid inference. For the purposes of this study we need not ask what states are relevant exclusively to the broader international system, but relevant as potential patrons of Palestinian rebel movements.**

 **Expanding on the traditional conceptualization of political relevance, we can create four categories:**

1. **Major powers**
2. **Arab states**
3. **Muslim-majority states (Outside of the Middle East)**
4. **Communist states (Other than the USSR)**

**Major powers are deemed to be politically relevant as they are not only the most important actors in the international system, but are theoretically capable of providing more and better support than other state actors. Arab states are deemed relevant both because of their ethnic links to the Palestinian national movement but due to their proximity to rebel groups’ areas of operations. The remaining two categories-Muslim-majority states and Communist states-were selected as religious and ideological identifications could provide additional categories for strategic framing. Palestinian groups such as Fatah incorporated elements of Marxist and Islamist thought into their ideologies, making these categories potentially usable in diplomatic framing. As the aim of this work is to test the salience of ethnicity in diplomatic appeals, we need to examine the fact that groups may utilize other categories around which to frame their appeals.**

**Our sample[[38]](#footnote-38) of major powers is:**

**1) The United States**

**2) The United Kingdom**

**3) The Soviet Union (USSR)**

**4) France**

**5) China (PRC)**

**Our sample[[39]](#footnote-39) of Arab States is:**

1. **Iraq**
2. **Syria**
3. **Egypt**
4. **Libya**
5. **Algeria**

**Our sample[[40]](#footnote-40) of Muslim-majority states consists of:**

1. **Pakistan**
2. **Saudi Arabia**
3. **Somalia**
4. **Turkey**
5. **Indonesia**

**Our sample[[41]](#footnote-41) of Communist states includes:**

**1) East Germany**

**2) Romania**

**3) South Yemen**

**4) Yugoslavia**

**5) Poland**

 **In selecting these states, we assume that ethnicity, ideology, and/or religion are salient to the *weltanschauungen[[42]](#footnote-42)* of the states that we have selected. Though some studies (see Freedman 1988) conceptualize of ideology as a “flexible tool” for justifying *realpolitik*  aims, others take a more holistic view, perceiving it as Hale (2004) does ethnicity: as a “radar” through which a state’s *weltanschauung*, and hence its foreign policy, is developed[[43]](#footnote-43).**

**Having selected our states, we need to determine…**

1. **The largest ethnic group in each state’s population**
2. **The dominant ethnic group of the state’s ruling coalition**
3. **Whether or not a given Palestinian faction reaches out to them in each given period**

**We can follow the logic of King, Keohane, and Verba (year)…**

**Additionally, we can code dichotomous variables for each of these values and run a simple logistic regression to complement our case studies[[44]](#footnote-44).**

**[REGRESSION RESULTS HERE]**

 **As we can see…**

 **Kirisci (1986) details the process by which the PLO mobilized support as at times growing from and at other times occurring between different conceptual levels.**

****

Figure 1: The spread of the mobilization of PLO support from one conceptual level to another. From Kirisci (1986).

 **Though Kirisci initially expected the provision of support to progress in a linear step function (such as the one graphed above), it often occurred between conceptual levels, with higher levels (i.e. international institutions such as the UN and Non-Aligned Movement) causing greater support at lower levels (Such as from Arab or Islamic States). This behooves us to assess the role of rebel diplomacy in this process.**

 **We included dummy variables for membership in NATO, the African Union, and the Non-Aligned Movement. These groupings have been shown to be salient…**

 It is thus necessary to find cases that show either the presence or absence of ethnically-based diplomatic appeals within this time period directed either at states or at populations within them (with the intent of using them to lobby a state’s government). Potentially confounding factors, such as the impact of ideology, rivalry, and the Palestinian diaspora will need to be analyzed and accounted for.

There is, however, a difficulty in obtaining data that are sufficient for this analysis. The minutes of private meetings between Palestinian rebel leaders and foreign heads of state are unavailable. However, other methods of analysis can allow one to deduce the presence and efficacy of targeted, strategic ethnic appeals. This work will utilize such a method.

First, following Pearlman (2011), this analysis will disaggregate the broader Palestinian National Movement into constituent groups for the purposes of examining the diplomatic behavior of these specific actors. The groups that will be assessed are Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

These particular cases were selected using the most –similar case method. All of the cases were selected from the same nationalist movement, though we expect to see a significant degree in the dependent variable (i.e. in their diplomatic strategies). This will allow us to control for a number of different outcomes and have a high degree of internal validity in our results. However, for the sake of intellectual honesty, it is important to note the flaws of this particular method of case selection. Though it has relatively high internal validity, its external validity is relatively low: insights gained from the study of the Palestinian national movement may not be generalizable to other cases. Likewise, the reasoning inherent in it is deterministic rather than probabilistic, which may be problematic for analysis. Even so, it is the best possible tool to utilize to assess our hypotheses.

The 1967-1982 time period will be broken down into three five year periods (’67-72, ’72-77, 77-82). Next, using academic sources, the states and populations targeted for lobbying by each group will be identified for each of the three periods. Then, utilizing available documents released by these groups (Such as those listed in Kadi, 1967, and available online), the rhetoric of these groups can be analyzed to see if any examples of targeted appeals exist. The latter step is critical to this analysis, yet it also leaves open the most possibility for error, particularly causality error. As the first paper on the subject of ethnic talk, a certain degree of humility is required: this work does not pretend to give final answers on this topic, and its analysis will likely be flawed. However, given the nature of extant literature on this topic and the availability of suitable data, this method should still be able to provide insights into a topic not previously explored.

As previously mentioned, I conceptually define ethnic talk as the strategic use and invocation of shared language, cultural symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context. To operationalize this definition, I ask:

A) Do rebels use language in their appeals to potential patrons that invokes common ascriptive ties? (e.g. “Support your Irish/Palestinian/Armenian brothers!”)

The presence of an ethnically similar state is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for ethnic talk’s occurrence. As Kalyvas notes, individuals of the same ethnic group may not always support their kinsmen’s rebellious aspirations or may be mobilized to action along other lines. Likewise, some rebel groups may value external engagement more than others. Groups may prefer to rely on local networks for support rather than open themselves to the agency and legitimacy costs that could potentially arise from external patronage (Staniland 2014)(Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011).

Let us return to the previously written decision theory:

**L iff EPr(S)-TCD-CL>0**

Each of the case studies will assess the variables contained in this model (Expected probability of diplomatic success, total cost of diplomacy, cost to legitimacy) of this model in each five year period to see if its expectations are met.

**4.4: Sources’ role in the method**

 One major obstacle in conducting research for this work was the difficulty of finding sufficient data. Even if one can prove the expected utility of ethnic talk and note all the reasons that it should happen, one must still find examples of it occurring. However, this presents a critical problem: the private transcripts of diplomatic interaction between rebel groups and states are inaccessible for researchers, if said transcripts even exist at all. It is thus not possible to directly examine the process of ethnic talk. However, examining public pronouncements and documents by rebel groups within the periods of interest, their examining targets (or rhetorical objects), and then comparing this information to the known supporters of these groups within these periods will allow us to deduce the presence (or absence) of ethnic talk between rebel groups and their patrons.

Fortunately, such accounts were easily located. Works such as Kadi (1967), Lukacs (1984), and others contain primary sources from the representative time periods. Such primary sources that are included are:

1. Founding documents of organizations (i.e. the PLO charter)
2. Interviews given by members and leaders of organizations
3. Public pronouncements made by members and leaders of organizations

There are several problems with this method of deductive analysis that must be addressed. First, we cannot directly discern the presence of ethnic talk. This is of particular concern due to the deterministic nature of case studies’ results. Next, public pronouncements may not be reflective of the material aims and intentions of the group: their appeals to ethnic affectations may simply be lip service rather than representative of a deeper salience of such ties. Likewise, as previously noted, a number of exogenous factors can cause variance in the dependent variable. Proclamations by groups may occur as a result of state support rather than as a cause of them. **As Kirisci (1986) evinces, the fluid and dynamic processes of mobilizing support for a rebel group can often be endogenous and difficult to identify individually.**

 **In sum ,we can conceptualize our research problem as the issue of separating potentially actionable issue frames from one another, identifying supply-side and demand-side factors, and determining which of these frames and forces were salient in Palestinian groups’ rebel diplomatic efforts. Our identification of different state categories and the preceding logistic regression allow us to…**

**Chapter Five: Cases from the Palestinian National Movement**

*“Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.”*- The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council July 1-17, 1968

**5.1: Introduction**

The Palestinian National Movement is a case that is both like and unlike many other rebel groups. The activities of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its constituent factions have taken place in a network of diplomatic interactions between Arab and non-Arab states.

 **The Palestinian national movement is rooted in Arab resistance to the British Mandate and to increasing Jewish immigration to historic Palestine. Indeed, as resistance to these outside forces continued throughout the first half of the 20th century, a distinct Palestinian identity developed through and alongside them. Nascent nationalism, often framed in Islamic terms, could be seen in the rhetoric of leaders such as Izz al-Din al-Qassam and Haj Amin al-Husseini. However, it was not until the 1960s that a cogent Palestinian national movement began to coalesce (Kirisci 1986).**

 The deep salience of transnational ethnic ties is elucidated by Fawcett (2014) and Barnett (1998), who notes that the Arab states of the Middle East are “territorial states” rather than nation states, which has resulted in conflict over norms and identity in the international politics of the region. **Indeed, the dynamics of support for the Palestinian cause are inseparable from regional rivalries and the domestic politics of Arab states. Indeed, the PLO’s creation resulted from such a rivalry: Egypt’s Nasser, not wanting to be perceived as weak in the face of an Iraqi appeal to establish a Palestinian government in the West Bank and Gaza, backed the creation of an armed organization to reclaim all of historic Palestine. This seemingly minor diplomatic footnote resulted in the birth of this highly influential guerilla organization. Though Yasser Arafat maintained that the Palestinian people “had to be rescued from the stranglehold of Arab tutelage, inter-party discord, and regional Arab policies” his Fatah faction and others never truly attained autonomy from their Arab neighbors (Rubin 1994). Miller (1983) corroborates this, noting that the contentious inner politics of Arab states and their strong influence over Palestinian groups limited the PLO’s autonomy. He avers: “The PLO’s dilemma is clear. Palestinian power, indeed, the success and survival of the movement, depends upon Arab support”.**

**The supply-demand framework that Salehyan et. al (2011) provide us with gives us a powerful theoretical lens with which to assess this national movement. A number of factors in the extant literature-such as those previously mentioned-fall under the purview of supply-side influences.**

 **Though…**

In this historical analysis, we will assess the Palestinian national movement from 1967-1982 and see if there is evidence that supports the previously outlined theory of ethnic talk. Thus, it is necessary to find cases that show either the presence or absence of ethnically-based diplomatic appeals within this time period directed either at states or at populations within them (with the intent of using them to lobby a state’s government).

**5.2: Palestinian Ethnic Identity**

Necessarily, ethnic talk requires an ethnic identity. However, reaching a working definition of Palestinian ethnicity and its origin is both a necessary and difficult endeavor. The origin of Palestinian identity in particular has been a topic of lively scholarly debate. Al-Hout (1984) maintains a primordialist perspective on Palestinian identity, positing that a cogent Palestinian nationalism has existed since the time of the Canaanites. Muslih (1988) against this perspective, and argues that Palestinian identity is a product of two important developments that occurred during the First World War: the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire and the fragmentation of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic ideology. Muslih’s assessment emphasizes that these factors lead to the development of a local form of nationalism, known as *wataniyya*. Khalidi (1992) and Migdal and Kimmerling furthers this argument, noting that this particular form of nationalism developed due to the religious and political importance of Jerusalem.

this study will follow the work of Sayigh who (1997) posits that Palestinian identity is both deeply related to[[45]](#footnote-45)-and distinct from[[46]](#footnote-46)-other Arab identities. Palestinian ethnic identity, like other such identities, is socially constructed and

“Palestinian” is an ethnic category within the broader spectrum of Arab identities. As Wilkinson (2006) posits, situations of conflict can harden ethnic identities, or lead to the “activation” of ethnic categories (Chandra 2012). Historical evidence suggests that…

**5.3: Palestinian Rebel Diplomacy**

Palestinian rebel groups were active diplomats. Indeed, Mishal (1986) notes that “the PLO considered engagement in diplomatic activity essential to furthering the goal of a Palestinian State”. If we are to follow Huang (Forthcoming)’s operationalization, Palestinian groups engaged in all three forms of rebel diplomatic activity, as they opened offices abroad, had a department for the conduct of international affairs[[47]](#footnote-47) and sent representatives on political missions. Palestinian armed groups conducted diplomatic activity with Arab States in the Middle East, non-Arab states outside of the region, and other armed groups. **However, did these groups engage in diplomatic activity in the ways and for the reasons hypothesized in this work? In order to determine this, we must engage with the historical and political record of events and the context in which such diplomatic activities occurred, drawing several key assumptions from the extant literature.**

**First, the relationship of the PNM’s constituent factions to Arab states was by their subordinate status. Rubin (1994) maintains: “the Arab states often saw the PLO as a useful tool to manipulate but never considered it an equal partner, never consulting it nor respecting its interests when setting their policy” and that “When not ignoring the PLO, they interfered with it”. Even so, Palestinian groups were dependent on Arab states for “bases, supplies, training, money, arms, political backing, and protection against retaliation” (Rubin 1994). Though Palestinian groups such as Fatah sought to maximize their autonomy to the greatest extent possible, diplomatic relations with other states still occurred across a vast power differential. Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, “[controlled] large territories, huge economic resources, well-equipped armies, and populations far exceeding the total number of Palestinians” (Rubin 1994). This power differential, and Palestinian group’s inextricable linkages to the inner politics and rivalries of Arab states “crippled PLO diplomacy” (McLaurin 1989). However, these linkages ensured the survival the group. Demand-side incentives very likely influenced the PLO’s continued engagement with Arab states. Despite the severe costs to their autonomy, Arab governmental support gave Palestinian factions legitimacy on the “Arab street” and continued material benefits.**

**Next, influential individuals-rather than an organized diplomatic corps-were responsible for much of Palestinian groups’ rebel diplomatic activity. Leaders of groups, such as the PFLP’s George Habash or Fatah’s Yasser Arafat personally traveled to different states and lobbied on behalf of their factions: “Arafat traveled in perpetual motion among Arab capitals, preserving his connections and making deals” (Rubin 1994).**

In many ways, the PLO is both like and unlike other rebel groups engaged in diplomacy. **The PLO was active in diplomacy with state governments, but the Palestinian diaspora played an important role in Palestinian efforts to gain external support. As Byman et. al (2011) evince:**

**“..diasporas are largely motivated by ethnic affinity. Indeed, almost inherent to the idea of a diaspora is the concept of homeland. Communities abroad often feel a genuine**

**sympathy for the struggles of their brethren elsewhere. At times, they may also feel a sense of guilt that they are safe while those left behind are enmeshed in brutal and bloody conflict. Insurgent groups actively play on this sympathy and guilt to secure criticalfinancial and political support. When such support is not forthcoming, insurgents sometimes resort to coercion”.**

 **Byman et. al (2011) also note that diasporas have been active in securing political support for insurgencies. Citing the cases of the Armenian, Kurdish, and Tamil diasporas, the authors note that these actors have succeeded in pressuring governments to provide support to the rebel groups that represent them. Governments may choose not to-or be unable to-block support for diasporas. In the particular case of the PNM, Arab states chose to continue the provision of support to Palestinian groups due to the risk of reprisals from Palestinians angered by a perceived lack of resolve or of acquiescence to Israel. These risks were born both from dramatic events such as the assassination of Jordanian King Abdullah I as well as the high population of Palestinian refugees throughout the Middle East. [EXPAND]**

 **As the role of the PLO in outreach to Palestinian diaspora/refugee populations is well documented[[48]](#footnote-48), the role that this paper needs to play is in establishing the link between the processes of mobilizing support among Palestinian refugees and ensuring support from Arab governments. It logically follows that this process could take either a direct or an indirect form.**

 **In its direct form, after being inspired (or coerced) by rebels’ lobbying efforts, members of a population will**

 **In its indirect form…**

 **Thus, if we are to assess the role of ethnicity in Palestinian factions to gain**

 -Transnational from the start: “external leadership” in other Arab states

**5.4: Expected Results**

 In line with our hypotheses, we expect to see Palestinian armed groups **lobby states whose populations and ruling coalitions are ethnically similar (i.e. Arab) to themselves. We also expect to see the employment of ethnic talk in their diplomatic appeals.**

 **We should expect lobbying to occur based on the conditions outlined in our model. [MORE DETAILS]**

 -Theoretically, should decrease TCD because of shorter distance

 -However, this may have an ambiguous effect on PrS

 -Diplomacy with neighboring states🡪often highly contentious (McLaurin 1989)

 -CL, in most cases, should tend towards zero

 **We should expect the PLO to have experienced both setbacks and successes in their diplomatic efforts with co-ethnic states. As Miller (1983) recognizes, the issue of Palestine, driven on to Arab governments’ agendas by large Palestinian refugee populations, was very politically salient in this period, and outbidding among states often occurred.**

****

Figure 2: Palestinian refugee population 1977, from Kirisci (1986)

**5.5: Ethnicity and Ideology**

 **Though constituent parts of a national movement, Palestinian armed groups incorporated non-nationalistic elements into their ideological frames of reference. The doctrinal and ideological heterodoxy of these armed groups presents us with a research conundrum: what frames were most actionable and when? Indeed, these dimensions of ideology and identity could have been strategically invoked in negotiations in lieu of ethnicity.**

 **We must first identify frames of relevance. Rubin argues that Fatah’s ideology evolved throughout the 1960s into an eclectic blend of “Islam [and] Marxism-Leninism [and also] Third World radical nationalism” (Rubin 1994). Fortunately, we are well prepared to confront this issue, as our criteria of political relevancy for states include both Muslim states and Communist states.**

**5.5a: The Role of Arab Nationalism**

As Ayoob (1995) notes: “Most regimes in Africa and the Middle East do not meet the test of political legitimacy by a long measure because they preside over artificial colonial constructs that are very vulnerable to internal challenges”. The creation of the PLO-and the relationship between its constituent groups and Arab states-was highly moderated by the potential agency costs of that relationship, specifically to states’ sovereignty. As previously evinced, Fawcett (2014) posits that Arab states are not nation-states, but rather “territorial states”[[49]](#footnote-49), in which a transnational ethnic group dominates multiple states and no one state government can legitimately claim to speak for the “Arabs”. In this vacuum of legitimacy, the cause of Palestine provided an opportunity for Arab leaders to showcase their ethnic *bona fides* to their populations and in normative competition with other states (Barnett, 1998). Palestinian groups employed the language of Arabism in their propaganda and in engagements with Arab states, which played both with and against the interests of Arab leaders.

Perhaps due to the factors that Fawcett (2014) outlined, the Arab Middle East’s most widespread ethnic nationalism, Arabism, has taken on a variety of forms both disparate and unified. No one individual has been able to legitimately speak for the entire “Arab street”, though some with pretensions to such a position, such as the leaders of Egypt and Syria, would perceive a vehicle for their ambitions in the factions of the Palestinian national movement. Indeed, in order to understand the successes and failures of these groups’ efforts at lobbying for support, it is necessary to understand the tensions that existed between the competing forms of Arabism.

Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch (1973), as well as other scholars, (See Baram 1983) identify the different varieties of Arab nationalism: *qawmiyya* nationalism and *wataniyya* nationalism. The former, derived from the word *qawm* (nation, people) is a variety of ethnic nationalism that signifies an affinity to the Arab people conceived as a whole. As previously evinced, the latter is derived from the word *watan* (homeland) and representss a local commitment to one’s own country rather than the whole imagined community of the Arabs (Muslih 1988; Anderson 1982). The ethnic –based appeals of Palestinian groups contended with and appealed to different aspects of these nationalisms at different points. **Necesarilly, *qawmiyya* was utilized when appealing to Pan-Arabist sentiments, and *wataniyya* was employed when lobbying Palestinian populations within states.**

*Wataniyya* , as a form of local nationalism ,is inextricably linked to the concerns over autonomy and sovereignty that Ayoob (1995) identifies. Arab leaders, such as King Hussein of Jordan, sought to combat “regionalism” (*iqlimiyya*), i.e. the efforts of hardline Palestinian groups to appeal to *qawmiyya* nationalism and seek the overthrow of conservative, “reactionary” regimes such as Hussein’s, which were perceived as being opposed to the liberation of Palestine and servants of Western interests (Sayigh, 1997).**A possible explanation for this is as follows.**  In order to defuse these leaders’ concerns and ensure the ongoing provision of support, the leadership of Fateh framed its cause as one that sought to create a Palestinian state rather than a pan-Arab polity. They accomplished this by emphasizing the distinctiveness of their Palestinian identity and framing their efforts in the language of *wataniyya*. However, some Palestinian groups, such as the PFLP, employed the language of *qawmiyya* and won the support of revisionist Arab states such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya. These states were relatively small and dissatisfied with the regional status quo, as shown by their long-standing unwillingness to make peace with Israel. Heraclides (1990) found that such states are more likely to intervene on behalf of or support rebel groups for ideational or ideological reasons. Thus, “regionalist” appeals played into their interests. **However, this interpretation contradicts the scholarly consensus on the matter, which posits that the PLO’s emphasis on the “specificity” of Palestinian nationalism is rooted in the failures of Pan-Arabism to provide a solution to the question of Palestine. Even so, t**hrough the case of Palestine, we can see ethnic appeals’ fluid nature.

Mishal (1986) notes: “ a dual Arab-Palestinian identity, a shared commitment to pan-Arab political unity, and exposure to both symbolic and material influences from different Arab regimes increased the tendency among the Palestinian organizations to endow their Palestinian national aspirations with an all-Arab meaning. No Palestinian could afford to be accused by fellow Arabs of preferring parochial Palestinian interests (*iqlimiyya*) over broad Arab nationalist ones”.

Mishal (1986) likewise notes how Palestinian rebel groups “searched for differing formulas to balance the demands of Arab nationalism and the requirements of Palestinian aspirations”. Such rhetorical shifts are not surprising: as Fazal (2013) notes, rebel groups will often alter their behavior in order to gain or maintain international recognition and support.

The oft-uneasy balance between the aspirations of Palestinian *wataniyya* and Arab *qawmiyya* is most starkly reflected in the language of the 1968 Palestinian National Covenant. Article 8 of the covenant states that: “The phase in which the people of Palestine is living is that of national struggle” and utilizes the adjective *watani* to stipulate the specific, Palestinian nature of this endeavor. Article 11, however, stipulates: “The Palestinians will have three mottoes, national unity; national mobilization and liberation”, describing their unity as part of *wataniyya* and their mobilization in terms of *qawmiyya*. This rhetorical tension is further reflected in Articles 12-15 of the Covenant. The former article, in its entirety, reads: “The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab unity. In order to fulfill its role in realizing this, it must preserve, in this phase of its national struggle, its Palestinian personality and the constituents thereof, increase consciousness of its existence and resist any plan that tends to integrate or weaken it”. The rhetoric of this part of the Covenant affirms the tension between maintaining a commitment to the ideals of pan-Arabism while not presenting an overtly maximalist viewpoint that would alienate the PLO’s state sponsors. This is evident in the usage of the adjective *watani[[50]](#footnote-50)* to describe their struggle rather than *qawmi*, all while offering rhetorical overtures to Arab unity. Articles 13 and 14 explicitly frame the issue of Palestine in Pan-Arab terms: “The destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the very Arab existence, depends upon the destiny of the Palestine issue”, as does Article 15, which states that Palestine is part of “the great Arab homeland” and that it is “a national (qawmi) duty to repulse the Zionist, Imperialist invasion” of it. As well as a means of assuaging the fears of Arab leaders, the PLO’s rhetorical paeans to *wataniyya* were a means of addressing the fundamental paradox of Palestinian nationalism: as Palestinians are Arabs who share a similar culture, language, religion, and history to other Arabs, they could be denied the right to their own particular state. Emphasizing the particular, Palestinian elements of their identity and of the territory they sought to control was a legitimizing strategy that allowed the PLO to continue to function as a national movement. As will be reflected in the case studies to come, the balance between these forms of nationalism was not always easily maintained.

Palestinian rebel diplomats likewise faced a unique dynamic vis a vis the Palestinian refugee population in neighboring Arab states. Palestinian armed groups depended heavily on the provision of sanctuary and support by local populations. Particularly in Lebanon, the greatest providers of such support to Palestinian guerillas were Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps on the outskirts of major cities like Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon.

**5.6 The Case of Fatah**

 **Yasser Arafat, a Palestinian activist who would arguably become the most important figure in the Palestinian history, founded the** Palestinian National Liberation Movement, better known by the reverse acronym Fatah[[51]](#footnote-51), **in 1959. Though dedicated to the reconquest of Palestine, Fatah was international from its inception: Arafat widely traveled, recruiting members and establishing bases abroad in Algeria, Syria, and Jordan in the years after the group’s founding.**

 **In 1969, Arafat became the Chairman of the PLO. Arafat’s “resistance-oriented” leadership “enabled the PLO to have a more effective and central role in mobilizing the Palestinians and in expanding its basis of support both at the local and the international level” (Kirisci 1986).**

**[More background on Fatah here]**

-Balance between Wataniyya and Qawmiyya in appeals

-Consequences and implications

-Effect on variables

 -Why we see x, why we don’t see y at z times

**5.6a: Fatah from 1967-1972**

 **In 1967, Israel defeated the armies of Egypt and Syria in the Six Day War. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this event to the politics of the Middle East in general and of Palestine in particular.**

 **In 1968, however…**

 **Great Powers…**

Fatah did not seek support exclusively from their Arab neighbors. In March 1970, a delegation from Fatah visited Beijing: indeed, Arafat is quoted as saying that the People’s Republic of China was “the biggest influence in supporting our revolution and supporting its perseverance”. (Harris 1977). Prior to 1967, China had already met with members of the PLO. In 1965, a delegation led by Ahmed Shuqairy arrived in Peking to “flag-waving crowds beating drums and gongs” (Cooley 1971). This visit resulted in Shuqairy’s signing of a pact for Chinese diplomatic, economic, and military support. According to an Israeli military report released in 1967, such aid consisted of small arms as well as “anti-tank and anti-vehicle artillery, decontamination chemicals and carloads of poison gas” (Cooley 1971). **Kirisci (1986) notes how Fatah’s ideology and framing strategies played a key role in consolidating support China and other Communist states in Asia. Visits from Arafat and other PLO officials coincided with the Chinese government stating that the issue of Palestinian self-determination was “no longer [merely] an international dispute over refugees, but [a] manifestation of the national liberation struggle of a distinct Palestinian people”. Arafat likewise made visits to North Korea and North Vietnam in the early 1970s, which resulted in the opening of diplomatic offices in these states and the provision of support. Israeli (in Norton and Greenberg 1989), notes the importance of supply-side factors in this relationship. [EXPAND]**

 **He notes that the PLO exploited the Sino-Soviet rivalry, but ignores other demand-side incentives, such as the internal conflict over ideological aims within the PLO.**

 **Arab States…**

Clearly, Fatah’s rhetoric was directed to Arab as well as non-Arab audiences. Indeed, this was necessary as the “core Problem” that Fatah face was winning “official Arab recognition” after 1967 (Mishal 1986). As previously evinced, it was necessary for Fatah to appeal to the maximalist aspirations of the Pan-Arab governments of Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, while emphasizing the local nature of their revolution so as not to alienate supporters who feared irredentism. In a 1968 interview with the newspaper *Al-Muharrir,*  Yasser Arafat described the Palestinian struggle for Palestine as “Palestinian in face, but Arab in heart”, and in a 1970 statement released from Beirut, a Fatah spokesman stated: “We in Fatah view Palestine in terms of [Arab] national, not geographic dimensions”. However, in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al-Rai al-Aam*, Fatah official Hani Al-Hassan stated: “We in the Palestinian revolution aspire to the day we will begin our social revolution, but it is nonsense to insist that we wage both [Palestinian and Arab] revolutions together, because if we do, we will lose both”.

What was the reality of the situation? Fatah sought to achieve their “parochial” goal of taking control over all of Mandate Palestine before seeking Arab unity. Mishal (1986) notes how Arafat sought to make appeals to both Arab Nationalist ideals while reassuring his Arab backers of non-interference in their own governments.

In a 1968 interview with French newspaper *Jeune Afrique* , Arafat said: “Since we do not interfere in the affairs of the Arab countries, since we have in common with them and with the Arab people the objective of ending the Israeli occupation, we see no reason for conflict between us”. By rhetorically delineating boundaries between the Palestinian “we” and the “them” of the Arab states of the Middle East, Arafat seeks to assuage the fears of Arab leaders who fear Arab nationalist irredentas in their own borders. As Mishal (1986) confirms, Fatah’s “cooperative” approach with Arab regimes was based on the assumption that “the fewer the ideological arguments over Arab national issues, the greater the chance to reach a workable consensus and to mobilize broad support from fellow Arabs”.

 **Muslim-majority states…**

 **Communist states…**

Likewise Fatah received support from the Soviet Union. **In the aftermath of the 1967 war, all Eastern European countries (save for Romania) ended their diplomatic relations with Israel. The perspectives of Warsaw Pact states evolved substantially between this year and 1972, changing from simply viewing the issue of Palestine as a refugee problem[[52]](#footnote-52) to one of national liberation. Kirisci (1986) notes two “breakthroughs” that influenced these states’ perceptions: Palestinian groups’ increased usage of violence on the local level and the increased discussion of Palestinian rights on the international level.**

Fatah first made diplomatic contact with the USSR in 1968, courtesy of Egyptian leader Gamal abd el-Nasser, **who facilitated a meeting between Arafat and Kremlin officials.** However, the movement’s leaders made independent trips to Moscow in the early 1970s, including a 1971 trip by Yasser Arafat that cemented the provision of training and medical aid from the Soviets (Reppert 1989). **As Reppert (1989) evinces, the PLO was “willing to seize the initiative in their relations with the Soviets” even as relations between Moscow and Cairo deteriorated. In this period, as in others, Arafat and others in Fatah made overtures to Marxist theory and a global struggle against imperialism. Arafat’s framing of Zionism as an extension of global imperialism matched the Communist Party’s official view, that defined Zionism as "militant chauvinism, racism, anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism” (Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1969).**

**Fatah’s political doctrine was a heterodox blend of “Islam [and] Marxism-Leninism [and also] Third World radical nationalism” (Rubin 1994). As Brubaker and Laitin (1998) note, there were often incentives to frame conflicts in “grand ideological terms”, invoking the global struggles against capitalism and imperialism as a means of mobilizing resources. Thus, so ethnic talk did not (and could not) occur between PLO factions and the USSR, other forms of strategic framing may have likely taken place in diplomatic engagements**

**Another Communist state that Fatah established diplomatic contact with was Yugoslavia. Yugoslav documents from this period note that Arafat-traveling under the alias Abu Omar-traveled to Belgrade in 1969 and met with Yugoslav officials from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in an attempt to secure the provision of arms (Batovic). Documents do not indicate that Arafat explicitly framed his appeals in ideological or ethnic terms, however, given the PLO’s statements on the anti-colonial and leftist aspects of their ideology-and the fact that they met with officials from the League of Communists-such framing may have likely taken place. Documents, however, do indicate that Arafat emphasized how the PLO was seeking to “resolve the position of the Palestinian people” through armed conflict rather than through negotiations or third parties (Batovic). Rather than signaling convergent ideological interests, Arafat appears to have explicitly signaled the PLO’s resolve to use costly tactics. As previously described, signaling capabilities and resolve is a common strategy that prospective agents will employ when seeking to gain the support of a principal.**

**Conflict between factions of the PLO within this period hampered Fatah’s diplomatic efforts with Yugoslavia. Internecine strife nearly caused Yugoslav officials to postpone a Fatah delegation’s visit in 1969 (Batovic). Other factors, such as Yugoslavia’s concern that too close a tie to the PLO could alienate it from more conservative Arab countries, served as obstacles in this period.**

The first official meeting between President Tito and the Fattah representatives took place in November 1969, during his the visit to Algeria. Two members of the Fattah mission in Algeria met with the President and Nijaz Duraković, a member of the LCY Executive Bureau. They reinforced their request to open a Fattah office in Belgrade and to arrange the delivery of Yugoslav weapons. According to the Fattah, the opening of a mission in Belgrade would increase its influence in Eastern Europe. Arms supply issue was discussed previously with the Yugoslav military attaché in Cairo. Tito agreed with their demands and made it clear that Yugoslavia always helped revolutionary movements around the world, and the Fattah should therefore not be an exception. He also agreed with the opening of the Palestinian Information Bureau in Belgrade and promised to handle it on his return. This was the first favourable reply to the Palestinian attempt to open an office in Belgrade. 39 Fattah's representative reiterated that their goal was the creation of a democratic Palestinian state, but also the liberation of Jews from Zionism. They made a distinction between Jews, whom they regarded as good cohabitants of over 50 years, and Zionism which connected to imperialism and colonialism. They wanted a free Palestine as a home for Jews, Arabs and Christians, and also made it very clear that they have no intention of throwing Jews into the sea. They were not interested in a particular Arab country, but only the best interest of Palestinians.

Mirko Aksentijević, Tanjug’s correspondent from the Middle East, spent a month in May in 1970 in the PLO camps in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. His writing offers a good overview of the change in the nature of Palestinian struggle, but also in the change of Yugoslav attitude towards it. The main issue noticed by Aksentijević was the process of unification of different Palestinian groups. There were around 40 disunited and inefficient groups in 1968. By 1970 they were integrated into 12 organisations, the majority of which were active within the PLO. The biggest and most influential organisation in the PLO was the Fattah, followed by ten other smaller organisations, and the general orientation of the movement was arms struggle. They were against the nature of Zionism in its aggressiveness, and unwillingness to compromise and negotiate. The PLO was purely a nationalistic, not a class movement, and it was not based in one country, but within one People who were expelled from their own country. The PLO’s main goal was therefore to liberate Palestine and to return to it. Considering the nature of Israel, no one believed a peaceful solution was viable, and a war was therefore inevitable

By 1971 the Yugoslav feelings for the Palestinian struggle had become much more favourable. The Palestinian demand for arms supply was granted, but only on commercial basis, and not as a donation. Material help from Yugoslavia included purchasing military equipment through Yugoslav export company Yugoimport, shipping medical supplies, including a fully equipped mobile medical unit, medical treatment of wounded Palestinians in Yugoslav hospitals, education grants for Palestinian students in Yugoslavia.44 At the same time, contacts were established between the Yugoslav Unions Federation and the Jordanian Labour Federation, that represented the Palestinians; Yugoslav Red Cross and the Palestinian Red Crescent; Yugoslav and Palestinian Student Unions; Yugoslav information agency Tanjug and Palestinian News Agency Wafa, etc. 45 The same year, following a visit of an official PLO delegation headed by Husam Hatib and Abu Lottof, members of the PLO leadership, the Yugoslav authorities finally accepted the request to open the PLO Information Bureau in Belgrade. Suleiman Taufik was the first head of the Bureau.46

 **What of Fatah efforts to reach out to populations in Arab states with the intent of gaining support?** In the years between 1967 and 1972, Fatah was able to attract and manage more recruits after 1967 than other Palestinian groups, due largely in part to resources granted by external supporters that enhanced their political and economic capacity. As Mishal (1986) maintains, this group entertained support from Egypt as well as “solid and continuing logistical backing from the Algerians, the Chinese, and the Syrians”. **Even while receiving support from Arab governments, Fatah presented itself as an alternative to these states’ inability to defeat Israel. As Miller (1983) evinces, “The guerillas offered Arabs and Palestinians alike a chance to regain self-respect and to create the “new Arab man”.**

 **However, as Kirisci (1986) notes, the period**

 **In light of this, what diplomatic actions did Fatah take?**

 **Fatah’s diplomatic efforts were conducted both through direct and indirect means. As evinced in the preceding paragraphs, Arafat and other Fatah officials made direct contact with states from whom they sought to receive material and diplomatic support. However, “indirect diplomacy” was facilitated both through Arab governments and through multilateral forums. During this period, Arab states such as Egypt and Algeria facilitated meetings between PLO leaders and other states as well as international organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement and Organization of African Unity (Kirsici 1986).**

 **In 1968,**

 **In 1970, the PLO was expelled from Jordan during that year’s “Black September”. Clashes between Palestinian *Fedayeen* and Jordanian security forces were common as more and more Palestinian guerillas launched raids from inside the kingdom, organized their own “state within a state”, and posed a threat to Jordanian sovereignty. Though, as Miller (1983) notes, the debacle that this ultimately resulted in “left the Palestinian movement divided, embittered, and with a host of organizational problems”, we would be remiss to let the outcome of PLO activity in Jordan shape our assessment of the processes that ultimately lead up to it: and the role of rebel lobbying in said processes.**

 **Palestinian groups were active in engaging in recruiting activities among the Palestinian refugee populations in Jordan, Lebanon and other Arab states. After the Cairo Accord of 1969, the constituent factions of the PLO were permitted to establish social, economic, and legal institutions in refugee camps. Not only did the PLO serve as governing force in the refugee camps, but as one that “[promoted] a collective political and national identity among the exiled Palestinians” (Hanafi and Long 2010).**

 **Fatah’s diplomatic efforts were constrained both by Palestinian institutions and international institutions. [EXPAND] These institutional constraints affected the content and quality of these diplomatic appeals.**

 **Let us return to our hypotheses. Our first hypothesis posits that rebel groups will be more likely to lobby states whose governments have a similar ethnic composition to their own. We receive mixed support for this hypothesis. Fatah indeed lobbied Arab states for support in this period, and even employed language invoking Arab identity at the time that it did so. However, it also lobbied Communist states such as Yugoslavia and major powers like the Soviet Union. We received a greater amount of support for our second hypothesis, which posits that rebel groups will engage diplomatically among ethnically similar populations. [EXPAND]**

**5.6b: Fatah from 1972-1977**

 From 1972-1977, **Fatah officials continued to pursue rebel diplomacy as a strategy for gaining material and normative goods.**

**Great Powers…**

**Fatah’s diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union continued throughout this period (Kirisci 1986). Arafat visited Moscow in the summer of 1974 and met with members of the Politburo in an effort to ensure the continuation of Soviet support to his forces. We can deduce that Arafat’s diplomatic efforts matched Coggin’s theorization of rebel diplomatic aims (i.e. seeking both material and normative goods): after his visit, Soviet President Podgorny spoke in support of establishing a Palestinian state (Kisirci 1986) However, supply-side forces played a major role in this period as well that may have confounded Fatah’s efforts to lobby for support. *Realpolitik* played an important role in USSR-Palestine relations. During this period, the Soviet Union lost influence in Egypt in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and sought to maintain relations with Palestinian groups as a means of retaining influence in the Middle East. Reppert, however, outlines that both supply and demand side factors influenced this dynamic. Ensuring superpower patronage was a means of furthering the PLO’s aims towards international recognition[[53]](#footnote-53) as well as material and financial support (Reppert 1989). This corroborates Coggins’ and Huang’s outline of rebel diplomatic aims. Likewise,**  Arafat established close diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union’s KGB and Romania’s security services **in this period** (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005).

**Arab States…**

Opposed the rejectionist front

Part of the PLO “mainstream” that announced the six-point program of a establishing a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip at the First meeting of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front that was held in Tripoli, Libya, in November 1977.

 Fatah received support from Arab states such as…

-In a statement released in January, 1973, by the Palestinian National Council, Palestinian leaders called for the establishment of a “national democratic regime in Jordan”, expressing continuing hostility towards the Hashemite monarchy.

-In the same statement, the PNC calls for “the struggle of the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples” to be “[welded]…to the struggle of the Arab nation”. (Documents on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Lukacs)

**Muslim-majority states…**

**Communist states…**

 **In 1974, all ambassadors from Warsaw Pact countries met with Arafat in Damascus (Kirisci 1986).**

 **Though Arafat had previously reached out to the Polish government, it only allowed the PLO to open a diplomatic office in Warsaw in 1976 (Kirisci 1986).**

 **Fatah’s goals, as Kirisci notes, were aimed at bringing attention to their cause at the international level: Arafat’s famous 1974 “gun and olive branch” speech at the United Nations exemplifies this. PLO diplomatic activity in international forums such as the UN, NAM, and OAU somewhat confound Asal et. al (2014)’s assertion that ethnonationalist rebels are less likely to contend for international support as their goals are limited to members of a specific ethnic group.**

**5.6c: Fatah from 1977-1982**

 In the last period that this study examines, Fatah**, as well as other PLO factions, faced harsh endogenous and exogenous political constraints yet continued diplomatic activity.**

**Great Powers…**

 **Fatah continued to engage in diplomatic activity with the Soviet Union in this period. According to a report detailing the proceedings of a 1978 meeting between Arafat and Soviet officials:**

**“Arafat had asked to meet in Moscow for the purpose of consulting with the Soviet leadership on the eve of the Baghdad conference. During the discussions, we adhered to the same well-known policy that had been coordinated with the friends of the socialist community regarding affairs in the Middle East. Evaluating the situation in the Middle East, we emphasized that the American-Israeli-Egyptian deal concluded at Camp David and the separate agreement on Sinai being prepared on its basis constitute a conspiracy at the expense of the fundamental interests of the Arab people. By taking this path, Egyptian President Sadat has thrown a noose on his neck and keeps tightening it at every step. He has betrayed shared Arab interests and openly went over to the camp of those who support Israel” (Wilson Center)**

 **At this meeting, Soviet officials reassured the PLO leader of their commitment to the “progressive forces of the Arab world” (Wilson Center). Though not an Arab state, Arafat nevertheless made multiple references to the goals of “the Arab people” and framed his efforts as being representative and supportive of their interests. This reveals several interesting facts to us. It validates our claim that leaders of ethnic rebel groups utilize ethnic talk in their dialogues with state leaders. Moreover, it shows that rebel diplomats will engage in this behavior even when lobbying governments with whom they do not share an ethnic linkage.**

**Arab States…**

 **On December 4th, 1977, Fatah and the other factions of the PLO called for the formation of “a Steadfastness and Confrontation Front”. The introductory text of this document reads:**

**“*In the name of all the factions, we ratify this unificatory document. In asserting the importance of the relationship of struggle and nationalism between Syria and the Palestinians. The Syrian Arab Republic and the PLO announce the formation of a unified front to face the Zionist enemy and combat the imperialist plot with all its parties and to thwart all attempts at capitulation. The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirnyah and the PDRY (People'.s Democratic Republic of Yemen -South Yemen) have decided to join this front, making it the nucleus a plan-Arab front for steadfastness and combat which will be open to other Arab countries to join*.”**

 **Fatah entertained strong relations with South Yemen during this period. These links appear to be both a function of the PDRY’s Pan-Arab and Socialist ideology and Fatah’s exploitation of it. In 1977, Arafat visited this state and was received in Aden as “Brother Arafat, the President of Palestine” (Halliday). It appears that Fatah’s anti-imperialist and third-worldist inclinations were more salient to Yemen’s leadership in this time period as after his visit foreign ministry officials in Aden announced that “supporting the just cause of national liberation movements, suppressed by Zionist imperialist and racist regimes did not constitute an act of terrorism” (Halliday)**

**Despite their affectations to the decidedly Pan-Arab PDRY,** Fatah had a preference for a “specific” solution to the issue of Palestinian statelessness, reflected in their rhetoric of this period. A statement from Mahmoud Abbas, then a member of the Palestinian Central Committee , to the Qatar News Agency reflected this: “What is important now is to force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and to establish an independent Palestinian state. Only then will the Palestinian people determine their relations [with Arab Countries], taking into consideration the Palestinian people’s interest and those of the Arab nation at same time” (Mishal 1986).  **During this time period, Fatah leaders pushed for the idea of a Palestinian “mini-state” in the West Bank and Gaza rather than a more maximalist design that incorporated the whole of historic Palestine. This goal-designed to enable Fatah to “represent its diplomatic activity as contributing to, or at least not opposing, the PLO struggle for a Palestinian state in the whole of Palestine” without “deviating from official policy” set by the PLO as a whole and by the expectations of Arab states (Mishal 1986). Fatah engaged in public diplomacy[[54]](#footnote-54) in order to convey these aims and win legitimacy on the international level. Though Jones and Mattiacci (2015) outline how rebels use public diplomacy to gain material resources and encourage intervention from outside sponsors, this usage of public diplomacy proves that rebels can seek normative goals as well.**

**Muslim-majority states…**

**Communist states**

**We can see mixed support for our hypotheses in this period. When we engage directly with the historical record, the salience of factors separate from ethnicity-such as ideology-become apparent. Carrying these lessons forward, we can now procede to assess our next case: the PFLP.**

 Fatah received support from…

 Fatah’s rhetoric was directed to…

**5.7 The Case of the PFLP**

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was founded after the Six Day War ended in December, 1967 by George Habash. A revolutionary leftist organization, the PFLP deigned to spread its revolutionary ideals to other states while engaging in armed resistance against Israel. **The PFLP was born of a merger between the Pan-Arabist Arab Nationalist Movement and other groups such as Youth for Revenge and the Palestine Liberation Front (Schweitzer 2011).** **Habash, along with his Arab nationalist comrade Hani al-Hindi, were active in organizing students in Beirut during the late 1950s. The ANM gained a direct link to Egypt’s Pan-Arabist president Gamal Abd El Nasser in the wake of a 1954 massacre of student demonstrators: the survivors, who were expelled from the American University of Beirut, were offered places at Cairo University under a special order from Nasser himself (Cobban 1984). By the start of our period of interest, the ANM had already established itself as an international force. As Cobban notes, they had acquired members in both the Levant and Arabian Peninsula, particularly in South Yemen, where the ANM participated in the fight for independence from Britain. Considered to be Fatah’s chief rival in the period surveyed, the PFLP nevertheless suffered from internal ideological debates, more than one of which lead to groups of fighters breaking away to form their own factions[[55]](#footnote-55).**

**Our period of study begins with the PFLP’s founding, which occurred in the context of structural and ideological changes within the ANM. The group had begun to develop a notable “socialist temper” (Cobban 1984). Likewise, efforts to outbid the already popular Fatah movement had lead it to adopt increasingly violent tactics.**

**The PFLP is noteworthy for bringing the Palestinian cause to worldwide attention through attacking international targets they deemed part of the US-lead “imperialistic world”: airliners, banks, and businesses were all targeted (Schweitzer 2011). How did this tactically innovative group, however, conduct diplomacy? And what role, if any, did ethnicity and nationalism play in their efforts?**

 “The Political, Organizational, and Military Report of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine”, a series of documents released in 1969, provide a useful introduction to the aims and ideology of the PFLP. The first section, the eponymous Political Report, names whom the PFLP considers to be their enemies. In addition to naming Israel, the Zionist movement, and “world imperialism” as their enemies, the PFLP targets “Arab Reaction represented in Feudalism and Capitalism” (Kadi 1969). The authors of the *Report* state that “merchants, bankers, feudal lords, big landowners, kings, princes, and sheikhs” are part of a “force which objectively sides with the enemy”. Though these actors are Arab, the Report continues to state that these “reactionary” forces are “the camp of the enemy which the Arabs are objectively facing in their war for the liberation of Palestine”.

 The *Report* thus provides us with an introduction to the tension and interaction between ethnicity and ideology in the PFLP’s doctrine.

 **In addition to reaching out to states and populations for support, the PFLP was active in making connections with other leftist and nationalist revolutionary movements, including the Italian Red Brigades, the Basque ETA, and the Irish Republican Army (Schweitzer). These linkages also facilitated the recruitment of non-Arab individuals, such as Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as “Carlos the Jackal”, which perhaps indicates a higher level of salience for ideology than for ethnicity. Likewise, time spent lobbying other groups was time not spent lobbying states or populations in accordance with our hypotheses.**

**5.7a: The PFLP from 1967-1972**

 On December 11th, 1967, the PFLP released their founding document, which declared: “The struggle of the Palestinian masses in the occupied territories is an integral part of…the Arab revolution against world imperialism and its collaborating forces”.

**Great Powers…**

 **In the wake of Black September, the Soviet Union sought to contain the crisis to the greatest extent possible. As Dannreuther (1998) evinces, the USSR “in no way wanted the Jordanian monarch to be replaced by a radical Palestinian leadership, including the pro-Chinese George Habash of the PFLP”. Supply-side forces played a key role in determining whom the PFLP targeted for lobbying, particularly the Chinese-Soviet rivalry. Even so, Habash visited the Soviet Union in late 1972, albeit as part of a PLO delegation with Yasser Arafat (Reppert 1989)**

 **China….**

 **In 1970, George Habash visited the People’s Republic of China. However, he received a cooler reception than Arafat and other Fatah leaders. Chinese leaders harbored reservations about the more radical Palestinian factions and the potential strategic risks of providing unconditional support to them, criticizing Habash’s faction for “wrong tactics” (Kirisci 1986)**

 **-Function of supply-side forces such as rivalry between USSR and China**

 **This same year, Habash also visited North Korea.**

**Arab States…**

**Muslim-majority states…**

**Communist states…**

 The PFLP received support from the Soviet Union, China, and several Arab states, including Libya, South Yemen, and Algeria.

The PFLP’s relationship with the Soviet Union

The PFLP’s relationship with China…

-Revisionist Arab states

 The PFLP’s rhetoric was directed to…

Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine (1969)

The PFLP made explicit appeals to the broader Arab world, took advantage of a perceived *zeitgeist*: “The hopes and anticipation of the Arab masses have reached a qualitatively new level from before the fifth of June”. To Mishal (1986), this represented the fact that “the PFLP…subordinated the daily struggle over Palestine to the social and political of the whole Arab world”; that they took “The Arab Revolution Approach” . This is apparent in the ethnically-based appeals they made to the “People of the Arab nation”. The PFLP also emphasized the dialectic of class struggle and proletarian internationalism in their official documents and rhetoric. Their international leftist ideology played as much as-if not a more significant role-than their ethnic nationalism. This is evident when one examines the regimes that they considered to be “agents of imperialism” as well as “enemies of the Arab people” (Mishal 1986). The PFLP derided such “reactionary” regimes as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt and Syria. South Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya, however, were deemed acceptable ideological allies. Their ideology lead them to consider other Communist countries and rebel groups allies and potential patrons as natural allies and providers of support, particularly China.

 The PFLP utilized frame extension in their rhetoric…

 **The PFLP suffered political constraints in this period due to intra-group ideological conflict. In 1968, Nayef Hawatmeh, one of the original founders of the PFLP, broke away from the faction to form his own, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Hawatmeh favored a stronger alliance with the Soviet Union and a more staunch ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism in opposition to the PFLP’s perceived Petty-Bourgeois tendencies (Miller 1983). In the same year, Ahmed Jibril, another PFLP leader, broke away to form the PFLP-GC (General Command), which favored an explicitly pro-Syrian position.**

 **Arafat also served to constrain the PFLP in this period (Miller 30)**

**5.7: The PFLP from 1972-1977**

From 1972-1977, the PFLP…

**At the end of this time period, the PFLP became embroiled in the Lebanese Civil War. While at the start of the war Fatah attempted to remain neutral and mediate between the different Lebanese sects, the PFLP saw this conflict as “a rightist, imperialist conspiracy to destroy “the Palestinian and Lebanese revolutions” (Miller 1983). Habbash saw Arafat’s more moderate position as inviting defeat at the hands of Lebanese Maronite Christians and their Syrian allies. Ultimately, Syria did intervene in Lebanon in 1976 and struck hard against the PFLP as well as other PLO factions[[56]](#footnote-56). Likewise, Habbash’s room to politically maneuver was severely reduced by the intra-PLO fallout that resulted from Egypt’s 1977 peace accords with Israel. Arafat attempted to avoid a complete break with the Egyptian government, which resulted in the PFLP, DFLP and other factions distancing themselves from him politically.**

**Without support from other PLO organizations, the PFLP thus faced a severe internal constraint on its diplomatic activity. Likewise, the Lebanon imbroglio imposed severe costs on it the organization both in terms of wealth and manpower.**

**Great Powers…**

**Arab States…**

**Muslim-majority states…**

**Communist states…**

The PFLP entertained close relations with the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s. The USSR provided financial support, weapons[[57]](#footnote-57) training to PFLP operatives and underwrote some of their largest operations, such as the 1975 raid on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005). The leader of their armed wing, Wadie Haddad, was the key to this relationship. However, rebel diplomatic efforts were not directly responsible for this: the KGB recruited Haddad in 1970 as an asset (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005). Instead, as Saideman (2002) and Salehyan (2011) theorized, this is an example of a patron seeking out a rebel group rather than vice versa.

 The PFLP’s calculated EPrS was a function of two related factors in this period: its membership in the Rejectionist Front and its participation in the Lebanese Civil War.

Joined rejectionist front in 1974

 Rebel diplomacy was not a significant part of the PFLP’s strategy in this period. This is a product of two endogenous factors: its fractured internal politics and its penetration by external state actors. As Pearlman (2011) notes: “Though any nonstate actor is vulnerable to interference, the more cohesive it is, the more impenetrable its internal decision-making processes and political-strategic position will be. The more fragmented, the more outside actors will be able to manipulate persons or factions within the movement to act as their proxies”. This phenomenon is evident through the KGB’s recruiting of Wadie Haddad and the USSR’s underwriting of PFLP operations. The PFLP’s internal politics in this period helped bring this state of affairs about.

**5.7c: The PFLP from 1977-1982**

 **As previously evinced, the PFLP joined the other factions of the PLO to sign the Six-Point Program announcing the creation of a “Steadfastness and Rejection Front”. Like other documents released by the PLO, it was the result of much internecine debate and compromise over rhetoric. Even despite the institutional constraints that it faced, the PFLP managed to benefit from this diplomatic act. First, the PFLP’s “Arab revolution” approach was officially endorsed in the document’s 10th article:**

**“*The conference pledges to the Arab nation that it will continue the march of struggle, steadfastness, combat and adherence to the objectives of the Arab struggle. The conference also expresses its deep faith and absolute confidence that the Arab nation, which has staged revolutions, overcome difficulties and defeated plots during its long history of struggle-a struggle which abounds with heroism is today capable of replying with force to those who have harmed its dignity, squandered its rights, split its solidarity and departed from the principles of its struggle. It is confident of its own capabilities in liberation, progress and victory, thanks to God”.***

 **The document also secured the cooperation of radical Arab states who historically cooperated with the PFLP, such as South Yemen, Libya, and Algeria. Article six states:**

**“*In asserting the importance of the relationship of struggle and nationalism between Syria and the Palestinians. The Syrian Arab Republic and the PLO announce the formation of a unified front to face the Zionist enemy and combat the imperialist plot with all its parties and to thwart all attempts at capitulation. The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirnyah and the PDRY (People'.s Democratic Republic of Yemen -South Yemen) have decided to join this front, making it the nucleus a plan-Arab front for steadfastness and combat which will be open to other Arab countries to join*.”**

 **However, as with other acts of Palestinian rebel diplomatic engagements, the rhetoric may have overstated its true degree of success. The last sentence of the document praises “Palestinian unity within the framework of the PLO”. However as we have clearly seen, relations between PLO factions were often contentious.**

**Great Powers…**

**Arab States…**

**Muslim-majority states…**

**Communist states…**

The PFLP received support from…

 The PFLP’s rhetoric was directed to…

**5.8: Results and Confounding Factors**

To reiterate, these case studies were intended to test the following hypotheses:

H1: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's population will lobby the state using ethnically-based language

H2: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of a state’s government will lobby the state using ethnically-based language

Likewise, our variables are as follows:

IVs:

A) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s ruling coalition to a rebel group

B) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s population to a rebel group

DV:

1. The usage of ethnic appeals within rebel diplomatic efforts

**5.9a: Hypothesis 1**

**5.9b: Hypothesis 2**

However, as previously evinced, some factors can lead to variation in our dependent variable: rebel groups may not always use ethnic appeals, even in the presence of ethnically-similar states .

Graphically, our results can be depicted as follows:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Group Name** | 1967-1972 | 1972-1977 | 1977-1982 |
| Fatah | Ethnic Talk and Non-Ethnic Framing[[58]](#footnote-58) |   |  Ethnic Talk  |
| PFLP | Ethnic Talk  | No Ethnic Talk |  |

 **When compared with Kirisci’s (1986) conceptualizations of support for the PLO as a multi-step function or as occurring across levels, PLO rebel diplomacy did not directly mirror either of these propositions. Palestinian groups lobbied actors from many of these levels simultaneously rather than working their way up an arbitrary “ladder” of relevancy. The theoretical processes that Kirisci describes appear to have been better at explaining the behavior of the actors that were lobbied by the PLO rather than the PLO actors who chose to lobby them in the first place.**

**5.9c: Comparison with Expected Results of the Model**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Group Name** | EPRS67-72 | TCD67-72 | CL67-72 | EPRS72-77 | TCD72-77 | CL72-77 | EPRS77-82 | TCD77-82 | CL77-82 |
| Fatah |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PFLP |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ba’athists |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**5.9d: Confounding Factors**

 **One possible reason that we failed to see the expected level of ethnically-based appeals in our case studies is because of the time period selected. Factors such as the 1961 collapse of the United Arab Republic, the defeat of Arab armies in 1967, and the death of Gamal Abd El Nasser in 1970 weakened the influence of Arabism among Palestinians. If we were to change our period of analysis to include the 1950s and early 1960s, we would likely witness different results. [EXPAND]**

The importance of strategic rivalry and military confound this relationship. Delegation to Palestinian armed groups as a form of “war by other means” against Israel was one of the driving factors behind Arab states’ behavior and may have even had greater salience than ethnic linkages at times. After the 1948 war, Arab states allowed *Fedayeen* to conduct reprisal raids from their territory and consistently provided arms and support throughout the mid-20th century. Signals of military success also were influential. For example, the successes of the raids on Kiryat Shmona and Ma’alot in the early 1970s by the PFLP-GC served as a costly signal of their resolve and won them additional support from the Libyan and Iraqi regimes.

The internal political dynamics of Arab states had a strong, if uneven confounding effect In the years after 1948, these states attempted to confound Palestinian refugees’ efforts to organize politically within their borders: in 1949, for example, Jordan banned Palestinian social organizations from political activity and, fearing secessionism, Egyptian authorities cracked down on Palestinian Ba’athists and Islamists in Gaza during the 1950s.The security fears of Arab regimes, as previously evinced, drove some Palestinian groups to alter their diplomatic efforts. Fatah, arguably the largest and most influential of the PLO’s factions, had to engage in framing that presented itself a legitimate supporter of Arab nationalist ideals, yet within a distinctly Palestinian framework; after 1969, it referred to “the liberation of Palestine” rather than “ending Israeli occupation” (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1973). A statement from Fateh spokesman Hani Al-Hassan notes: “We in Fatah have learned that the Arab nation will not embark on the course of struggle and cannot change its conditions unless it practices revolutionary mutiny…Revolutionary struggle as we view it is the only way for the recreation of the Arab nation, the reformation of its soul, and the reactivation of the Arab masses”. Thus, it can be seen that groups like Fateh still appealed to broader Arab nationalism even while they sought more limited objectives. Likewise, the PLO is something of a unique case among rebel movements, as it was created in a 1964 meeting of the Arab League as a “Potemkin village” controlled by Arab states (Barnett, 1998). This was rooted in concern over costs from supporting Palestinian actions against Israel: the creation and backing of the PLO was an endeavor far less costly than direct military engagement. The high level of external penetration by Arab states from the very outset ,ay have a strong impact on the results we saw.

The internal dynamics of the Palestinian national movement also greatly influenced how and from whom its constituent groups sought support. Particularly after the “Black September” conflict of 1970 , they Yom Kippur War, and the PLO’s Ten Point Program (which was perceived by hardliners as limiting the liberation of Palestinian territory) divisions between the Marxist, *qawmiyya*-oriented factions and more mainstream nationalists like Fatah were exacerbated, which ultimately led to the creation of the Rejectionist Front in 1974. The constituent factions of the Front, the largest of which was the PFLP, pursued an independent diplomatic agenda targeted at revisionist Arab states like Libya and Syria. As Pearlman (2014) notes, analyzing the Palestinian national movement as a singular entity is a difficult, if not fruitless endeavor, due to the number of discrete factions within it with often divergent motives.

**Differing ideological currents within the PLO made its internal politics continuously contentious. Pan-Arab *qawmiyya* and Palestinian *wataniyya* clashed, and the Marxist views of groups such as the PFLP and DFLP made Arafat’s decision-making hard to enforce despite his efforts to present the PLO as a unified force (Rubin 1994). Smaller factions within the PLO, such as the previously surveyed Ba’athist groups, also confounded Arafat’s vision.**

e can nevertheless ascertain that the PLO acted as a unitary actor at times when pursuing state support in a few cases, as some Arab states provided the whole organization with support (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1973). However, as previously evinced, there is a fundamental issue with analyzing support for a *movement* rather than a discrete *group*. Let us return to the previously presented equation[[59]](#footnote-59).

L iff PrS-TCD-CL>0

If we apply this equation to a movement that consists of multiple groups, the value of TC(D) and C(L) become divisible. This presupposes that the movement is:

1. A unitary actor
2. Seeks to become the future governing coalition of the polity it seeks to control
3. The factions of the movement are able to credibly commit to a plan to divide diplomatic and governmental responsibility

If the movement fails to meet these factors, then the bargaining environment between its rebel diplomats and potential patrons will be significantly altered. Indeed, if a movement is weak or disunited, it could provide an opportunity for states to play a more coercive role in the diplomatic process. Huang (Forthcoming)) notes that states can use the offer of diplomatic engagement to influence the behavior of rebel groups. In his study of militant groups in Kashmir, Staniland (2014) notes that the pre-existing weaknesses of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) provided opportunities for penetration and interference by both Pakistan and India. In the case of the PLO, different Arab states founded and backed proxy factions within the movement. Seeking to create a Ba’athist alternative to Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, the Syrian government created *as-Sa’iqa* (“the thunderbolt”) in 1966. Iraq followed a similar course of action three years later with the creation of the Arab Liberation Front. Though officially a part of the PLO, Sa’iqa was forced to fight against other constituent factions of the movement during the Lebanese Civil War. This group, clearly a tool of the Syrian government for enacting its interests, is a clear example of state exploitation of a rebel movement. Thus, if we are to judge the PLO as a whole, it does not meet any of the aforementioned categories. Even though a strategy of ethnic talk could raise the movement’s EPr(S), the associated costs and credible commitment problems would nullify attempts at unified diplomatic engagement. This explains why individual factions of the movement pursued their own diplomatic agendas using differing framing devices in their appeals.

The strategic employment of ideological, rather than ethnic framing also confounds this relationship. This can be seen in the DFLP (then PDFLP)’s rebel diplomatic efforts with the Soviet Union. This group framed itself in Marxist terms and “Strove to assert itself as the principal Soviet ally within the PLO” (Sayigh, 1997). This form of framing was strategically employed in the 1960s, and sought to play into Soviet third-worldist” foreign policy. **The assertion that rebel groups can draw upon multiple frames of reference is substantiated in multiple bodies of literature. [EXPAND]**

**Our time period of analysis may also have influenced our results. The defeat of Arab armies in 1967 significantly affected the salience of Pan-Arab ideology to the PLO’s constituent factions, which likely had a significant effect on their usage of language invoking Arab identities-or lack thereof. Even so, the autonomy of said groups grew during this time period, due in part to the fact that until 1967 Gamal Abd El Nasser (who was largely responsible for the PLO’s actions during its earliest years) had placed stringent restrictions on Palestinian political activity (Cobban 1984).**

 Perhaps the most important confounding factor, though, was diaspora support for Palestinian armed groups. As Asal et. al (2014) note,

**Chapter Six: Conclusion**

**6.1** **Summary of Results**

This study finds that rebel groups will…

**6.2 Opportunities for Future Research**

Though well substantiated, this work is only the first to be written on the subject of Ethnic Talk. Thus, there is substantial room for future research on this topic.

First, there is an opportunity to continue to elucidate the role of ethnicity in rebels’ transnational political activities. Both this work and Asal et. al (2014) provide a solid foundation for such endeavors, yet several important questions remain unanswered. Do ethnic linkages change the amount of support that groups receive or the nature (financial, material, military) that they receive?

Lastly, improvements can-and should-be made to the existing data on civil war. [EXPAND]

 This work intends to start a scholarly conversation on a topic of deep salience to both the academic study of conflict and the efforts of policymakers to contain it.

**\**

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**APPENDIX**

1. Hale cites Weber (1978) to identify these categories: “ perceptions of common descent, history, fate, and culture,

which usually indicates some mix of language, physical appearance, and the

ritual regulation of life, especially religion” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Such as Carment and James 1995, 1997, Davis and Moore, 1997, and many others [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The ELF “measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the overall population belong to different ethnic groups” (Bossert, D’Ambrosia, and La Ferrara 2005) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. “Little house” in Kinyarwarda: the clan-centric oligarchs that surrounded Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2002) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. This ties directly to Fearon (1994)’s concept of audience costs [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The role of such *realpolitik* aims are a distinct confounding factor this work’s theory, and will be discussed later [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. In order to conceptually define what an “insurgent group” is, we follow Staniland (2014)’s definition: “a group of individuals claiming to be a collective organization that uses a name to designate itself, is made up of formal structures of command and control, and intends to seize political power using violence”. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Raucchaus details how supported groups who are adversely selected can engage in atrocities [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) provide another intellectual starting point for this in framing the state-rebel relationship as one of supply and demand [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Asterisks indicate ethnic rebel groups [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Jones and Mattiacci note: “Public diplomacy allows rebels to shape foreign perceptions

of the potential benefits of intervention by framing their own beliefs and preferences

as commensurate with those of foreign audiences” [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See Fazal (2014) for further insight on rebel behavior [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Leftist rebel groups linking their local struggles to broader struggles against colonialism and imperialism provide an example of this [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Such affectations are a key variable in this work [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See… [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. See Hale (2004) and Anderson (1983) [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. In ethnic conflict [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Emphasis mine [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. L=Lobby iff=If and only if Pr*S*=Probability of lobbying success *TC*D=Total transaction costs of rebel diplomacy *C*L=Local legitimacy costs [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. See Turner (1991). I follow Asal et. al (2014) in maintain that rebels are instrumentally rational actors. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See Collier and Hoeffler (2004) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. For more literature on rebel governance, see Kalyvas (2006) and Staniland (2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Their survey experiments were conducted in the West Bank [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. See the example of the PLO soliciting support from The Soviet Union and China [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. A term from McCarthy and Zald (1977) [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Foreign Terrorist Organization [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. In Salehyan et. al (2011): regression coefficient of .962, significant at p<.05 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. The “sender” of the signal [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. In other strategic interactions, rebels may want to signal their resolve to the state, and thus have the types “resolute” and “irresolute” [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. For the purposes of the game, not using ethnic talk will be considered a signal rather than the absence of a signal [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. See appendix (to be added) [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. See Zahavi 1977 [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. See \*\*\*\* [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. These years were selected as they mark the year that the PLO was founded and the start of the Lebanese Civil War. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Run by the author in SPSS [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Khalidi and others note the importance of this event as part of the formation of Palestinian national identity [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Selected based on permanent UN Security Council membership as a proxy for major power status [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Selected based on a simple random sample of Arab states that existed between 1967-1982 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Selected by a simple random sample of Muslim countries that existed between 1967-1982 [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Selected based on a simple random sample of Communist states that existed between 1967-1982 [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Ways of perceiving one or one’s state’s role in the world in the broadest sense [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. See Dannreuther (1998) [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Dataset included in appendix [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. “Palestinians have moreover stressed their commonality, rather than distinctiveness, of culture with neighboring Arab societies, with which they share language, religion, social custom, and family ties” (Sayigh, 1997) [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. “Collective memories, perceptions of common injustice, and the sense of belonging to a particular territory provided a basis for turning a latent collectivity into a community, and set Palestinians apart from other Arabs, with whom language, religion, and culture were shared” (Sayigh, 1997) [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. The Political Department [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. See [SOURCES] [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Alternatively, “national states” (Sayigh, 1997) [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. “National” as in “wataniyya” nationalism [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. “Harakat al-Watanniya li-Tahrir Filastin” [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. In early 1969, the USSR sponsored a peace proposal that guaranteed Palestinian refugees the right to return to their homes [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Likewise see Coggins (2011) for more information on the role of great powers in recognizing rebel groups’ claims to statehood [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. As Jones and Mattiacci (2015) detail [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. A notable case of this way Nayif Hawatmeh’s 1969 split to form the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Save for al-Saiqa, a pro-Syrian Ba’athist faction [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Small arms, rocket propelled grenades, mines and other explosives, and ammunition [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Such framing as ideological, religious or other framing strategies, e.g. framing conflict in leftist terms when lobbying Communist states [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. L=Lobby iff=If and only if Pr*S*=Probability of lobbying success *TC*D=Total transaction costs of rebel diplomacy *C*L=Local legitimacy costs [↑](#footnote-ref-59)